254th Infantry Regiment- Page 3
| Contents |
The following is the story of two significant battles the 254th Infantry was
involved with during the period 20 January - 1 February 1945. They were to
be known as the Battle of Hill 216 and the Battle of Jebsheim, France. For
their part in these battles, the 2d Battalion, 254th received a Presidential Unit
Citation for Jebsheim and the regiment earned a Presidential Unit Citation
and a French Croix de Guerre with Palm for their battle successes.
HILL 216: At last, after three weeks of mastering the defensive arts, we
were assigned an offensive mission.--We were to take Hill 216. Field Order
1, issued on 20 January 1945, indicated the plans of the Regimental
Commander for the seizure of this well defended knoll. The First Battalion
was designated assault element and assigned a thousand yard front extending
from a point south of Mittelwihr, eastward from the easterly power line. The
battalion, two companies in a line, was to push forward to the north bank of
the Weiss River and establish defensive positions from the junction of this
stream and the power line eastward to the Fecht River and thence northward
to the highway bridge. An outpost line was to be pushed forward from the
Weiss River to a distance of some thousand yards south of the main
disposition while the bridge was to be secured by not less than one platoon.
During this action, the Second Battalion was to continue to hold its defensive
position facing eastward along the Fecht River. The Third Battalion was to
stand by in regimental reserve, although Company L was assigned the
mission of patrolling and outposting to the front upon the attainment of the
Weiss River line. Two days before the attack was to be made, the First and
Third Battalions were released from their defense positions and brought to
rear areas west of Mittelwihr for training. Here we were briefed on the task
which awaited us. We found on the map that Hill 216 was located
south-west of the Alsatian town of Bennwihr, about four miles north of
Colmar. We knew that there were strongly prepared positions on the flanks
of the hill and a reinforced defensive arc running generally parallel to the
Bennwihr-Ingersheim Road.
Although there was some tension as the time for the attack drew nearer, a
great deal of this was dissipated as we became "armchair strategists:.
Around each map a group of us would gather and a mild discussion would
begin; soon, however, fists would pound the table as each of us realized that
the rest of those present had no understanding of what really should be done.
The endangering of the flank in our planned zone of advance by the
powerfully held German stronghold of chateau de Schoppenwihr became the
major argument. Those who believed the attack of the 7th Infantry (3rd Inf
Div) in their zone would command the attention of the defenders disputed
with the more pessimistic of us. All preferred to forget that twice before the
hill had been unsuccesfully attacked by other units.
During the early morning hours of 23 January, the First Battalion (Less C
Company in reserve) marched from the assembly area near Beblenheim to
the line of departure. It was still snowing and a bitter north wind seemed to
tear unhampered through combat pants and layers of sweaters ending in field
jackets. Our new shoe-pacs were warm but uncomfortable to walk in, even
on the soft snow, nevertheless we were thankful for them. As we moved
along the narrow road to the line of departure we looked like a column of
hooded ghosts in our snow capes. Company B led the column and
proceeded to the eastern half of the battalion front. A Company followed to
the western half. At fifteen minutes before "H" hour, 0700, the 3rd Division
as well as the organizational and attached artillery began firing a preparation.
We lay in the snow and watched as the big shells flashed against the snow
clad hill. As we saw the destruction rained on whatever was out there
waiting, we remembered what the 3rd Division doughs had told us. "An
Infantryman may be the hero to a lot of people, but when you're ready to
shove off in the attack, the artilleryman is the hero's hero". Minds and bodies
became tense as we awaited the signal to move forward. We had seen some
of war but always it had been we who awaited the enemy in our defensive
positions; now it was his turn to wait in a hole, ours to attack. For the Nth
time we checked the bolt on our rifle, or adjusted the weight of our mortar
ammunition, or made sure our K-rations were properly tied to our
equipment.
"OK, let's go!" Before we knew it we were moving forward, a lot of the
tenseness had left us, and we had begun our first combat attack. Silently and
unseen we moved through the deep snow, our capes blending in perfectly
with the world of white which surrounded us. For a few moments after we
heard the dull explosions and saw our comrades lying on the ground, we did
not realize what was happening. No shell scream, no mortar whistle
accompanied the burst. Then our minds began to work once more and we
recognized the barrier the crafty Germans had erected--a field of the tiny,
foot-shearing Schu-mines. The heavy snow fall of the preceding days
coupled with brisk winds had perfectly hidden the mines and the footprints of
the soldiers who laid them. Together the two companies began to cross the
minefield , in the only way that a minefield can be crossed--slowly, grimly,
probing each step before moving, with a foot or a leg or a life the penalty for
a misstep. The explosions of the mines alerted the waiting Germans and
mortar fire began to pour into the minefield. This was clearly directed from
the top of the hill and came from weapons in the woods south of the Weiss
River. The concentration was extremely heavy and B Company began to
receive large numbers of casualties from this shelling as well as from the
Schu-mines. As the light became better, machine guns opened up from their
positions along the road at the base of Hll 216 while snipers on the northern
slope of the hill aimed their deadly fire on the men picking their way through
the mine=field.
Finally, in order to avoid a direct frontal assault on the positions at the base
of the hill, the company "gave way" to the east and started working
southward with its left flank about five hundred yards west of the river. Fire
came in increasing intensity from the Chateau de Schoppenwihr and from the
woods along the Fecht River--small arms, machine guns, and 88's. Pinned
down by this curtain of fire the advance of the company after 0800 was
tortuously slow. So heavy was the resistance and so high the casualties that
at 1000 it was decided to employ Company C on the left flank. A
Company, on the battalion right flank, was making better progress. Although
many men fell from the Schu-mines, the mortar shells consistently dropped
behind the advancing units. As the companies neared the top of the hill,
machine gun, machine pistol, and rifle fire became devastating in its accuracy.
Courage in the face of superior fire power coupled with heavy small arms,
machine gun and mortar fire poured into the German positions on the north
slope of the hill forced the enemy to vacate this position. By 0900 A
Company had reached the crest, the first platoon in the lead, the second in
echelon to the left rear and the third following shortly behind. When the units
crossed the peak they found enemy dug in on the south slope. Even more
intense fire than they had received from the north slope met them here as
they began again to work their way through another thickly sown minefield.
Direct fire from small arms and machine guns in the wooded area south of
the Weiss river added to the torrent of fire which the determined Germans
threw in an effort to halt the attack. Casualties mounted as men fell from the
exploding shells, the accurate small arms, and the fiendish Schu-mines.
Nevertheless, the company continued to advance and by 1230 had reached
the east-west road on the southern face of Hill 216. Between this position
and the river there was an open field, undoubtedly mined and swept by
direct fire from the woods along the Weiss River. Considerably depleted by
casualties, the company found further advance to be impossible and the unit
commenced digging in.
Company C, in reserve in Mittelwihr, was alerted at 1000 and by noon, the
line of departure used by the other companies earlier in the morning was
crossed. Sniper and machine gun fire from the Chateau and the woods
below it were received almost immediately, By the time Company C had
worked down to B Company's former position, the latter unit had pushed
forward. A group of riflemen had inched toward the machine gun nests and
silenced the guns and B Company was moving forward again. As they came
to the east-west road, the second platoon spread to the right to gain contact
with A Company, while a small group from the first platoon, following the
edge of a vineyard pushed toward the Weiss River. Contact was made with
A Company by B Company's second platoon at 1430. The other platoon
pulled to the west of the north-south road and using an abandoned enemy
CP formed a defensive line facing east. the leading element of C Company
had not proceeded far along this road before it met B Company's group
returning from the river, still under small arms fire. C Company, therefore,
built up a defensive line east of the road facing the Fecht River. At about
1400 it became apparent that the now depleted First Battalion without
assistance would be unable to reach the Weiss river before dark. the Third
Battalion was alerted and moved out at 1650. Only two rifle companies
were available to that unit for the operation. Company I remaining in
regimental reserve. In addition, K was short one platoon which had been
employed since early morning on the First Battalion's left flank and was still
pinned down by fire from the Chateau. Leaving the assembly area near
Beblenheim, I and K Company proceeded along the east side of the
Bennwihr-Ingersheim road between the two power lines. The advance of
both units was slowed down considerably by a mine field encountered on the
approach march. Probing their way through this under continued small arms
and machine gun fire, I Company proceeded, under intense fire from the
south bank of the Weiss River, to the junction of the eastern power line and
the stream. Here, after extending eastward, the men dug in at about 1900.
HILL 216 BATTLE (CONTINUED) 254th Infantry Regiment-
Page 4
involved with during the period 20 January - 1 February 1945. They were to
be known as the Battle of Hill 216 and the Battle of Jebsheim, France. For
their part in these battles, the 2d Battalion, 254th received a Presidential Unit
Citation for Jebsheim and the regiment earned a Presidential Unit Citation
and a French Croix de Guerre with Palm for their battle successes.
HILL 216: At last, after three weeks of mastering the defensive arts, we
were assigned an offensive mission.--We were to take Hill 216. Field Order
1, issued on 20 January 1945, indicated the plans of the Regimental
Commander for the seizure of this well defended knoll. The First Battalion
was designated assault element and assigned a thousand yard front extending
from a point south of Mittelwihr, eastward from the easterly power line. The
battalion, two companies in a line, was to push forward to the north bank of
the Weiss River and establish defensive positions from the junction of this
stream and the power line eastward to the Fecht River and thence northward
to the highway bridge. An outpost line was to be pushed forward from the
Weiss River to a distance of some thousand yards south of the main
disposition while the bridge was to be secured by not less than one platoon.
During this action, the Second Battalion was to continue to hold its defensive
position facing eastward along the Fecht River. The Third Battalion was to
stand by in regimental reserve, although Company L was assigned the
mission of patrolling and outposting to the front upon the attainment of the
Weiss River line. Two days before the attack was to be made, the First and
Third Battalions were released from their defense positions and brought to
rear areas west of Mittelwihr for training. Here we were briefed on the task
which awaited us. We found on the map that Hill 216 was located
south-west of the Alsatian town of Bennwihr, about four miles north of
Colmar. We knew that there were strongly prepared positions on the flanks
of the hill and a reinforced defensive arc running generally parallel to the
Bennwihr-Ingersheim Road.
Although there was some tension as the time for the attack drew nearer, a
great deal of this was dissipated as we became "armchair strategists:.
Around each map a group of us would gather and a mild discussion would
begin; soon, however, fists would pound the table as each of us realized that
the rest of those present had no understanding of what really should be done.
The endangering of the flank in our planned zone of advance by the
powerfully held German stronghold of chateau de Schoppenwihr became the
major argument. Those who believed the attack of the 7th Infantry (3rd Inf
Div) in their zone would command the attention of the defenders disputed
with the more pessimistic of us. All preferred to forget that twice before the
hill had been unsuccesfully attacked by other units.
During the early morning hours of 23 January, the First Battalion (Less C
Company in reserve) marched from the assembly area near Beblenheim to
the line of departure. It was still snowing and a bitter north wind seemed to
tear unhampered through combat pants and layers of sweaters ending in field
jackets. Our new shoe-pacs were warm but uncomfortable to walk in, even
on the soft snow, nevertheless we were thankful for them. As we moved
along the narrow road to the line of departure we looked like a column of
hooded ghosts in our snow capes. Company B led the column and
proceeded to the eastern half of the battalion front. A Company followed to
the western half. At fifteen minutes before "H" hour, 0700, the 3rd Division
as well as the organizational and attached artillery began firing a preparation.
We lay in the snow and watched as the big shells flashed against the snow
clad hill. As we saw the destruction rained on whatever was out there
waiting, we remembered what the 3rd Division doughs had told us. "An
Infantryman may be the hero to a lot of people, but when you're ready to
shove off in the attack, the artilleryman is the hero's hero". Minds and bodies
became tense as we awaited the signal to move forward. We had seen some
of war but always it had been we who awaited the enemy in our defensive
positions; now it was his turn to wait in a hole, ours to attack. For the Nth
time we checked the bolt on our rifle, or adjusted the weight of our mortar
ammunition, or made sure our K-rations were properly tied to our
equipment.
"OK, let's go!" Before we knew it we were moving forward, a lot of the
tenseness had left us, and we had begun our first combat attack. Silently and
unseen we moved through the deep snow, our capes blending in perfectly
with the world of white which surrounded us. For a few moments after we
heard the dull explosions and saw our comrades lying on the ground, we did
not realize what was happening. No shell scream, no mortar whistle
accompanied the burst. Then our minds began to work once more and we
recognized the barrier the crafty Germans had erected--a field of the tiny,
foot-shearing Schu-mines. The heavy snow fall of the preceding days
coupled with brisk winds had perfectly hidden the mines and the footprints of
the soldiers who laid them. Together the two companies began to cross the
minefield , in the only way that a minefield can be crossed--slowly, grimly,
probing each step before moving, with a foot or a leg or a life the penalty for
a misstep. The explosions of the mines alerted the waiting Germans and
mortar fire began to pour into the minefield. This was clearly directed from
the top of the hill and came from weapons in the woods south of the Weiss
River. The concentration was extremely heavy and B Company began to
receive large numbers of casualties from this shelling as well as from the
Schu-mines. As the light became better, machine guns opened up from their
positions along the road at the base of Hll 216 while snipers on the northern
slope of the hill aimed their deadly fire on the men picking their way through
the mine=field.
Finally, in order to avoid a direct frontal assault on the positions at the base
of the hill, the company "gave way" to the east and started working
southward with its left flank about five hundred yards west of the river. Fire
came in increasing intensity from the Chateau de Schoppenwihr and from the
woods along the Fecht River--small arms, machine guns, and 88's. Pinned
down by this curtain of fire the advance of the company after 0800 was
tortuously slow. So heavy was the resistance and so high the casualties that
at 1000 it was decided to employ Company C on the left flank. A
Company, on the battalion right flank, was making better progress. Although
many men fell from the Schu-mines, the mortar shells consistently dropped
behind the advancing units. As the companies neared the top of the hill,
machine gun, machine pistol, and rifle fire became devastating in its accuracy.
Courage in the face of superior fire power coupled with heavy small arms,
machine gun and mortar fire poured into the German positions on the north
slope of the hill forced the enemy to vacate this position. By 0900 A
Company had reached the crest, the first platoon in the lead, the second in
echelon to the left rear and the third following shortly behind. When the units
crossed the peak they found enemy dug in on the south slope. Even more
intense fire than they had received from the north slope met them here as
they began again to work their way through another thickly sown minefield.
Direct fire from small arms and machine guns in the wooded area south of
the Weiss river added to the torrent of fire which the determined Germans
threw in an effort to halt the attack. Casualties mounted as men fell from the
exploding shells, the accurate small arms, and the fiendish Schu-mines.
Nevertheless, the company continued to advance and by 1230 had reached
the east-west road on the southern face of Hill 216. Between this position
and the river there was an open field, undoubtedly mined and swept by
direct fire from the woods along the Weiss River. Considerably depleted by
casualties, the company found further advance to be impossible and the unit
commenced digging in.
Company C, in reserve in Mittelwihr, was alerted at 1000 and by noon, the
line of departure used by the other companies earlier in the morning was
crossed. Sniper and machine gun fire from the Chateau and the woods
below it were received almost immediately, By the time Company C had
worked down to B Company's former position, the latter unit had pushed
forward. A group of riflemen had inched toward the machine gun nests and
silenced the guns and B Company was moving forward again. As they came
to the east-west road, the second platoon spread to the right to gain contact
with A Company, while a small group from the first platoon, following the
edge of a vineyard pushed toward the Weiss River. Contact was made with
A Company by B Company's second platoon at 1430. The other platoon
pulled to the west of the north-south road and using an abandoned enemy
CP formed a defensive line facing east. the leading element of C Company
had not proceeded far along this road before it met B Company's group
returning from the river, still under small arms fire. C Company, therefore,
built up a defensive line east of the road facing the Fecht River. At about
1400 it became apparent that the now depleted First Battalion without
assistance would be unable to reach the Weiss river before dark. the Third
Battalion was alerted and moved out at 1650. Only two rifle companies
were available to that unit for the operation. Company I remaining in
regimental reserve. In addition, K was short one platoon which had been
employed since early morning on the First Battalion's left flank and was still
pinned down by fire from the Chateau. Leaving the assembly area near
Beblenheim, I and K Company proceeded along the east side of the
Bennwihr-Ingersheim road between the two power lines. The advance of
both units was slowed down considerably by a mine field encountered on the
approach march. Probing their way through this under continued small arms
and machine gun fire, I Company proceeded, under intense fire from the
south bank of the Weiss River, to the junction of the eastern power line and
the stream. Here, after extending eastward, the men dug in at about 1900.
HILL 216 BATTLE (CONTINUED) 254th Infantry Regiment-
Page 4
| The Battles of Hill 216 and Jebsheim |
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