



*63rd Infantry Division
Blood and Fire*




*63rd Infantry Division
Blood and Fire*



*History of
The 255th Infantry Regiment
63rd Infantry Division
In
World War II*

*Scanned and processed by
Fred Clinton D/254th Inf*



255th Infantry Regiment



Blood and Fire



COR FERREUM (Heart of Steel)



Blue and White are the colors used for Infantry. The wavy partition line denotes the Rhineland. The European wild boar, noted for its courage and fierce fighting qualities, symbolizes the vigorous spirit of the regiment and the European campaign honors awarded during World War II.



Blood and Fire

Battle Honors

Ardennes/Alsace Campaign

Rhineland Campaign

Central Europe Campaign

Combat Infantrymen's Streamer

63rd Infantry Division

255TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
63RD INFANTRY DIVISION

REGIMENTAL HISTORY
255TH INFANTRY REGIMENT
63RD INFANTRY DIVISION
JANUARY THUR MAY, 1945

THE ENCLOSED MATERIAL WAS MADE AVAILABLE BY JOHN R. GRAVES,
H Co., 2ND BN., 255TH INFANTRY REGIMENT, FOR WHICH WE
THANK HIM.

NOTE:

FOR EVENTS IN DECEMBER, 1944, SEE REPORT OF OPERATIONS,
TASK FORCE HARRIS, 63RD INFANTRY DIVISION.

MICHAEL BAYMOR
HQ & HQC 63RD DIV.

255TH INFANTRY REGIMENT

REGIMENTAL HISTORY

31 DECEMBER 1944 - 31 JANUARY 1945

The 255th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Edward A. Charal commanding, moved by truck during the night of 31 December 1944 - 1 January 1945 from Camp d'Oberhofen WR 0921 northward toward the Sarreguemines - Bitch front. On its arrival in the XVth Corps area it was attached to the 100th Infantry Division.

On 1 January the 1st and 2d Battalions took up defensive positions on the Maginot Line along a front of approximately 6000 yards running east and northeast from the town of Witting 5650* in a bend of the Sarre River and just to the north of the two villages of Achen 5949 and Singling 6249. The 3d Battalion moved to an assembly area in Rahling 6243. At 0600 1 January it was ordered to become the reserve battalion for the 100th Division being detached from the 255th Infantry; the battalion moved by marching to take up positions near Montbronn 6845, southeast of the rest of the 255th Infantry and in the area of the 398th Infantry Regiment. During the same day the regimental command post was established at Oermingen 5544. On the left flank of the regimental front were elements of the 253d Infantry Regiment, attached to the 44th Infantry Division, and on the right flank was the 397th Infantry, one of the regiments of the 100th Infantry Division.

After nightfall of New Year's Day the 3d Battalion, less Company I which had been committed at Lemberg 7344 during the day, was moved by truck into Lemberg, 5000 yards to the east of Montbronn 6843, to reinforce the 399th Infantry Regiment in its defense of the town. The battalion underwent a light artillery barrage during the night, and early on the morning of the second of January, having been relieved, returned by foot to Montbronn, reverted to regimental control, and prepared to take up reserve defensive positions to the north of Schmittviller 5945 and Kalhausen 5747, behind the other two battalions of the 255th Infantry. Meanwhile the 1st and 2d Battalions occupied a relatively inactive front although to their left flank there was enemy tank activity and other enemy activity along the front of the adjacent 71st Infantry Regiment.

* All grid co-ordinates refer to the series "Eastern France 1/50,000". The two sheets referred to here are Sarreguemines (XXVI-13) and Bitch (XXVII-13). The zone letter "Q" has been omitted. Proper names appear with the spelling used on the map even though other spellings may be more common, e.g., "Sarre" in place of "Saar".

Again after nightfall, on 2 January the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry moved by truck to Enchenberg 7146, between Montbronn and Lemberg where the battalion had been the night before. The battalion marched by foot from Enchenberg 7146 northeast to Lambach 7248, a town in a mountain valley in the area of the 399th Infantry. Here again the battalion took defensive positions, this time around Lambach and the adjacent town of Glassemburg 7348. The battalion remained in these positions until relieved on the night of 5-6 January. It improved its defensive positions and operated patrols during this period. One of these patrols was noteworthy because of its success.

At 2315 on the night of 3 January a combat patrol of 24 men of the 3d Platoon of Company K of the 255th Infantry led by 2d Lt Ralph S. Matlock, 0557135, went out through our lines south of Lambach 7248 along a route going southeast from the town across the open terrain between two hills to the edge of the woods approximately a mile away, then northeast along the woods toward Meyersviller 7549. The return route was to proceed northwest from Meyersviller and then generally westward along the northern slope of the hill whose southern slope, about a thousand yards to the south, the patrol had skirted on its outward route. The mission was to clear of enemy for a depth of fifty yards the woods which the patrol was to enter on going out, to attack and destroy six buildings in Meyersviller, and to comb the woods on the return route.

As the patrol approached Hill 427 at 745454, it received heavy machine gun fire from two guns on the hill. Shortly later and further along, the patrol was fired on by a machine pistol fifty yards away to its right front and by two machine guns to its left rear. The lead scout moved up and threw a hand grenade into the open emplacement from which the machine pistol had been fired. His grenade killed four enemy. At the same time others of the patrol had crawled around to the rear of the two machine gun positions on the left. These men threw hand grenades and white phosphorus grenades, killing the two enemy in one position. A white phosphorus grenade struck one German in the other gun position. He scrambled out, clawing his face and trying to surrender, but the other German remained at the machine gun. Both were killed.

With these three enemy positions knocked out the patrol broke through the enemy's outpost line of resistance to the woods at 74504305, the woods they were to clear to a depth of fifty yards. Here the patrol received rather heavy rifle fire and engaged in a fire fight with what appeared to be at least an enemy squad armed with two machine pistols besides the rifles. Here two of the patrol were killed or seriously wounded.

After the fire fight only eight of the men reported to the rallying point. The patrol leader with these eight men, by moving to the left of the enemy into the woods, was able to outflank the positions and go on. The reduced patrol found no enemy activity in the woods at 747486 beyond the crest of Hill 427. Although the patrol was able to obtain only poor observation of Meyersviller from outside, five men went into the town. They entered it undetected, fired anti-tank grenades at and threw hand grenades into the windows of three buildings on the edge of town. Afterwards their investigation of these buildings seemed to show them to be unoccupied, though as the patrol withdrew it received rifle fire from the center of town.

The nine-man patrol, under occasional mortar fire, followed generally the planned route on returning.

At 0330 eight other members of the patrol, two of them walking wounded, came back through our lines. An hour later, the rest of the patrol returned with the body of one of the two men hit during the fire fight at the woods. The patrol had killed or wounded at least thirty enemy with a loss of one of its men killed and one missing.

Meanwhile the other two battalions of the 255th Infantry had been attacked, had held, and mounted a successful counterattack. During 2 January the enemy exerted pressure against a number of points along the front held by the 44th Infantry Division, whose right boundary ran northeasterly across the secondary front held by the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 255th Infantry. The enemy began at 0155 by infiltrating between the 71st Infantry Regiment, the right element of the 44th Division, and the left flank of the 397th Infantry, the left element of the 100th Division. The attack came against the 2d Battalion of the 71st Infantry in the vicinity of Moronville Ferme 633550. The 2d Battalion of the 71st Infantry withdrew and fell back upon positions 6254, about 1700 yards southeast, held by the 2d Battalion of the 253d Infantry along the railroad tracks running northwest and southeast between Gros-Réderching 6252 and Rimling 6555. By 0500 the enemy was digging in at his newly-gained positions and later sent troops to occupy le Schlossberg, high ground overlooking the railroad, where he remained in spite of artillery fire which was directed upon him during the morning. Just after noon two enemy planes dropped a few bombs on a farm about 1200 yards east of Gros-Réderching. This sector was reinforced at 1500 when the 3d Battalion of the 253d Infantry was moved by motor to the vicinity of Gros-Réderching and attached to the 71st Infantry.

An hour earlier nearly 5000 yards to the northwest, the Bliesbruck sector 5957 of the 44th Division's front had been attacked when an enemy tank supported by infantry moved from the direction of the town and forced one platoon of Company G of the 324th Infantry to withdraw from its positions 592573 near Kunstmuhl, positions which enemy infantry then occupied. By 1610 additional troops had arrived in support of this sector; the 1st Battalion of the 71st Infantry moved into the reserve area near Grand Viesing Ferme 573562. But enemy pressure continued during the early darkness against the 71st Infantry front between Bliesbruck and Gros-Réderching, especially from enemy in the Bois de Bliesbrucken 6055, and the 3d Battalion of the 253d Infantry near Gros-Réderching heard enemy tanks to its front at 1858. The Bois de Bliesbrucken area received additional troops when the 2d Battalion of the 114th Infantry, attached to the 71st Infantry, closed in the area near the Hermeskappel 587558 at 2040. Nevertheless, at 2150 one platoon of Company G of the 71st Infantry was completely surrounded and cut off by enemy infantry.

Three hours before, enemy artillery had begun firing on the Felpersviller sector 5558 of the line held by the 324th Infantry and upon the sector held by the 114th Infantry at Sarreguemines.

About 2230 the enemy had begun to shell the vicinity of Gros-Rederching, and three hours later, early in 3 January shells were falling on the forward positions of the 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry, extending from near the right bank of the Sarre opposite Witting approximately 3500 yards eastward to just east of Achen. Mortar fire began landing near the Command Post of Company E at 0330. The 3d Battalion of the 253d Infantry began a withdrawal from Gros-Rederching. At 0435 an Anti-Tank officer of that battalion, arriving at the Command Post of the 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry, reported being driven from the town. He had fired on two German tanks during the day, but had had no contact with the rest of his unit since the day before and believed the other anti-tank guns had been lost in the town. Because of this withdrawal on its left flank the 397th Infantry moved a company to Rohrbach, south of Gros-Rederching. At 0620 Company F of the 255th Infantry reported having had a sergeant with forty men from Company I of the 253d Infantry withdraw through their lines. Shortly thereafter one squad from the 2d Platoon of Anti-Tank Company of the 255th Infantry repulsed an enemy combat patrol north of Achen. The attack had begun.

The enemy, estimated to be 150 SS troops with four tanks and reported to be of the 38th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, began the assault on the town shortly after 0700 and by 0900 was in possession of the town. The attack started with a great deal of small arms and machine gun fire from directly north of the town and to the left front of Company B. Enemy mortar fire continued to fall on the town, starting several fires. At 0800 Company F moved its Command Post from the town to a position 1000 yards northwest a few minutes before two enemy tanks entered the northern sector of Achen followed by infantry. Later one of the tanks withdrew. With this attack on the town there was also an attack on the right flank of the 1st Battalion, almost directly south of Gros-Rederching. A number of tanks were moving about in this vicinity to the front of Company C; west of this area, at 0845 three tanks started out of the woods 1500 yards north of Achen, moving toward the town. Company F, receiving heavy cannon fire, began to move toward the right in the direction of 1st Battalion positions where, north and just east of the town, Company B was receiving a strong attack from enemy infantry who were reported at 0855 to be seizing Company B positions and taking some prisoners. At 0845 the Command Post of Company H had received a direct hit from artillery, and the Command Post was moved to the west of town. The 2d Platoon and the Mine Platoon of Anti-Tank Company also withdrew under strong fire from the enemy tanks which came from the woods north of Achen.

Meanwhile the regiment's counter-attack was being prepared. Company A had been reported moving toward Achen at 0820, and at 0830 the Regimental Executive Officer had directed that Company G should be moved forward to force the enemy out of Achen. By 0945 the enemy advance had been slowed; Company A was near the town and found that elements of Company B, still north of town, were in a position to give some assistance in establishing a defensive line.

When elements of Company I of the 253d Infantry were reported falling back and withdrawing through our lines. The Commanding Officer of the 255th Infantry asked for artillery support for the regiment. At 0700 the Commanding General of the 100th Division informed the Commanding Officer that the 495th Armored Field Artillery Battalion was to have this support mission. This unit was in bivouac in Achen and Etting, and some elements of it were engulfed by the enemy attack on Achen. At 0850 the regiment still had no artillery support but was informed that the 495th Armored Field Artillery was in process of moving back to positions near Oermingen 5544 from where it would send liaison officers and establish communication with the front. Shortly after daylight Cannon Company of the 255th Infantry, with its Commanding Officer acting as forward observer on the ridge 6044 east of Achen, began to fire observed fire on the western section of the town. Still in positions from which it had been firing on the area around Gros-Rederching, Cannon Company had been forced to delay its fire because of lack of certainty about the location of the 44th Division troops withdrawing through our lines. As soon as contact with the front-line troops of the 255th Infantry made it clear that the enemy already held the town and that Companies E and F of the regiment had taken positions outside the town to the south. Cannon Company began its shelling and continued to fire with good effect until the town was reoccupied by our troops, being especially effective against enemy troop concentrations attempting to withdraw northward from the town. Cannon Company received no counter-battery fire.

Company G launched its counter-attack from southwest of the town shortly after 1030. For a time one of its platoons was pinned down 100 yards outside of Achen by machine gun fire, but the rest of the attack went forward. A platoon of Company A attacked from north of the town in co-ordination with Company G and against enemy in a pillbox on that edge of the village as well as against enemy attempting to enter through a wooded draw 6050 in that sector. At 1300 word came for the cannons and mortars to cease firing on the town because the 2d Platoon of Company A had entered.

A short while after Company A entered the town, 1st Sergeant Wilson and Private Cybulski of that company asked their Company Commander for and received permission to try to start an abandoned armored vehicle which they had come upon. Under sniper fire from the western end of town the two enlisted men investigated the vehicle, decided that it lacked only fuel, took the spare gasoline can from a destroyed truck nearby, and started the armored vehicle. They used it to cover the squads of Company A as they moved from house to house flushing out the enemy. When the Company A sector of the town was cleared, the sergeant maneuvered into position to fire on and kill the crews of two machine guns northwest of town who were holding up the advance of Company G. While he was doing so, four enemy who were hiding in the underbrush nearby saw the vehicle and surrendered.

By 1530 Company G had occupied the southern part of the town though two enemy tanks still remained in the northern sector. There was still enemy resistance in and around the village.

This resistance continued all night. An estimated company still held out between the 1st and 2d Battalions to the north and west of town, but there was no activity on the flanks in front of Companies C and E nor to the front of Company F. In Achen itself the enemy held several houses and outside the town to the northeast and northwest occupied two pillboxes. From these they fired during the night. However, one enemy tank was abandoned in the town, the crew managing to escape in the direction of Gros-Réderching. Civilians, questioned, said that the enemy planned to return at 0700 in the morning with more tanks.

In the meantime reports had arrived that friendly troops were to be attacking Gros-Réderching. By 1630 units of the 5th (French) Armored Division, having moved north through Etting (a town erroneously reported occupied by 200 Germans and two tanks) had seized the town. (The 3d Battalion of the 253d Infantry which was driven from Gros-Réderching had been reported wiped out, but 70 enlisted men from that unit reached Company A of the 255th Infantry at 1350, in time to be fed at the evening meal.) It was intended that elements of the 44th Division should occupy Gros-Réderching so that the French Armored units could withdraw. To hold the town until relieved by units of the 44th Division, one platoon of Company C of the 255th Infantry went to Gros-Réderching. It arrived to find that, because of increasing enemy artillery and strong attempts by the enemy to move in, the French unit was planning a withdrawal. The Germans were reported to have moved into the town with four American Sherman tanks manned by English-speaking crews. After the arrival of the platoon from Company C, the artillery fire falling on Gros-Réderching from both enemy and friendly batteries was so heavy, particularly from friendly artillery, that the troops took cover. Most of the platoon remained in the town all night.

During the night, too, heavy fire from enemy 88's fell on the positions north of Achen, and spasmodic machine gun fire covered the entire front. And although the original main line of resistance had been almost wholly re-occupied, fighting continued in the town. Five tanks from the 5th (French) Armored Division arrived in the area at 0712 the morning of 4 January. This unit made contact with Company G, and the two units jointly reduced all resistance in the town. By 1150 only a pillbox 200 yards north of Achen was still held by Germans, and Company G was being returned to its position as battalion reserve.

Artillery and mortar fire still landed in the town during 4 January. Although some of the pieces which were firing were located, the confused and fluid situation made difficulties. Elements of the 2d Battalion of the 71st Infantry were reported at 1140 to be driving the enemy out of the woods 583515 from which 88's were fired at 1040. The 3d Battalion of the 253d Infantry, incorrectly reported wiped out, was given the mission of driving southeast the woods 600530 to Gros-Réderching. Since this drive was to include tanks, the situation was made even more difficult because the Germans were reported to be operating American Sherman tanks in the area, just as they were said to have used Sherman tanks manned by English-speaking crews against the platoon of Company C of the 255th Infantry and the French tank units in Gros-Réderching the previous night. By error some friendly

artillery was directed on Aachen after it was in our hands. The 255th Infantry was also receiving fire at 1050 from the woods directly north of Aachen where at 1340 approximately 50 Germans and two tanks were observed, but the regiment was unable to return the fire because of the possibility that friendly troops were in the area. No report later than the one at 1300 about the location of friendly troops had appeared, but at 1520 an observer for 2d Battalion reported that an estimated company of friendly troops with some armor was moving into the woods. Two squads later came out of the woods going in a southeasterly direction. An unfortunate consequence of the confused situation occurred at 1130 when an Anti-Tank officer who had earlier been in the building, by error directed a French tank to move up to the Command Post of Company A of the 255th Infantry and fire into it. Two of those within were wounded.

At 1440 an officer from 2d Battalion made contact with a platoon of Tank Destroyers. With the assistance of infantry they were to accomplish the mission of going through Aachen to complete the wiping out of enemy resistance and also to prevent hostile tanks from moving southwest from Gros-Réderching to Aachen. By 1635 they had arrived in Aachen, and the town was quiet.

Meanwhile elements of the platoon from Company C of the 255th Infantry, which had entered Gros-Réderching and found the French unit planning to withdraw, were still unaccounted for. Of the 39 enlisted men and one officer who made up the patrol, 9 men and one officer had returned by 1645; the rest in the confusion following the arrival of German tanks in the town had become disorganized and lost contact. The commanding officer of the company had earlier requested permission to take a strong patrol into Gros-Réderching to get them out. The Regimental Commander now directed the 1st Battalion Executive Officer to send a patrol to Gros-Réderching, advising of the necessity of co-ordination of the patrol's activity with the 397th Infantry, since the 100th Division had ordered that patrols enter the town during the night. An hour later, however, 27 men of the platoon had returned. Moreover, at 2300 the 44th Division reported that patrols of the 71st Infantry had been sent to Gros-Réderching. The patrols were reported to have pushed out from the town which they found unoccupied at 1800. The 71st Infantry planned to move down in force later in the night and also to occupy the high ground to the north of the town.

On the morning of 5 January, after a night in which a great deal of movement by armored vehicles, some of them probably friendly, had been heard along the front, 120 men of Company K of the 253d Infantry appeared at 0830 at the Command Post of Company A of the 255th Infantry in Aachen. The 44th Division, advised of the location of these troops from the 253d Infantry, directed that they be sent to Gros-Réderching. The 255th Infantry was informed through a liaison officer that elements of Company K of the 253d were going to Gros-Réderching. (At least two thirds of this company were even then in our Company A sector.) Later nine tanks appeared northwest 5951 of Aachen to pick up these men from Company K of the 253d Infantry. At 1030 the 44th Division reported that its earlier announcement that Gros-Réderching had been taken was erroneous. Company K of the 253d Infantry, thought to be in that town, had actually appeared in Aachen. Companies I and L of the 253d Infantry were at the time of this report 1000 yards west of Gros-Réderching.

At 1315 the 397th Infantry of the 100th Division reported that Gros-Rederching was in the hands of the 3d Battalion of that regiment. Company I of the 397th Infantry was in the town itself; Company K of the 397th Infantry was storming out northwest and southeast of the town; a patrol of forty men was moving north out of the place; and Company L of the 397th Infantry was in contact with the 2d Battalion of the 114th Infantry of the 44th Division.


Meanwhile the 255th Infantry had been ordered to move from its positions. During the night of 5-6 January it accomplished the complex operation of a double relief with the 398th Infantry, both regiments moving elements from positions in line to positions in line in spite of weather and terrain difficulties. The 3d Battalion of the 398th Infantry moved from the vicinity of Siersthal 7149, the reserve position of its regiment, to relieve the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 255th Infantry in their positions in the Maginot Line, north of Achen 5949 and Singling 6249. On being relieved these two battalions of the 255th Infantry moved north and east to take up the positions of the two battalions of the 398th Infantry which were in the front lines. Specifically, the 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry moved by motor to relieve the 2d Battalion of the 398th Infantry which was holding positions north of Holbach 7151 in and north of Hottviller 7353. This move was completed, the positions being physically occupied, by the 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry by 0305 on 6 January. In turn the 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry moved by motor to occupy the lines held by the 1st Battalion of the 398th Infantry north and slightly east of Petit-Rederching 6850, physical occupation of all positions being completed by 0400. Having been relieved by the 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry, the 2d Battalion of the 398th Infantry moved from the Hottviller-Holbach area southward to Lambach 7248. In the Lambach area it relieved the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry, assuming the reserve position and being attached to the 399th Infantry. The 3d Battalion of the 255th, on being thus relieved, moved by marching to the reserve position of its own regiment, taking positions in the Maginot Line just north and east of Petit-Rederching 6850. Not only was this complex movement of the two line battalions of the 255th Infantry completed by 0400, but the operation was accomplished during a very cold and dark night over roads so slippery with ice as to make any movement difficult. In these new positions the regiment had the 397th Infantry on its left and the 399th Infantry on its right. The regimental Command Post was established in Bining 6448. The regiment occupied these positions, engaging in the defensive warfare of holding positions and operating patrols, until the night of 18-19 January when it was relieved by elements of the 397th Infantry.

On that night the 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry relieved the 2d Battalion of the 397th Infantry in its sector of the Maginot Line and became for a short time the reserve battalion of the 398th Infantry, being attached to that regiment for tactical operations only. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 255th Infantry, on arrival in positions along the Maginot Line between Witting 5650 and Rohrbach 6549 reverted to Task Force Harris and came under the command of the 44th Division, the regimental Command Post being established in Oermingen 5544. Two nights later, the night of 20-21 January, the second Battalion of the 255th Infantry relieved the 3d Battalion of the

324th Infantry, moving by motor from near Rohrbach 6549. Before 2400 on the 21 January the 1st and 3d Battalions had moved into positions north and east of Sarreinsming 5454, replacing elements of the 324th Infantry. The regimental Command Post was moved to Sarreinsming. The regiment continued to occupy these defensive positions and to carry out patrol activity for the rest of the month.



Left, tying dynamite into a notched tree. When the charge is exploded, the tree falls across the road forming an abatis, or roadblock. Above, time out to wash up.



History of
the
Century
Division
2-3
Jan 45

Keeping vital roads passable was a full-time job for the engineers. Right, refugees returning to Rohrbach after the town was liberated by Centurymen.

The regimental CP moved to Montbronn during the night, and the 925th F A Battalion withdrew to positions around the town. Enemy aircraft dropped a number of bombs in the area of Co. A. Co. G drew back to positions around a road net east of Hottviller positions about a kilometer west and south where they would be in less danger of having the enemy infiltrate behind their positions.

On the remainder of the 399th Inf. front, the Germans, with lines running almost north and south from Hottviller through Simserhoff and Freudenberg Farms and across le Steinberg and le Spitzberg hills, was generally quiet. Co. L attempted to move forward to the high ground on Steinkopf but, after eight hours of bitter resistance by the enemy, was forced to go back to its original lines.

Co. C of the 141st, attached to the 399th the preceding day, held against enemy pressure and the 3rd Battalion of the 255th moved into reserve positions in Rohrbach.

Against the other flank of the division, the 3rd Battalion of the 397th Inf. continued to be harassed by enemy assaults, and the Germans went on attacking although they had been doped. A pre-dawn attack was broken up by artillery, and a mid-morning attack with at least 150 foot troops and a very large number of tanks was driven off by the artillery and by the 399th on Schlietzen Hill. The Germans had completely shelled Rimling and now began to use white phosphorous shells which set fire to a number of buildings in the town. Co. E, to strengthen the exposed flank, moved further north so that it occupied a

nose of hill south of Rimling and pointing southwest toward Gros Rederching. The maintenance and kitchen installations of the 374th F A Battalion moved south to Rahling to get them away from enemy shell fire.

The reason for these changes in position was that the 44th Div. had been forced back to lines south of Gros Rederching so that the flank of the 397th Inf. was unprotected for about 5000 yards south of Schlietzen Hill. Coming through the gap between the 100th and the 44th, the enemy had pushed 150 men and four tanks into the town of Achen where two battalions of the 255th Inf. 63rd Div. had been holding secondary defense positions along the Maginot Line. Though without artillery support, the battalions counterattacked and retook the town thereby ending the German threat to turn the flanks of both the 100th and the 44th Divisions.

Although the enemy main effort on the fourth day of his offensive was directed against the 44th Div. to the west of our lines, he also tried and failed to drive Co. G. of the 397th from the hill south of Schlietzen. On our eastern flank, the Germans attempted to push Co. A of the 399th from high ground but elsewhere on the regimental front was content to hold the forward slopes of the hills whose reverse slopes were occupied by the 3rd Battalion of the 399th.

In the most thrilling action of the day, Co. K of the 255th Inf. sent a 26-man patrol from near Lambach out to Reversviller and killed 30 enemy with the loss of a single man.

On this day, also, Col. Andrew C. Tychsen was offi-

28 February 1945

REGIMENTAL HISTORY

1 February 1945 - 28 February 1945

The 255th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Edward A. Chazal, occupied defensive positions with two battalions on line and one in reserve during the first six days of February. On 1 February the Regimental Command Post was located in Sarreinsming, France, Q5454*, where it had been since 20 January 1945 and where it remained during the month of February. The 3d Battalion was in reserve around Sarreinsming with the Battalion Command Post in Woelfling Q5954. The regimental front of more than 6000 yards extended from the vicinity of Frauenberg Q5559 on the left southeast along a series of hills overlooking the Blies River so that the right flank was along the secondary highway, number 3, coming southwest from Bliesbrücken Q5957. The defensive positions adjacent to this right boundary, of which the flank positions held Hill 325, Q5955, were occupied by elements of the 44th Infantry Division. On the left flank of the 255th Infantry was the 253d Infantry, the two regiments being a part of Task Force Harris which was attached to the 44th Division.

The 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry was on the left along a front extending from the vicinity of Frauenberg Q5561 to positions south and east of Blies-Ebersingen Q5758, with the Battalion Command Post in Polperaweller Q5558. The 1st Battalion occupied positions on the right with its Battalion Command Post at Klein Wiesinger Hof Q5756.

During this period, while it had a battalion in reserve the 255th Infantry, which had been on line since 22 December 1944 with the exception of a single day at Camp Coerhofen and the time necessary to the movement from the Hagenau area to the Sarreguemines-Bitche front, was able to arrange for a program of rehabilitation for its troops. A mobile shower unit was set up in Sarreinsming where troops in the reserve battalion could shower and exchange their uniforms for clean ones. Besides training and the work of care and cleaning of equipment, the troops were able occasionally to attend training and recreational films. The regiment also began to receive quotas allowing officers and enlisted men to go to Paris for forty-eight hour passes. These quotas were continued throughout the month,

*All map references are to the following sheets:

France, 1:25,000, Sarreguemines 3 & 4, XXXVI-13

France, 1:25,000, Bitche 1 & 2, XXXVII-13

Germany, 1:25,000, Saargemünd, 6808

Germany, 1:25,000, Gersheim, 6809

those receiving the passes being given an opportunity to shower and change to clean uniforms the afternoon of the day before they went to Hambach Q4851, the location of Service Company, where they entrucked for Paris. As a further program of improvement, the regiment arranged to feed the troops through battalion kitchens.

Other activities — these concerned with combat rather than with rehabilitation — in which the regiment engaged early in February were the formation by both the 2d and 3d Battalions of a Battalion Ranger Platoon, made up of volunteers and given special training in patrolling. The 1st Battalion organized and trained its Ranger Platoon later in the month. The regiment also operated a motor patrol both for road and bridge security and for contact between the battalions. During the thawing weather of the early part of the month this patrol continued to function in the face of difficulties caused by muddy, and frequently almost impassible roads. Another activity of the regiment was the operation of a training program for newly assigned reinforcements.

During the night of 3 - 4 February the 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry was replaced on the left by elements of the 253d Infantry, and the battalion moved into the reserve position of the regiment while the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry, which had been in reserve, moved its Command Post from Woelfling Q5954 to Weisviller Q5853 and took up positions to the right of the former regimental boundary, relieving elements of the 114th Infantry Regiment of the 44th Division. The operation resulted in shifting the front of the 255th Infantry to the right and in shortening it slightly; the front now extended from approximately Q570581 to Q602549.

On 6 February at 1200A command in the regimental sector and of the regiment was assumed by the 63d Infantry Division, minus the 254th Infantry Regiment which has not yet arrived in the area. The 255th Infantry now had indirect support the 263d Field Artillery Battalion and Company "C" of the 263d Engineer Battalion, the units being again united which had constituted Combat Team Blue during the training period of the regiment in the United States.

Also at noon on 6 February, Lieutenant Colonel Marion W. Schewe, the Executive Officer of the 255th Infantry, became Acting Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion, a command which he held until 12 February when Major Robert C. Forbes assumed the command of the battalion.

Elements of the 3d Battalion launched two local attacks at 1100A on 6 February. The left platoon of Company L, which was also the left platoon of the battalion, attacked in the Bliesbrucken Wald to seize a nose of

Wooded hill which lies east or to the right of the secondary highway, number 3, leading south and southwest from Bliesbrücken 05957, and forward or to the north of the railway extending southeast through the woods (Grid Squares 05956 and 05955). The platoon had advanced 200 yards and taken its objective by 1500A. In doing so it had moved forward against machine gun and mortar fire and repulsed two enemy counter-attacks. At one point during its attack the platoon, which consisted of only seventeen men, was pinned down by machine gun fire. Technical Sergeant Clinton W. Keeter, 39139577, acting platoon leader, organized a flanking element and knocked out the position. In this maneuver he was joined by First Lieutenant La Rue Cantrell, 0550919, the Platoon Leader of the Weapons Platoon of Company L. Lieutenant Cantrell had been acting as forward observer for mortars. He voluntarily took his place with the flanking attack and killed one enemy and caused two to surrender. Afterwards he continued to direct effective fire from the mortars when, as Sergeant Keeter's platoon moved forward, it was met by a frontal counter-attack. To Sergeant Keeter's hasty defense and Lieutenant Cantrell's mortars slowed and finally repulsed this attack. The enemy mounted a second counter-attack when the platoon reached its objective. This action was also repulsed and the terrain firmly held, though the seventeen-man platoon had suffered eleven casualties.

The right platoon of Company "K" which, since it was the right platoon of the battalion, the regiment, and the division, was the other extreme end of the battalion front from the attacking platoon of Company "L", had also at 1100A launched an attack in its sector in the Bliesbrücken Wald at 002551. The platoon advanced 100 yards, defying enemy small arms and machine gun fire and knocking out a log bunker which had been a formidable emplacement for a machine gun. By 1500A the platoon was digging in at positions forward of the railway in an area extending from 00255527 to 00425520. At 1625A the Commanding Officer of the Regiment instructed the 3d Battalion to alert ambush patrols in each company area in view of the likelihood of a counter-action by the enemy.

Two hours later, at 1820A, the enemy began counter-attacking to the front of Company "L" and, on its left, to the front of Company "C" on Hill 325. A report had just arrived from G-3 quoting a prisoner of war, whom the 3d Battalion had captured earlier in the day, to the effect that the enemy was planning to attack in that sector. The attack was preceded by a mortar barrage and consisted in an advance by approximately 100 enemy troops. The chief danger of the counter-attack was the chance that the enemy might succeed in penetrating our lines because he attacked while there was still daylight, that is, before the companies had occupied certain outpost positions to which troops could go only under cover of darkness.

The two battalions acted effectively and quickly against the attack. The 1st Battalion began immediately to direct mortar and artillery fire on enemy positions and on enemy troops approaching along secondary highway, number 3. The reserve positions of the battalion were occupied, and within half an hour of the first evidence of the attack, Company "B" had moved to positions to the rear of Hill 325 for defense in depth in the sector held by Company "C". On learning that the Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion was in the 2d Platoon area of Company "C", in the midst of the sector toward which the attack was directed, the Regimental Commander ordered S-3 to go to the 1st Battalion Command Post to take command of the battalion if necessary and in the meantime instructed the Commanding Officer of Company "D" to take charge. The Regimental Commander also alerted Company "G" in the reserve battalion to be prepared to move to the attacked area if necessary. By 1905A emergency rations and additional ammunition had been distributed to Company "C".

While the 1st Battalion was thus handling its part of the attack, the 3d Battalion had also acted to stop the enemy. Company "I", receiving the attack in the area where it had advanced earlier in the day, used mortars against the enemy; a squad from Company "I" was moved to the rear of Company "L" as support. Although the telephone line communicating with battalion had been broken by the enemy mortar barrage, Company "I" was able to maintain contact with the Battalion Command Post by means of radio. By slightly more than an hour after the counter-attack began, the enemy had withdrawn. His furthest advance had carried him no nearer than 300 yards to the front of our forward positions.

From 7 February until 10 February the regiment continued to hold its defensive positions and to operate patrols, some of which encountered the difficulty of crossing the Blies River while its waters were in virtual flood. On 7 February a platoon of Company "I" replaced the platoon of Company "L" which had attacked and received the counter attack on the previous day.

On the night of 9 - 10 February the 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion of the 253d Infantry. When this relief was completed, the regimental front of the 255th Infantry was extended to the left and all three battalions were on line. The positions taken by the 2d Battalion were those in the sector where it had been relieved during the night of 3 - 4 February, encompassing positions from the vicinity of Blies-Ebersingen 55753 to the vicinity of Frauenberg 55559 to the northwest. The front following the course of the Blies river formed an irregular slant, one side of which ran northwest to a point above Frauenberg to meet the other, and shorter side, which ran southwest from the point. This change gave the 255th Infantry a front in excess of ten thousand yards.

On the 3d Battalion sector during this period an enemy machine gun in a dug-out under a disabled and long abandoned German tank in the woods at 001550 had been troublesome to our troops. According to a prisoner of war there were two dugouts under the tank, the one under the end facing our lines being a machine gun emplacement, the second behind and slightly to one side of this serving as a platoon command post under the other end of the tank. On 9 February two men from the Battalion Intelligence Section, one armed with a flamethrower, the other with white phosphorous hand grenades, attempted a harassing attack on the machine gun dugout. With the support of a number of riflemen and an automatic rifle team, the two moved toward the tank. A white phosphorous grenade fired by one of the riflemen had landed so that its smoke obscured the space under the tank through which the machine gun was fired. Aided by this smoke the two men from the Intelligence Section were able to approach to within ten yards of the emplacement. Here the smoke suddenly cleared, and the man with the flame-thrower found himself facing the machine gun and its gunner. He squeezed the activating lever, but the flame-thrower failed to function. The machine gun fired a burst at point blank range. Somewhat desperately he pulled the lever of the flame-thrower again. This time unignited fuel spurted out into the face of the German at the machine gun. Taking advantage of this turn of events the operator of the flame-thrower hastily withdrew, impeded only slightly by underbrush, fallen branches and concertina wire, and even less by fire from adjacent enemy positions. The other man from the Intelligence Section threw a white phosphorous hand grenade, intending to set fire to the fuel which had sprayed from the flame-thrower. When the grenade failed to detonate and when he saw that his supporting fire had already, somewhat prematurely been withdrawn, he also moved back to our lines. Three days later, just at dusk on 12 February, two men from the Battalion Intelligence Section, covered by automatic rifle teams to their flanks and by other supporting troops, again attacked the tank emplacement with a flame-thrower. This time they succeeded in destroying the enemy in the dugouts.

After dark on 13 February the 2d platoon of Company "I" took up the positions on the nose of hill 0594502 which the 1st platoon of the company had seized on 6 February. The 2d platoon replaced a platoon from Company "I" which had relieved the attacking unit the day after the advance. Also on 13 February a prisoner of war stated that a relief had been effected recently in the sector of enemy lines opposite the regimental front; enemy small arms fire increased, his troops displaying a willingness to fire on any targets presented.

On 14 February the 255th Infantry began the preparations immediately preceding an attack. The first part of the attack was to involve the 3d Battalion, the right (east) flank of the regiment. The operation was to be part of a series of actions by the XVth corps, intending to rectify and shorten the front lines. The 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry had the

attack mission of seizing, organizing, and defending the high ground in the Bliesbrücken Wald (Grid Squares Q5955 and 5956), north of the railroad track, not yet held by the battalion. This action was to take place at the same time as, and in conjunction with, an attack by the 44th Division, reinforced, and in its zone to the right of the 255th Infantry.

In preparation for this attack, Company "B" of the 255th Infantry, the reserve company of its battalion, became the regimental reserve at 1600A and on 14 February and had moved into position behind the 3d Battalion by 2100A that night. To replace this company as battalion reserve, one officer and 18 men from Company "A" moved to battalion control at Gross Wiesinger Hof Q5756. Since the mission of the 1st Battalion was to keep any reinforcements from coming out of Bliesbrücken, to neutralize fire from the town, and to assist the 3d Battalion by fire from the left flank, a patrol from Company "C" consisting of a squad with a light machine gun, was sent out to place a road block on the secondary road (number 3) south of Bliesbrücken at Q596571. The patrol reported at 2140A on 14 February that it had run into a mine field; two men were injured, and the patrol returned to re-organize and go out by a different route. Later the patrol reported that the road block had been established.

Meanwhile, the Commanding Officer of the Regiment had informed the battalion that H-hour was 0615 and that D-day was 15 February. The 2d Battalion was ordered to be prepared to move its reserve company, Company "F" to 3d Battalion area at any time after 0630 on 15 February. The 863d Field Artillery Battalion was to be in direct support of the regiment, and the 718th Field Artillery Battalion was in general support.

In the 3d Battalion, where the attacking companies were to be Companies "I" and "K", one squad of the Pioneer and Ammunition Platoon was attached to each. The Ranger Platoon of the battalion, reinforced by three bazooka teams from the Anti-Tank Platoon, was attached to Company "K" and ordered to mop up and cover the organization of new positions as well as to furnish a contact patrol with the 1st Battalion of the 114th Infantry, on the right flank of Company "K" of the 255th Infantry.

Before the attack began the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry occupied positions along a front approximately 1400 yards wide. Except for a sector of three or four hundred yards, the sector held by Company "E", on the left flank of this front, the positions were behind, that is south of, the railway (Grid Squares Q5955 and Q6055) running southeast below Bliesbrücken Q5957. On 14 February, the day preceding the attack, this front was defended from the left flank to the right flank as follows: On the left, the nose of wooded hill adjacent to and east of the secondary road, number 3, running south from Bliesbrücken, and in the angle formed by this road and the northern edge of the railway, was held by Company "I" which had taken it

in a local attack on 6 February, been relieved, and now again occupied it. Company "I" was in positions south of the railway, south and east (to the right) of Company "L". East of Company "I" were the positions of Company "K" which formed the right element of the battalion, the regiment, and the division, and which was adjacent to the 114th Infantry. All the positions of Company "K" except those held by the right flank platoon were south of the railway.

Company "L" already held the woods and forward slope overlooking a segment of the small stream called the Schlierbach. In the attack Company "I" was to seize the wooded crest of the hill beyond the railway, the slope adjacent on the east to the hill held by Company "L" and separated from it by a draw. The third hill to the east was to be seized and occupied by Company "K" in the attack. Beyond the summit of the two left hills the wooded area is broken by a clearing from one to two hundred yards wide from the far side of which the woods continues down the steeply descending forward slope to the stream. The hill to the front of Company "K" is uninterruptedly wooded.

For the attack one platoon of Company "L" remained in positions on the first or left hill; the other two rifle platoons of the company made up the reserve to the rear of Companies "I" and "K", two squads of one platoon forming a covering force for Company "K" and one squad being to the right rear of Company "I"; the other platoon was in reserve with the battalion. Two rifle platoons of Company "I", supported by the company's Weapons Platoon and reinforced by a squad of the battalion Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon, were to attack from opposite lateral slopes of the second hill; the other platoon was the company support element. Two rifle platoons of Company "K", also with a Pioneer and Ammunition squad and with the battalion Ranger Platoon and three additional bazooka teams, were to attack the third hill. In the progress of events, the third rifle platoon was committed so early that the attack was actually made by the whole company.

It should be noted that the 255th Infantry made the attack when it held a very wide front, one in excess of 10,000 yards, and had all three of its battalions on line. The 3d Battalion had, therefore a very small reserve. And the regimental reserve consisted of the reserve company of the 1st Battalion, Company "B", having, as an additional resource, the reserve company of 2d Battalion, Company "F", prepared to move by truck to the 3d Battalion area.

At 0520A in the darkness of early morning 15 February, the 2d and 3d Platoons of Company "I" left the secondary highway (number 2, Grid Square 05955), after a final check and a final issue of ammunition, and moved forward in a northerly direction toward the railroad tracks. The platoons moved in squad columns through the woods, thick, filled with tangled under-


brush, and very muddy underfoot; the 2d Platoon, on the left entered the woods at approximately 0594556; the 3d Platoon left the road some 450 yards to the right. Shortly after 0600A both platoons were in position beside the bank of the cut on the forward side of the railway.

Because the 44th Division plan for attack called for the advantage of surprise, there was no artillery preparation, and there had been no artillery fire in the area for several hours. At 0615A a round of artillery fell as a signal for the attack to begin.

The approach made by Company "I" had been so quiet that it was apparently unobserved by the enemy; at least the platoons drew no fire until they themselves began shooting in the direction of supposed enemy positions. The morning was foggy and still very dark so that our troops were able to locate enemy positions only by the muzzle flash of hostile return fire.

During the first hour and a half following its crossing of the line of departure at 0615A, the 2d Platoon of Company "I" advanced along the left slope of the hill about 100 yards. The advance was not easy because in addition to the difficulty presented by heavy underbrush and fallen branches, the platoon had to overcome resistance from numerous enemy fortifications. The underbrush and branches made firing from a prone position at the base of a tree virtually impossible. Moreover, the antipersonnel mines which were affixed to many of the trees were more frequently detonated by enemy small arms fire, directly or by ricochet, than by the action of their trip wires.

But these hindrances to the advance were additional to the fortifications in the area. These fortifications were dug-in emplacements which had been surrounded and covered by split logs. The typical position of this sort was a log structure enclosing an area six to eight feet on a side, extending below the surface of the ground, or with logs set vertically into the ground, and rising perhaps four feet above the surface. For all its external bulk it contained little space for personnel because of the thickness of the walls and roof. In general there was room inside for three men lying down, one to fire a machine gun from the embrasure in front and two others firing rifles or machine guns from corner embrasures on either side of the center weapon. With visibility reduced by fog, it was difficult for our troops to see these apertures to fire into them, especially as the bunkers had been camouflaged with earth and branches to conceal their shape. Against the heavy construction of these fortifications, small arms fire and hand grenades had no effect. Bazooka fire was very little more telling. In one instance a soldier armed with a bazooka, rising partially from behind a tree to bring his weapon into position to have a clear lane of fire scored a direct hit against the corner of one of the structures. Yet the round had so little effect that the machine gunner within was able to push his weapon back into the embrasure, aim and fire it, and wound the man with the bazooka before he could throw himself to the ground.



Sketch showing approximate routes of attack by elements of 3d Battalion 295th Infantry 15 February 1945.

The most successful way of knocking out these bunkers, the 2d Platoon of Company I discovered, was to move around to the rear of the position and throw a hand grenade into the tunnel-like entrance to the fortification. This method, however, forced the man attacking the pillbox to come into the field of fire of the bunkers on either flank of the position.

In spite of the inimical terrain and the difficulty of destroying enemy positions, the 2d Platoon of Company I had moved forward 175 yards, had neutralized and gone beyond four bunkers by 0850A, only two and a half hours after the start of the attack. Several enemy had been taken prisoner and sent to the rear; one was shot while trying to escape.

During the following hour the enemy staged a local counterattack, but the skirmish line of the platoon held. In fact by 1100A it had moved forward an additional 25 yards and knocked out a fifth enemy pillbox. This line marked the point of farthest advance for the platoon, which was here pinned down by enemy fire. At this point the skirmish line formed a crescent; the left flank extended into the draw between the hill assigned to Company I and the hill held by Company L. From this left flank, which faced in a northeasterly direction down the draw, the skirmish line curved back to face the crest of the hill so that it could bring fire upon a large pillbox which otherwise would have had enfilade fire against the platoon. Enemy fire from the right flank was intense because the 3d Platoon of Company I had not been able to advance on the right side of the hill and knock out the pillboxes to its front.

While the 2d Platoon skirmish line thus formed a half-moon, a German medical aid man came through the line to care for the enemy at the bunker which had just been rendered ineffective. The enemy at the bunker were all dead, but two severely wounded enemy lay just within the line. The German aid man was ordered to care for them. One died while the aid man was trying to give him medical attention; the aid man was ordered to take the other to our rear when he regained consciousness. Both thus became prisoners of war.

Because the platoon needed more fire power, the platoon sergeant, Technical sergeant James E. Ford, 36690806, wanted to send for a machine gun and crew. Since he had no communication with his company--the platoon radios did not function in the woods--Sergeant Ford sent his messenger, Private First Class Ross G. Willard, 36966406, back to the company forward command post. Private Willard took the message back, but when he returned, he was unable to go to his former position because of fire from enemy automatic weapons and snipers. Instead he remained at the bank of the railway cut and shouted messages to the sergeant as well as relaying messages from him. Later Private Willard brought two medical aid men to a place along the bank, told them to stay there while he himself crawled forward with a litter to a wounded man. Though he was pinned down by fire for 30 minutes, he managed to clear away the underbrush, spread the litter, roll the wounded man on to it and drag the loaded litter back to the railway.

Meanwhile, three men with a machine gun had moved under heavy fire into the draw to the left rear of the platoon. In a short while all were wounded. An attempt by part of the reserve of Company I to come from the same direction to the assistance of the platoon was likewise unsuccessful.

As early as 0900A a forward observer for the 863d Field Artillery had reported a number of enemy, at least a platoon in strength, in the draw between Companies K and I at 050125604. These or other enemy troops appeared from the right side of Company I's hill and moved toward the bunker on the crest. The 2d Platoon of Company I allowed them to approach because of an initial uncertainty whether the troops were part of the 3d Platoon moving up to attack the pillbox, an uncertainty induced partially by poor visibility, partially by lack of communication which otherwise would have made clear the position of the 3d Platoon, and partially by the fact that most of the enemy were wearing parts of the uniform of the United States Army, particularly American field jackets and overcoats. This lack of certainty was dispelled when the troops at the crest of the hill began to fire on the 2d Platoon. This counterattack was also defeated, but the platoon remained pinned down unable to advance.

Meanwhile, the 3d Platoon of Company I had begun well in its mission to advance on the right slope of the same hill. It destroyed an enemy bunker shortly after beginning its attack at 0620A and moved across the railroad track. Immediately it began to receive cross and frontal fire. Just beyond the railway the left flank of the platoon encountered a mine field and suffered several casualties. To by-pass the mine field the platoon moved slightly to the right and down the draw. Although the casualties were so numerous that by 0831A one of the wounded reported that the platoon needed more men, the platoon knocked out another enemy bunker and advanced down the draw nearly 300 yards. Enemy fire was so intense that a medical aid man was killed while he was in process of bandaging the arm of a wounded platoon leader. By 0930A the support platoon of Company I and one squad of Company L, the Battalion reserve, were moving to the area to the rear of the 3d Platoon. The 1st section of the 1st Platoon of Company M had moved in to give supporting fire. One squad placed its machine gun at the corner of the destroyed bunker; the other moved in behind the cover of a fallen tree. Both the rifle platoon and the machine gun section were suffering heavy casualties from mines and small arms fire. When the rest of his squad, including the squad leader, had all been wounded or killed, Private Albert A. Reed, 39336038, continued to fire the gun alone until a stoppage which could not be immediately remedied put the gun out of action. Private Reed then moved over to the machine gun behind the fallen tree. This gun was not firing because all of its squad had been wounded. Private Reed operated this gun until enemy fire from automatic weapons cut and tore his clothing in the region of chest and groin. He then removed this gun from its tripod and carried it back to the bunker beside which he had been firing his own squad's gun. When this second machine gun stopped firing because

all the ammunition had been shot up. Private Reed moved forward and retrieved an automatic rifle which lay beside a wounded rifleman. With this third weapon the private continued to engage the enemy and gave covering fire to the remaining riflemen as they withdrew to the rear side of the railroad tracks. Later when he was himself withdrawing, Private Reed gave help to his wounded platoon leader, helping him to the aid station.

The Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion had decided at 0930A to send one squad of Company "L" as forces additional to the support platoon of Company "I" which was being committed in the area of the attack by the 3d Platoon of Company "I". (The 1st and 3d Platoons of Company "L" formed the battalion reserve; the 1st Platoon was already being committed in the Company "K" area; the 3d Platoon had a strength of less than two squads, of which one full squad was now being committed.) As soon as the squad from Company "L" moved into the enemy zone of fire in the area of the 3d Platoon of Company "I", shortly after 1020A, Sergeant James M. Casey, 42 070 719, the squad leader, was wounded in the groin. Unable to move forward with the squad and unable, if he kept low and did not expose himself to fire, to inform himself of the squad's movement so that he could control it as it moved away from him, Sergeant Casey rose to his knees and shouted directions and orders to his men. Later he bandaged his own wound, and still later, as he was withdrawing with the rest of the forces, he suffered a broken leg from small arms fire.

By noon, then, of 15 February 1945, the attack in the Company "I" sector of the 255th Infantry had not attained its objective of seizing the second hill from the left in the Bliesbrücken Wald. Instead the 2d Platoon of Company "I", though it had knocked out five enemy bunkers and repulsed two enemy counter attacks, was pinned down, unable to advance, from the skirmish line which curved upward from the draw and backward along the left slope of the hill, its farthest advance being about 200 yards from the line of departure. The 3d Platoon of Company "I", forced by a mine field on its left flank to make its line of advance down the rather shallow draw on the right slope of the hill, had silenced resistance in two enemy pillboxes and some of its forces had moved as far as 300 yards forward of the line of departure, advancing down the draw toward the emplacement under a long disabled and abandoned German tank. But the 3d Platoon's casualties had been so severe that, even with the assistance of the company support platoon and a squad from Company "L", it had been unable to overcome the enemy and seize the hill.

Meanwhile Company "K" of the 255th Infantry had also begun an attack in its sector, the large, wooded hill to the left of that attacked by Company "I". The attack began at 0615A on 15 February 1945. This attack against lighter opposition than that encountered by Company "I" was much more successful. At the start the 2d Platoon of Company "K" was on the left, adjacent to the draw between the sectors of Company "K" and Company "I". On the right flank was the 1st Platoon of Company "K", forming the right flank element of the

byd Division and adjacent to Company "B" of the 114th Infantry Regiment of the 44th Division. The 3d Platoon of Company "X" was to the right rear.

For the first three-quarters of an hour after crossing the line of departure Company "X" advanced almost without opposition. Then a machine gun began to fire from the left against the 2d Platoon; enemy mortar fire began to fall in the area; and there was continuous enemy small arms fire from the front. Two hundred yards to the right from the enemy also sent up two red flares which a prisoner of war later identified as a German signal meaning, "The enemy is attacking." By 0500 the 2d Platoon by-passed the machine gun on its left, leaving a unit to silence the weapon, and both the 2d and the 1st Platoon, in spite of heavy opposing small arms fire, advanced 200 yards, so that the 1st Platoon was on line with the 114th Infantry on its right.

The 3d Platoon of Company "X", however, was having difficulty; the platoon leader had been wounded and the platoon was somewhat disorganized. It was suffering casualties from flanking machine gun fire when it moved into a mine field. Through the efforts of Technical Sergeant Conley K. Horrell, 34 882 693, and Staff Sergeant George R. Dodson, Jr., 38 600 404, the platoon was re-organized, and contact between elements of the platoon as well as with the rest of the company was re-established. The platoon withdrew from the mine field and requested Cannon Company of the 255th Infantry to shell the mined area.

The 1st and 2d Platoons of Company "K" had also encountered a mine field but had been able to find paths through it and continue, though slowly, to advance. By 0900 the 1st Platoon, on the right, was forward of the bend in the trail at 0335549, more than 300 yards forward of its line of departure, and it had suffered almost no casualties. The 2d Platoon was to the left rear of the 1st having moved more slowly because it had had to knock out four enemy bunkers, but it too was almost without casualties.

At approximately 0930, through some error, the 2d Platoon on the left and the 3d Platoon on the right were reported to be on their objectives. Actually both were still some distance short of that position. The 3d Platoon had had so many casualties that it requested support, and the 1st Platoon of Company "L", more than half of the battalion reserve, was committed and sent to the area. The 3d Platoon of Company "K" also asked for a squad with a heavy machine gun for security on its right flank because the heavy machine which had accompanied the platoon had been badly shot up. Having committed his reserve, the Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion requested the regiment to send one platoon of Company "B", the regimental reserve, to occupy to the rear of Company K the positions which Company "L" was leaving.

Two hours after the first reports that they had reached their objectives, and only slightly more than five hours after the attack began, the three platoons of Company "K" were well along in the process of organizing their positions on their objective and were mopping up scattered enemy resistance in the area, capturing or killing isolated enemy groups. In this

work the Battalion Ranger Platoon was giving assistance. The 1st Platoon had come through the action without a single casualty; the 2d had only two casualties; the 3d Platoon had suffered heavily. But reinforced by the Ranger Platoon, which moved into its area at 1015A and assisted in re-organizing the advance, and later strengthened by the 1st Platoon of Company "L", the 3d Platoon of Company "K" had moved up on line, and by 1345A the remaining elements of the original platoon and the support platoon were digging in.

Having made sure of their objective elements of Company "K" pushed beyond the positions they were going to occupy and moved down to the stream, the Schlierbach, at the foot of their hill. When they had made sure that the enemy had withdrawn from their front to the other side of the stream, they returned to their positions and prepared for their defense. This action was accomplished by 1400A. By 1513A the right flank of Company "K" was in visual contact with elements of Company "B" of the 114th Infantry, and the two companies were in positions which made it possible to cover the area between them with fire. Later a patrol from the 114th Infantry while crossing the draw to Company "K" positions encountered enemy fire; the two flank elements investigated the draw, found it clear of enemy, and coordinated their fire.

Earlier in the day, because Company "I" of the 255th Infantry had not, as had Company "K", been able to seize its objective, two platoons of Company "B" had been committed to positions to the rear of Company "I". The Company "B" Platoons began to move from their reserve positions at 1237A. At the same time Company "F", the reserve company of the 2d Battalion of the 255th, which had been in readiness to become the regimental reserve was ordered to move to take up the positions left unoccupied by Company "B", positions to the rear of the 3d Battalion. By 1415 the mortars of the Weapons Platoon of Company "B" were being moved into position with those of Company "I" and found that Company "I" was using its reserve mortar ammunition. The rifle platoons of Company "B" moved to positions where they could cover the withdrawal of the elements of Company "I" which were pinned down in the area of their attack. These elements after withdrawing took up reserve positions behind Company "B".

The attack in which Companies "K" and "I" of the 255th Infantry participated was the left or western flank of an action involving the whole of the 114th Infantry Division to the right of the 255th Infantry. All three regiments of the 44th Division were in the attack, the 114th Infantry being just to the right of the 255th Infantry; the other two regiments of the 44th Division, the 71st Infantry and the 324th Infantry, were further to the right. The 1st Battalion of the 114th Infantry, the unit adjacent to the 255th Infantry, began the attack with two companies, Companies "B" and "C", on line; Company "D" was on the right flank of Company "K" of the 255th Infantry.

Company "B" of the 114th Infantry advanced initially without opposition and during the first hour of the attack moved forward 500 yards to the road junction at Q50715477. By 0730A its right flank elements had crossed the railroad track at the edge of woods at Q61035517, but its left flank element was halted by a Schu-mine field in the woods just north of the railway to the right of Company "X" of the 255th Infantry. Company "C" of the 114th Infantry, further to the right, also began by advancing rapidly without opposition; by 0850A it had crossed the railway tracks to the right and north of Bellevue Ferme Q61105487, but its left element had struck mines on the road west of the farm. In its advance the infantry was assisted by at least eight tanks which moved up the road running east past Bellevue Ferme. By 0930A the two regiments to the left of the 114th Infantry, the 71st and the 324th Infantry had reached their initial objectives. At the same time the two companies of the 114th Infantry to the right of Company "K" of the 255th Infantry had advanced less than two hundred yards to the north of the railway, being impeded by the mine field and opposed by heavy fire from enemy mortars and automatic weapons. Company "C" of the 114th, having surrounded and by-passed Bellevue Ferme moved into and through the point of woods at Q6155, and by 1045A, when the farm was taken, the forward elements of Company "C" were abreast of the attacking elements of Company "B" of the 114th Infantry at grid line 557, and both companies were forward of Company "A" of the 255th to their left. By shortly after 1500A Companies "B" and "C" of the 114th Infantry had reached their objective on the forward slope of hill to the right of Company "X" of the 255th Infantry; Company "A" of the 114th Infantry, the reserve company of its battalion, committed at 1130A, was engaged in mopping up the woods to the rear of the other two companies. At the same time Company "B" had established visual contact with Company "K" of the 255th Infantry on its right. During the early part of the night of 15 February the 1st Battalion of the 114th prepared its defenses against a possible enemy counter-attack, and operated patrols and continued mopping up activities with the aid of search lights.

None of the units on the front of the 44th Division, to the right of the 255th Infantry, appears to have encountered opposition as formidable as that which confronted Companies "I" and "X" of the 255th Infantry.

During the afternoon of 15 February when elements of Company "I" and a squad of Company "I" of the 255th Infantry were withdrawing under the covering fire of elements of Company "B" of the same regiment, Company "F", the reserve company of the 2d Battalion, had become the regimental reserve and moved to the vicinity of Wiesviller Q5353 to take up positions to the rear of Company "X" on the right and of one platoon of Company "B" and the remainder of Company "I" on the left. When the withdrawal was completed, one platoon of Company "B" and Company "I" held positions in the sector to the rear of the hill where Company "I" had attacked. The rest of Company "B", released by the regiment to the 3d Battalion at 1630A, moved out of the Company "I" sector and proceeded east and north through the sector held by Company "X"

here it was to attack to the left and west of Company "K" and approach from the right flank the hill which Company "I" had been unable to seize by frontal attack during the day.

Meanwhile it was necessary to provide for any counter attack which the enemy was likely to mount against the regimental front. The use of Company "B" as regimental reserve and, later, as an part of the 3d Battalion had left the 1st Battalion without a reserve company, and the use of Company "F" as the regimental reserve after Company "B" had been released to 3d Battalion, meant that the 2d Battalion had no reserve company. A number of reinforcements, newly assigned to the regiment, had arrived at Sarreinsming 05454, the location of the regimental command post. The Headquarters Commandant was ordered to send the 37 men and the non-commissioned officers who had been assigned to the 3d Battalion to their units. To the 2d Battalion as reserves went 19 men and the non-commissioned officers who had been assigned to that battalion. The reserve forces of the first battalion consisted of 18 men from Company "A", a number of men from the Regimental Anti-Tank Company, and the assigned non-commissioned officers of the newly arrived reinforcements.

Company "B", having withdrawn from the Company "I" sector and moved through the new sector occupied by Company "X" was prepared to attack from the right flank the hill which had been the objective of the attack by Company "I". Crossing the line of departure at 1925A the evening of 15 February, Company "B" moved forward to the west down into the draw on the left flank of Company "X" and into the clearing at Q599560. As it attempted to cross the clearing Company "B" began to receive enemy small arms and machine gun fire which slowed its progress. Two and a half hours later, at 2200A, the company had crossed the clearing to the edge of woods on the western side of the draw and was attempting to move up the slope of the hill where the 3d Platoon of Company "I" had during the morning suffered heavy casualties. The opposition to Company "B's" advance came chiefly from four enemy bunkers which the Company at first tried to by-pass while sending a combat patrol out to destroy the emplacements. In this action it was unsuccessful, and shortly before midnight of 15 February Company "B", except for the combat patrol, moved back to the east or Company "X" side of the clearing and began digging in.

The last hours of the day had also brought a heavy barrage of mortar and artillery fire from 88's, accompanied by small arms fire, to the sector held on hill 325 by Company "C" of the 255th Infantry. This sector lay west, to the left, of the hill held by Company "L", that is, it lay on the west side of the secondary road, number 3, running south and southwest from Bliesbrücken. By contrast the sector to the front of Company "X" had been very quiet.

Certain other events of the day, not directly a part of the narrative of the attack, should be recorded. In addition to heavy mortar fire, the enemy used rockets against our attack, some of the rockets falling in the vicinity of the 3d Battalion Command Post in Wiesviller. The enemy also had considerable armor in the vicinity, at least twelve tanks being reported to the regimental front, though some of these may have been assault guns. But the enemy did not use tanks in the regimental sector, just as the 255th Infantry did not employ tanks, though a number of them were in the area, because the terrain was not suited to their use.

The Commanding Officer of the regiment went to the forward area before the attack began and remained there throughout the day. During the morning the Commanding General of the 63d Division also was in the forward area for a time.

One occurrence was somewhat unusual. A number of prisoners of war, captured by the 3d Battalion of the 255th, were being taken under guard along the route to a collecting point for transportation to the regimental pen. Military Police of the 44th Division overtook the guard and his prisoners on the road, offered and were allowed to give the prisoners transportation. The prisoners were taken to the 44th Division cage.

On the morning of 16 February shortly after 1100A Company "B" of the 255th Infantry renewed its attack on the hill which Company "I" had not seized the preceding day, and which Company "B" itself had not been able to take the night before. Again the attack moved out from the woods on the left slope of the hill held by Company "K" and across the clearing. This time, however, two other elements were attacking in conjunction with Company "B". To the left, Company "I", reconstituted as a single platoon of three squads, two attacking and the third being in support with a section of light machine guns attached, again advanced upon the hill from the south and forward of the railway, though this time from a point somewhat to the right of the position from which the 3d Platoon of the company had attacked the previous day. The third element in the attack was Company "L" which had returned to the hill adjacent to the highway so that it launched its action from the left slope of the hill which was to be seized.

The communications used in this attack are worth noting. Company "I" which had found the range of its platoon radios too limited to be useful in the attack on the fifteenth, used the radios in relay to maintain contact within the platoon for the operations on 16 February. In the attack by Company "B" communication with the Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion, to which the company was attached for the action, was maintained through a line spliced in to the line to the telephone carried by the forward observer for a mortar section of Company "M" which was giving support to the attack. Staff Sergeant Wilbur L. Mumford, 17 095 345, the mortar forward observer, advanced with the attacking echelon of Company "B", laying his own communication line

as he went. Of his own volition he sent back information the battalion observation post concerning the progress of the attack and the location and movement of Company "B" as well as intelligence of enemy activity, this in addition to directing mortar fire. Once he went far forward of his telephone position to gain knowledge of the advance and received fragments of white phosphorus shells on his clothing.

In general the attack went well. Company "B" reached the bottom of the draw meeting only slight opposition and by 1155A had crossed the clearing and started to turn north in the woods on the hill which was the company's objective. At this point the company began to be opposed by machine gun fire and encountered a mine field. Here Private First Class James R. Mason, 35 656 012, having penetrated some distance into the mine field, inadvertently exploded a mine, though the explosion had blown off his foot, Private Mason would not allow medical aid men to endanger themselves by entering the mine field to assist him; instead, he persuaded them to throw medical equipment to him. When he had bandaged his own wound, he turned and continued to fire at the enemy. Several hours later he directed the activities of the Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon as it cleared the field to reach him.

While Company "B" at 1200A, an hour after its attack began, was encountering opposition to its attempt to move northward in the woods and toward the far slope of the hill which was its objective, Company "L" began its attack from the west side of the hill, opposite the attack by Company "B", and at the same time Company "I" moved in from the south. By 1243 Company "I" had advanced 200 yards without being opposed; Company "L" had destroyed and passed two emplacements and was turning north into the woods so that its attack was now parallel, rather than opposite, to the direction of Company "B's" advance. By 1305 Company "B" had reached its objective, had established contact with Company "I", had arranged for the battalion Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon to come and clear a mine field and help remove some wounded troops. The Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion had been with Company "I" in the attack. He now sent the Ranger Platoon as a contact patrol to the left toward the area where Company "L" was advancing. At 1317A Company "L" came up over the bridge to the left of Company "I".

The objective having been reached, Company "B" moved through Company "I" and returned to its former area and reverted to 1st Battalion control. Company "L" organized the defense of the new sector.

On 17 February the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 255th Infantry were to be the right edge of an attack involving the 253d Infantry and other elements to the left of the regimental front. The 255th Infantry was responsible for three actions on the day of the attack. At 0200A on 17 February it carried out "Operation Gamma". This operation consisted in moving a platoon of Company "F" forward of the line held by Company "B" along the left flank of

the regiment, a line running southwest on the high ground overlooking the main road, number 1, between Frauenberg Q5559 and Neumkirchen Q5258. The platoon of Company F moved forward to the new position, the area between Q541598 and Q545593, without opposition at 0200A.

The other two actions for which the 255th Infantry was responsible were raids, one with the code name "Seattle" by the 1st Battalion across the Blies River in the vicinity of Bliesbrücken Q5957, the other (in code "Portland") by the 2d Battalion on Habkirchen Q5859. This also involved crossing the Blies River.

Since the plans involved the use of the battalion reserve companies, Companies B and F, for the raids, the employment of these two companies in the attack by the 3d Battalion on 15 and 16 February raised the question of whether plans should be made to use other elements of the regiment for the actions. IN fact a change was tentatively agreed upon by the Regimental S-3 and the Commanding officers of the two Battalions involved. In the eventuation, however, the raids proceeded as originally planned, or nearly so.

Raid "Seattle" was intended to cause as much damage and as many casualties as possible in Bliesbrücken, being in part an action to mislead the enemy as to the sector of the chief action which was the attack by the 253d Infantry and the 70th Division to the left. The raid was carried out by seventeen men from Company B of the 255th Infantry led by Lieutenant Donald E. Brockel, Q549492. The raid was planned to include twice that number, but a number of the men who were to have been in the patrol were wounded in the attack in the 3d Battalion area on the day before, and others, because of difficulties with the river crossing, could not be taken to the Bliesbrücken side. All the men who made up the patrol had been in action in the attacks by Companies K and I during the evening of 15 February and in the attack by their own company in the same area on 16 February. They were, therefore, tired and reluctant to start on another mission, but Lieutenant Brockel's leadership was able to enspire the men. He had demonstrated his leadership and courage the preceding day in the attack on the hill in the 3d Battalion sector. When he saw a fellow officer, the Platoon Leader of a platoon attacking next to his own, Lieutenant Brockel took a .30 calibre light machine gun from its tripod and, in order to go to the wounded officer, moved out in full view of the enemy, firing the machine gun from a standing position to silence the enemy automatic weapons in the hedge row before which the officer had fallen.

The raiding party left the command Post of Company B at 0300A on 17 February. After only a few hours of rest. They moved to the west bank of the Blies River which they were to cross at Q581579. At this point the river, its rapid waters raised by thawing weather, was forty feet wide. The covering group of the patrol completed crossing in rubber boats by 0440. This group had the mission of taking positions at Q591530 and Q593581 on the high ground north of town from which it could lay protecting fire for the assault group. Although two

boats overturned and one was lost so that some men had to be left on the approach side, the assault group had crossed by 0520A. During the advance toward town Lieutenant Brockel wiped out two enemy emplacements, one a mortar position where he killed five enemy and wounded at least seven. His clothing was cut through by machine gun fire which also wounded his hand, a fact which he concealed from the men lest they become panicky. At 0703 the two-minute artillery preparation ended, and the patrol entered the town, throwing white phosphorous and fragmentation hand grenades into buildings occupied by enemy troops. They used automatic rifles and sub-machine guns to reply to enemy fire, especially sniper fire from second-storey windows. The patrol returned at 0820A, exposed by daylight to enemy observation. It suffered only three wounded, killed more than 20 enemy, and brought in one prisoner of war, taken as a guide should the patrol encounter mine fields on the return.

Raid "Portland", the demonstration by 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry, began in conjunction with the attack by the 253d Infantry to the left at 0200A. The raid began with the preparations for putting a bridge across the Elies River. This action drew heavy mortar fire. By 0520A the bridge was finished, and the order was given to artillery, Cannon Company, and Mortar Platoons to fire their mission, first a mission in one section of town to deceive the enemy as to the place of the assault and there a mission on the part of the town actually to be raided. At 0600A the order to make this shift in fire was given. The patrol from Company E raided the town successfully, and returned at 0700A with eleven prisoners of war. In preparation for this return staff sergeant Edward H. Patterson, 12082140, came back to the rallying point with seven prisoners. He left the area to help the patrol leader reassemble the patrol. In doing so Sergeant Paterson entered a Schu-mine field and detonated a mine which blew off his left leg. In falling he set off another which shattered his right arm and severely injured his right leg. He refused, however, to allow other members of the patrol to endanger their lives by coming into the minefield with a litter. Instead he crawled out of the minefield unaided. The only other casualty of the patrol was one man wounded by shrapnel. Before the raiding party had returned, the 253d Infantry was reported at 0620A to have taken its objective.

The 255th Infantry continued to defend along its sector from 17 February to 28 February. On 17 February thirty-eight former enlisted men of the regiment were commissioned second lieutenants by battlefield appointment.

During the night of 20-21 February the 254th Infantry, minus two battalions, relieved elements of the 255th Infantry and the 253d Infantry. Specifically, elements of the 2d Battalion of the 254th Infantry relieved one platoon of Company F of the 255th Infantry, the left flank platoon of the regiment.

On 23 February the Commanding General of the 63d Infantry Division presented the Award of the Silver Star to 1st Lieutenant James A. Udine, Jr., 01321389, at the Regimental Command Post at Sarreinsming, France, the first award of the Silver Star in the regiment.

31 March 1945

Regimental History

1 March 1945 - 31 March 1945

The 255th Infantry Regiment, commanded until 20 March 1945 by Colonel Edward A. Chazal, 015791, and after that date by Lieutenant Colonel James E. Hatcher, 0186357, engaged in three attacks during the month of March 1945. The first of these actions, a local attack by the 1st Battalion 255th Infantry while attached for operations to the 253d Infantry, began on 3 March 1945 and ended with the successful seizure of its objective on 6 March 1945. The second attack of the 255th Infantry during March 1945 was part of a large-scale action by The Seventh Army, beginning for the 255th Infantry on 15 March 1945 with an attack in Germany to the North of Sarreguemines, France, and continuing until 21 March 1945, by which date the Regiment had broken through the Siegfried defenses in the Saar Palatinate south of Hessel, had seized its objective beyond the main area of those defenses, and was out of contact with the enemy. For its third offensive action in March the 255th Infantry, again as part of a larger action, having crossed the Rhine River north of Worms and having moved south to relieve elements of the 44th Infantry Division, attacked southward toward Heidelberg on 28 March 1945, crossed the Neckar River, captured that city, and was continuing to attack as the month ended. During the intervals between these three attacks, the 255th Infantry occupied defensive or reserve positions and prepared for the offensive actions.

On 1 March 1945 the 255th Infantry occupied defensive positions on the high ground overlooking the Blies River from the southwest. The front extended from west of Frauenberg 05055 southeast a distance of approximately 5500 yards along the Blies River to a position opposite Bliesbrücken 05957. Two battalions were on line: the 2d Battalion was on the left, in positions adjacent to those of the 2d Battalion of the 254th Infantry, and held the section of the front extending from Frauenberg to and including Blies Ebersingen 05753, with Companies F and G on line and with Company E in reserve in the vicinity of Felpersweiler 05553 where the 2d Battalion Command Post was also located; the 1st Battalion 255th Infantry was on the regimental right flank with Companies C and B on line and Company A in reserve at Gross Wiesinger Hof where the 1st Battalion Command Post was located. The 1st Battalion right boundary was the right boundary of the 255th Infantry and of the 253d Infantry Division as well as of the XXIV Corps. Adjacent to this right boundary were elements of the 2d Battalion 114th Infantry of the 44th Infantry Division.

The 255th Infantry's Regimental Command Post was located in Sarreinsming 05454 where it had been since 20 January 1945. The 3d Battalion was in reserve at Steinbacher Hof 05255 between Sarreinsming and Sarreguemines.

During 1 March 1945 the 3d Battalion left Steimbacher Hof and moved to relieve the 1st Battalion on the right sector of the regimental front. The 1st Battalion moved into reserve preparatory to being attached to the 253d Infantry for operations.

At noon on 2 March 1945 the 1st Bn of 255th Infantry was attached to the 253d Infantry for operations to make the main effort in an attack by that regiment to seize and hold the high ground east and southeast of the town of Gudingen, Germany, high, wooded ground overlooking the town and the highway and railroad running along the Saar River between that town and Bubingen Q4964 to the south.

Field Order 11 issued by the Commanding Officer of the 253d Infantry at 030730A March 1945 ordered the following sequence of actions in this attack: At 030430A March 1945, more than nine hours before the attack, elements of the 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry were to raid Habbkirchen, coded as Raid "Z"; this town is more than 8 kilometers southeast of the area in which the attack was to take place. Before daylight the same morning, the 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry was to move to an assembly area in the Hinterwald Q5064, east of Bubingen, and to the rear of Company A of the 253d Infantry. The 1st Battalion 255th Infantry was to be reinforced with other elements, among them elements of Anti-Tank Company of the 255th Infantry; attached to the Battalion as well was Company A of the 749th Tank Battalion, a company of medium tanks, which was to move to an adjacent assembly area.

Between 0400A and 0600A of the same morning Company B of the 253d Infantry was to move forward from its reserve positions, north of Kleinblittersdorf Q4962, and relieve elements of Company C 253d Infantry in its sector north of Bubingen Q4964, a section between the Saar River and the Hinterwald which was held by Company A of that regiment. Company C 253d Infantry, less the right platoon of the company, was then to move to the assembly area to the rear of Company A 253d Infantry, the area where the 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry and the Company of medium tanks were to be assembling.

At 031305A March 1945, one hour before the attack, one company of the 254th Infantry, with a section of assault guns, was to raid Hartungshof Q5364 and the woods to the north, coded "X"; this large farm house stands in a valley north of Blichsrainsbach Q5263 and Eschringen Q5365, an area approximately three kilometers to the southeast of the main attack.

From 1400A to 1405A, the five minutes preceding the start of the attack, the 1st Field Artillery Battalion was to fire an artillery preparation on Objective "H", a high hill (the Birnberg or Birnberg, originally 340 meters in altitude) from which stone had recently been quarried.

At 1405A, the H-Hour of the attack, Company C (minus one platoon) of the 253d Infantry was to advance, seize, and hold this hill-quarry. At the same time Company A 99th Chemical Battalion, attached to 1st Battalion 255th Infantry, was to smoke Objective "H", the high, wooded area called the Kainbusch Q4966 and Q5066, north and west (i.e. beyond and to the left) of the hill-quarry and overlooking Gudingen Q4866.

This woods was the objective of the attack by the 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry. While Company A 99th Chemical Battalion was smoking this area, a smoke screen, which was to be maintained until ordered lifted and shifted in preparation for aiding the artillery by screening enemy observation from the north and north-east, the main attack was to begin.

The 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry, with the close support of Company A of the 739th Tank Battalion, was to attack, seize, and hold the Hahnbusch, this being the main effort of the action.

At 1630A, if weather permitted, the XIIth Tactical Air Force was to bomb Gudingon 04866, and then Fechingen 05166 and Eschringen 05305. When it had seized the wooded area overlooking the town, the 1st Battalion 255th Infantry was to raid Gudingon, clear the town, and establish road blocks and a strongpoint southeast of the town. Again the Battalion was to be supported by the Company of medium tanks, which then was to revert to the control of the 253d Infantry and be prepared to repel enemy counter-attacks from the north, northwest, and north east. In the wooded area, objective "H", the 1st Battalion 255th Infantry was to be given immediate, close support by the 822d Tank Destroyer Battalion.

If necessary, the platoon of Company C 253d Infantry which had been left in place when the company was relieved was to be ordered to mop up isolated resistance between the hill-quarry and the Saar River, an area approximately one and a half kilometers in width.

Field Order 11, Headquarters 253d Infantry, thus provided for two chief actions: The seizure of the hill-quarry, objective "G", and the seizure of the high wooded area overlooking Gudingon, the woods called Hahnbusch, coded as objective "H". Objective "G" was the task of part of Company C 253d Infantry; Objective "H" was the goal of the 1st Battalion 255th Infantry supported by a company of medium tanks.

In accordance with the Field Order, elements of the 2d Battalion 255th Infantry crossed the Blies River at 0430A on 3 March and conducted Raid "Z" on Hahkirchen 05059. The raiding party encountered heavy enemy small-arms and machine gun fire which wounded two of the patrol before the river crossing was completed. After the raiders withdrew, they called for artillery and cannon fire on the enemy positions revealed by the enemy's attempts to stop the raid. At 1305A of the same day Company C of the 254th Infantry, reinforced with a section of assault guns raided Mertenhof 0532043 and the woods to the north, the raid being preceded by five minutes of artillery fire. Within an hour, in the face of medium opposition consisting of machine gun, small arms, mortar, and light artillery fire, Company C 254th Infantry entered and began cleaning out the settlement with one platoon while another platoon set up blocking positions to the east of the settlement and a third platoon cleared the woods to the north. All elements were in position by 1500A. The raiding party withdrew at 2000A.


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Sketch of Atk by 1st Bn 255th Inf atchd 253d Inf 031405A Mar 45
 Scale: 1/25000 (Many details omitted)





MAP SHOWING AREA OF ATTACK BY
1ST BATTALION 255TH INFANTRY
WHILE ATTACHED TO
253RD INFANTRY
3-7 MARCH 1945

Meanwhile, the main attack to the north and west had not been going well because of intense enemy opposition. The 1st Battalion 255th Infantry moved out of the assembly area (see sketch) following tanks. Company C was on the right moving up along the edge of the woods south of the quarry. As forward element of the attack Company C was to take the left or west half of the woods, Objective "H". Company B followed at three hundred yards. As second element of the attack Company B was to seize the right half of the woods.

As the tanks followed by the infantry, moved into open country (050055) they encountered fire from anti-tank guns at the two southern points of the woods and from a gun between the woods and the hill-quarry. Six tanks were quickly rendered ineffective, and the rest of the tank company then withdrew to its original assembly area, reorganized and moved to set up a base of fire for the infantry.

Company C 255th Infantry, attempting to advance without the tanks had moved forward about 400 yards by 1425A against artillery fire. When the company, having advanced perhaps 800 yards, reached the open area where the tanks had been stopped, it ran into heavy enemy fire from automatic weapons located in houses at the edge of the quarry, (050255) approximately 200 yards east of the road up which the tanks had proceeded. At the same time the troops were receiving fire from 88 millimeter guns located in and on the opposite side of the quarry. Receiving fire from front, right, and right rear, Company C withdrew to reorganize.

Company A 255th Infantry had advanced from the assembly area to dig in at positions to the rear of Company C on the right and also to the rear of Company B to the left rear of Company C. Company A had gone forward and organized its defense when the 1st Platoon, on the right, was ordered to advance and take a house 050055. At 1700A Company A was ordered to take the objective which had been assigned to Company C, that is the left half of the high, wooded ground of Objective "H". By 1735A all elements of the 1st Battalion 255th Infantry had cleared the houses to their front and were attempting to move forward to the southern end of the woods which were the objective of the attack.

In the meantime Company C 255th Infantry, advancing as the right element of the attack, had been attempting to clear the hill-quarry from which very intense fire had been falling on the other elements in the action. At 1700A Company C 255th Infantry was ordered to support the action of the 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry (in its advance toward the southern edge of the woods) by fire from the northwest side of the lower, or southern, half of the quarry. By 2100A Company C 255th Infantry had cleared out the southern half of the quarry in spite of heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire and in the face of resistance which had grown more determined as the attack progressed. Having cleared this part of their objective Company C 255th Infantry began to dig in and organize defensive positions along this lower half of the quarry 050355.

While the right platoon of Company A 255th Infantry had been clearing out the house to its front, the extreme left platoon had been destroying machine gun positions

with white phosphorous hand grenades to clear the woods to the west of the quarry, woods on high ground commanding the main road and railway between Bubingen and Gulingen. With the way prepared by this action of Company A 255th Infantry. The Regimental Battle Patrol of the 253d Infantry advanced to clear the houses along this main road so that Engineers could establish a road block south of Gulingen. But the Battle Patrol was delayed by enemy machine guns to the left of the highway Q492555.

At 2350A Company B began a night attack to try to reach the southern edge of woods Q502660, the battalion objective. The area had received a two-minute artillery preparation, part of it white phosphorous, but Company B was not able to seize that part of the woods within half an hour of the attempted advance. An enemy patrol forced the Company to dig in 200 or 300 yards south of the lower edge of the Hahnbusch.

The first day of the attack, 3 March 1945, ended with Company C 253d Infantry having taken half of the hill-quarry, Objective "W", and with Company B 255th Infantry attempting unsuccessfully to reach the nearer edge of the high, wooded ground, Objective "X". The 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry had suffered heavy losses.

During the early hours of 4 March 1945 the 3d Platoon, the left element of Company A 255th Infantry, having cleared the woods Q495655 to the right of the main highway to Gulingen, moved north and west, silenced enemy resistance around a road block at Q492660, less than a kilometer south of the town, and awaited the Battle Patrol of the 253d Infantry which 500 or 600 yards to the south, had been halted in its attempt to clear the road.

Between 0425A and 0700A Company L 253d Infantry moved by foot the assembly area Q507644 to the rear of Company A 253d Infantry, there to be prepared to resist an enemy counter-attack.

Company C 253d Infantry moved forward from the southern half of the hill-quarry, Objective "W", and finally cleared out and reduced the last enemy strongpoint in that position by 041155A March 1945. The quarry had been protected by mine fields and, as commanding ground, was held desperately by the enemy, one prisoner of war reporting that the quarry had been ordered held at all cost. What added to the difficulty was the fact that all shells not only ricocheted themselves ^{or fused} but fragments of stone to act as a additional shrapnel.

Before Company C 253d Infantry had reached its final objective, it had sustained an enemy counter attack between its position and that of Company C 255th Infantry to the left. This enemy attack was repulsed at 0915A.

The 3d Platoon of Company A 255th Infantry, on the company's left flank, moved from the position on the highway where it had earlier knocked out an enemy road block and strongpoint at Q492660, and, swinging north and west in spite of enemy

opposition, established a road block and began digging in at 1010A at a point just to the south of Gudingen at Q487665. Later this position was supported by 3d Platoon Anti-Tank Company 253d Infantry. The rest of Company A 255th Infantry had attacked from the west against the left half of the woods, Objective "H" at 0600A. They moved along the left edge of the woods against enemy dugouts and captured a number of prisoners. Advancing north through the woods the company attempted to seize the high ground to the north of the woods, Hill 296.3, but an enemy tank forced the company to withdraw to the edge of the woods and to begin digging in. Before the defenses were completed, the enemy counter-attacked with four tanks supported by infantry. Tree-bursts from the tank fire caused numerous casualties among the men of Company A. Nevertheless the troops held and repelled the attack. By 1010A the Company was digging in and organizing a strongpoint in the woods. Communication lines had been knocked out by this attack and because the numerous casualties and the constant mortar and artillery fire made the reestablishing of the lines impossible, this part of Company A was without communication, except by messenger, for 22 hours, when communication by SCR 300 was brought into action.

At 1022A the tanks of Company A 749th Tank Battalion, which at 0510A had moved into positions below the quarry and south and west of the Zinterwald Q504646 where they were to break up an enemy counterattack in case any of the battalion were overrun, were released from the control of the 253d Infantry, effective 1200A. The tanks left the area of Kleinblettersdorf at 1400A.

After being stopped in its attempt to enter the right half of the Hahnbusch during a night attack, Company B 255th Infantry attempted a day attack at 0502662, the south edge of the Hahnbusch. The attack met heavy resistance from enemy strong-points and pillboxes, and the company was again halted, suffering numerous casualties. Plans were, therefore, made to take up the best possible holding position for the night. Companies B and C 255th Infantry were to be organized into a single company in positions where they would be in contact with those elements of Company A 255th which were in the left half of the Hahnbusch and also with the platoon of Company A organized at the road block south of Gudingen at Q492660. Company B 253d Infantry, earlier relieved in positions above Bubingen by Company L 253d Infantry, was to organize south of the woods to protect the rear of Companies A and B/C 255th Infantry and to maintain contact with Company C 253d Infantry on the hill-quarry, Objective "W".

The second day of the attack, 4 March 1945, therefore ended with the units moving into and organizing these positions. The day had seen progress by Company A 255th in entering the west half of Objective "H" and in reducing the road block below Gudingen as well as by Company C 253d Infantry in further occupying the quarry, Objective "W". The positions held at the end of the period were these: Companies L and A 253d Infantry, respectively left and right, held positions in grid squares 4964 and 5064 above Bubingen and adjacent to the positions of the 2d Battalion 253d Infantry. To their front Company B was in support positions in grid squares 4965 and 5065. The front formed a semi-circle around this position. On the left

from the highway to and including the left half of the Hahnbusch were the positions held by Company A 255th Infantry; on the right, where the front curved south, were the positions held by Company B/C 255th Infantry and adjacent to these the positions held in the quarry by Company C 253d Infantry.

The third day of the attack, 5 March 1945, brought virtually the completion of the seizure of the two objectives "E" and "W". At 0125A Company B/C 255th Infantry began to move into the right half of the woods. By 0540A the double company was digging in. At 0620A Company B 253d Infantry moved forward of these positions to clear the right half of the woods. Against opposition from enemy infantry and tanks, it advanced to seize the woods which it reported taken at 1210A. During the action the company had knocked out one tank and captured 15 prisoners of war. Earlier Company C 253d Infantry had again moved to reduce enemy resistance in the quarry. At 0833A the company reported having cleared out the enemy and again retaken the enemy strongpoint at the northwest end of the quarry. By 1300A the two companies which made up 1st Battalion 255th Infantry were organized in the woods, and Company A 255th Infantry had successfully taken the peak above the left half of the woods, the sector it had been unable to seize the previous day. So well was it in possession of both peak and forward slope that communication wire was being run so the company which had had no wire communications since early morning of the day before. Company A 255th Infantry also raided houses to the west of their positions, houses on the outskirts of Gdingen and took 8 prisoners. When the company repeated the raid on order of the Battalion Commander, The Company captured 40 more prisoners of war. The third day had been relatively successful. Because Company B 253d Infantry held positions in the troublesome right half of Objective "E", it was attached to 1st Battalion 255th Infantry.

The fourth day of the attack, 6 March 1945, ended with the attacking elements reaching and organizing the final areas of their objectives, strengthening their positions with defensive wire and mines. Patrols which had been operating during the preceding day continued to clear out pockets of enemy resistance to the rear of the forward positions, particularly along the road and railway north of Bubingen. Although Company L 253d Infantry, in support position, reported heavy mortar fire at 0150A, the enemy opposition especially his artillery and mortar fire was only sporadic during the early part of the period. At 1030A a platoon of Company A 255th Infantry attacked enemy installations to the west of their positions in the dense woods on the forward nose of the hill overlooking Gdingen. A platoon of Company C 255th Infantry followed this attack and by 1210A had organized the positions cleared. On the extreme left of the Company A sector, the crater at 40212 was made into a strong road block. Continued enemy attempts to hold the quarry and to deliver harassing fire from the commanding positions there were again frustrated. A platoon of Company C 253d Infantry, sent out to clear the quarry at 1245A was met with heavy enemy fire from a position there. But two hours later the platoon had captured the strongpoint. When Company C 253d Infantry had again completed this mission, it was relieved by Company L 253d Infantry which moved from support positions and completed the relief at 1830A.

Operations Instructions, Headquarters 63d Infantry Division, 061100A March 1945, directed that the 254th Infantry shift its boundary to the west to take up positions held by the right flank of the 253d Infantry. This done, the 253d Infantry was to take the positions held by the 1st Battalion 255th Infantry which then moved to reserve in the Steinbacher Hof 05255 and reverted to the control of the 255th Infantry. This change was to be completed before midnight of 7 March 1945.

On 7 March 1945, the last day of its attachment to the 253d Infantry, the 1st Battalion 255th Infantry improved the defense of its sector on the high ground southeast of Gudinggen. Company A 255th Infantry sent a strong combat patrol through Gudinggen and along the main road to Saarbrücken to a point at 0454678; the patrol encountered no enemy. This patrol was the last activity of the first attack action of the 255th Infantry during March.

On 8 March 1945 1st Battalion 255th Infantry returned to control of the regiment and moved into reserve position at Steinbacher Hof where it spent the next few days in rehabilitation. The regiment maintained its defensive positions until the night of 12-13 March 1945 when, in accordance with Operations Instructions 21, Headquarters 255th Infantry, it was relieved on position by elements of the 114th Infantry Regiment 44th Infantry Division. The 255th Infantry moved to Sarreguemines and received training on the attack on pillboxes in preparation for the second offensive action of the regiment during March 1945.

At 0100A on 15 March 1945 the 255th Infantry began the second of its attack actions for the month. This attack was part of a larger action in which the 63d Infantry Division, reinforced with tanks attached, in conjunction with the 45th Infantry Division on its right, to uncover the defensive positions of the Siegfried Line, penetrate these Siegfried defenses, seize Hassel 05874 and the hilly wooded area surrounding the town. (Hassel is approximately 4000 yards east and south of St. Ingbert 05575.) When the 63d Infantry Division had seized this objective, it was to turn the Siegfried defenses from the rear and capture Sarrebrücken 04671, assisted by elements of the 70th Infantry Division, attacking from the south and west.

The action of the 255th Infantry in this attack was ordered in Field Order 3, issued by the Regimental Commander at 140500A March 1945. This Field Order directed that should attack on D-Day (15 March) at H-Hour (0100A), passing through positions held by the 254th Infantry north and west of Bliessweiler 05261, in a column of battalions. The battalions were to march from Sarreguemines, crossing the Seare River, to reach assembly areas in the Mühlenwald, along Highway 2 leading from Sarreguemines northward to the west of the Elies River. The column of battalions was to assemble with 2d Battalion leading, followed by 3d Battalion, then 1st Battalion. The area of the 255th Infantry's attack lay west of a line reaching from Bliessbolchen 05462, northeast up a draw and along a road at the west edge of the woods, the kirchenwald, to Ormesheim; this right boundary included Ormesheim 05666 and extended northeast to include Ormesheim 05669 as well. This right boundary was

shared by the 180th Infantry Regiment of the 45th Infantry Division. The left boundary of the 255th Infantry, the boundary which it shared with the 254th Infantry to the west after the attack began, extended from Kruppenfeld Q531635, north of Bliesransbach, in a northeasterly direction so that it was adjacent to but excluding Eschringen Q5365 and Ensheim Q5467.

The 2d Battalion, heading the column of battalions, was to cross the line of departure - the Buhlbach running from the vicinity of Bliesransbach southeast into the Blies River - and attack to seize Objective "E". This objective was the group of hills covered by a large wooded area the nearer edge of which was two and a half kilometers to the northeast of the line of departure. The wooded area is divided into three forests, The Schorrenwald Q5354 and Q5355, at the southern end, the Saucrackerwald Q5454 and Q5455, and the Koppelwald Q5555 and Q5556. The 2d Battalion was also to seize Objective "A", Hill 372.9 Q5464, to the west of Objective "E" and above Hartungshof Q5364, the settlement raided by the 254th Infantry as a part of the action of the 1st Battalion 255th Infantry on 3 March 1945.

The seizure of these two objectives, "E" and "A", may be regarded as the first phase of the attack by 2d Battalion 255th Infantry, since the battalion, having seized Objective "E" was to organize and hold the ground, awaiting further orders. Field Order 3 further directed 3d Battalion, when it had moved to the assembly area, to maintain contact with 2d Battalion and at H-Hour to move to an assembly area in Bliesransbach to await orders. 1st Battalion was ordered to await orders in the assembly area, being prepared to provide a reinforced platoon to mop up by-passed pockets of resistance. One squad of the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon with an attached platoon of the 63d Reconnaissance Troop was to protect the right flank of the regiment and maintain contact with the 45th Infantry Division. The 255th Infantry was to have the direct support of one company of the 822d Tank Destroyer Battalion and of the 863d and 522d Field Artillery Battalions. It was to have in general support the regimental Cannon Company, the 718th Field Artillery Battalion, and Battery B of the 991st Field Artillery Battalion. Company B of the 70th Tank Battalion was to move after H-Hour to the vicinity of the Regimental Command Post in Bliesgersweiler Q523617, west of the Blies River, there to await orders.

The 2d Battalion 255th Infantry launched its attack at 0100A on 15 March 1945 and by 1130A had captured Objective "E" which it organized and defended for the rest of the day.

Half an hour after leaving its line of departure the 2d Battalion encountered a road block at Q529628, on Highway 2 leading from the south into Bliesransbach at the point where the road crossed the stream, the Buhlbach, just above the Gotzenmühle. This road block was not reduced for nearly three hours.

At 0200A while moving northeast up the high ground above the same Highway 2 between Dilsdorfchen, on the regimental right, and Bliesransbach, now occupied by

Elements of the 254th Infantry, Company E of the 255th Infantry came upon Company C which had been halted in its attempt to move to the assembly area. On order of its Battalion Commander Company E attempted to go around Company C, but both companies were pinned down in the vicinity of 0535023, above Retthof, by heavy machine gun fire from 0538025 further up the slope. The companies sent out maneuvering elements to either side of this point of resistance, reduced it, and two and a half hours later, having advanced more than a kilometer, Company E reported that it was in contact with the maneuvering element of Company C and 100 yards south of Objective A.

Meanwhile the 254th Infantry on the left had reported reaching Eschringen 05305, its Objective "E", and the 180th Infantry on the right, having crossed the Blies River reported having entered the woods, the Breiterwald, on the high ground east of Bliesmengen - Bolchen, their Objective "B".

At 0430A, therefore, the Regimental Commander of the 255th Infantry ordered the Commanding Officer of 3d Battalion to report to the Regimental Command Post to be familiarized with the situation and to be prepared to commit the battalion to the left of the 2d Battalion.

Although it continued to meet resistance, Company E advanced slowly along the right slope of Hill 323 (0540023) and by 0535A had reached 0540029 along the west fork of the draw, above Grefenthal, leading along the Schaferaberg to the southern edge of the woods, still 500 yards away, which was Objective "E". At the same time Company C was at 0542035 in the open fields north and east of Bliesransbach, still 100 yards from Objective A.

When, an hour later, at 0630A Company E had entered the lower part of Objective "E" and Company G was preparing to move in to help sweep the woods, the Regimental Commander ordered the 3d Battalion to move from Bliesransbach into position for an attack on Objective "A". While 3d Battalion, which, it was initially planned, would move through 2d Battalion after the capture of Objectives "A" and "E", was moving to the attack in a column of companies, proceeding along the road east of Bliesransbach, the regiment received word of the progress of adjacent units: leading elements of the 254th Infantry were reported in Eschheim 05407, their Objective "L"; the 253d Infantry had reached all of its objectives; but the 180th Infantry, to the right of the 255th Infantry, was meeting increased resistance to the north of the woods 05601, their Objective "B", and was reinforcing that area as well as sending elements into Bliesbolchen for a flanking assault.

Company K, the lead company of 3d Battalion 255th Infantry, having moved along the road east out of Bliesransbach, sent its 1st and 2d Platoons north through a lined, defiladed draw 200 yards to the right of the woods below Objective "A". At 130A, while Company C was attempting to attack objective "A" from 0535045 to the west of the hill and north of Hartungshof, Company K began the attack from the right edge of the woods, that is from the southern slope of the objective. Company K moved forward in line of platoons, sweeping the objective with 60 millimeter mortar

MAP WITH
OVERDRAWING.
SHOWING
AREA AND OBJECTIVES
OF THE ATTACK
BY THE
255TH INFANTRY
15 MARCH 1945
SCALE: 1/25,000

NOTE

The following are the map sheets referred to by the coordinates used in the text:

France	1:25,000	Sarrequehines	3 & 4
Germany	1:25,000	Spargemund	Sheet 6508
Germany	1:25,000	St Johann	Sheet 6708
Germany	1:25,000	Blieskastel	Sheet 6707
Germany	1:25,000	Illingen	Sheet 6603
Germany	1:25,000	Neunkirchen	Sheet 6609
Germany	1:25,000	Homburg	Sheet 6610
Germany	1:25,000	Otterberg	Sheet 6412
Germany	1:25,000	Winnweiler	Sheet 6413
Central Europe	1:100,000	Kaiserslautern	Sheet U-2
Germany	1:100,000	Mannheim	Sheet U-3
Germany	1:25,000	Benheim	Sheet 6317
Germany	1:25,000	Viernheim	Sheet 6417
Germany	1:25,000	Ladenburg	Sheet 6517
Germany	1:25,000	Heidelberg	Sheet 6518





SAARGEMUND

5/2 St. Johann 1:50,000 53

SECOND DEUXIEME EDIT, N (AEF) (COLORED)

F

SHEET
FEUILLE

57000m

55

56

54

53

Ormesheim

Watten

Hugelort

Teuchingen

254 = 255

A

FIRE AD

Bleibensbach

255 = 256

Febels

fire while a platoon of heavy machine guns from Company M, having established a base of fire advanced its fire across the slope. By 1847A, only 17 minutes after starting its attack, Company K had seized the objective and was reorganizing to push on. It had captured nearly 20 prisoners of war and had suffered no casualties.

The attack of Companies E and G was also progressing, though not so rapidly. The 2d Battalion had encountered enemy rifle fire from the slope of the Heidenkopf to the east of the objective. Nevertheless by 0850 they had captured nearly two-thirds of the objective and had reached the phase line running through Sauerackerwald between Fonsleimerhof 0548550 and Hunackerhof 056047. By 1130 the two companies have overrun the entire objective, though there were still pockets of resistance and snipers to be cleared out.

At 0803, two hours after the Regimental Commander had reconnoitered the terrain for their possible use, the tanks of Company B 70th Tank Battalion moved out of Bliesgerweiler and advanced through the area between Objective "A" and "E". By 1240 they were beyond the northern end of Objective "E".

The seizure of Objectives "A" and "E", the first by Company K of the 255th Infantry and the second, more slowly, by companies E and G may be regarded as ending the first phase of the Regimental attack, a phase lasting from 0100A to 1200A, though Company K had seized Objectives "A" by 0847A. There were, however, other problems in this phase. Resistance in Objective "E" continued for several hours after the entire wood had been overrun, but resistance in the northern end of the objective was slight and a prisoner of war, who said that his company was badly shot up, reported that his unit was retreating north out of the woods when he was captured. Also, there were other enemy groups which continued to put up opposition. One pocket of resistance, earlier by-passed by Companies E and G, remained in the area between Ritthof 0536622 and Hill 323 0545627. Company F had been left in this area as Companies E and G went on to Objective "E". One platoon of Company B with the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon was also employed to reduce this opposition. By 1545A the platoon of Company B was reported to have suffered numerous casualties in the area, and a platoon of Company E was ordered to move south and assist in taking the hilly area. At 1625A this enemy strongpoint was cleared.

As the first phase of the attack by the 255th Infantry ended at noon 15 March 1945, two reports came from adjacent units. The 130th Infantry, on the regiment's right, was having some difficulty in clearing Harkirchen 15659 which was now in the rear of its advance elements. And Company B of the 254th Infantry, moving out of Eschringen 05365, had taken the wrong road and instead of going to Ensheim 05467, had moved at 1110A into the outskirts of Ormesheim 05666. This town, still in enemy hands, was Objective "F" of the 255th Infantry. Company B 254th Infantry was ordered to remain in this position until relieved by elements of the 2d Battalion 255th Infantry.

Although the capture of Objective "E" was delayed until nearly noon, Company

K, the leading Company of the 3d Battalion attacking to the left, had seized Objective "A" by 0847A. Company K immediately reorganized and moved north and east. According to Field Order 3, when 2d Battalion had seized and held Objective "A" and "B", 3d Battalion was to move north and east with the aid of tanks and seize Objective "B" 05567, a hill east of Ensheim and northwest of Ormesheim, and Objective "F", Ormesheim itself 05666, assisted by fire from 2d Battalion to the south. The 3d Battalion was then to continue the attack by seizing that part of Objective "G" which lay in its zone of advance. Objective "G" was Ormesheim 05669 and the area west of town along secondary highway 2 leading into the town from the south west along the stream, the Saarbach, including the high ground north of the road and stream as far west as the Kinkelbach at 05568. The east part of this objective was the zone of advance of the 1st Battalion; the west or left part of the objective lay in the 3d Battalions zone of advance.

Therefore Company K, still leading the 3d Battalion, attacked to the north and east, encountering enemy small arms fire from the house and barn of Ponsheimerhof 0547650. The assault echelons of the two leading platoons pushed forward, leaving elements to reduce this resistance. The 1st Platoon swung left down the draw along the stream called the Buschbach, meeting enemy machine gun fire from 0541658, south of Eschringen, knocked out the machine gun and turned right up the valley of the Saarbach; the 2d Platoon, on the right, moved straight forward across the nose of hill called the Scharfeck; thus, the two platoons converged in an attack on the populated area around Gatsenmühle at 0550661. Faced by continuous small arms and artillery fire, the assault waves of the two platoons pinned down, Company K placed all possible automatic weapons fire on the town and sent the support platoon to the right to attack the village from the rear. This maneuver succeeded; enemy opposition ceased, and the remaining 17 enemy soldiers surrendered. Company K reorganized and continued to attack to the northeast at approximately 1100A, advancing toward Objective B, the high ground east of Ensheim. The 3d Platoon, lead was subjected to heavy small arms and artillery fire from the enemy. Because of this difficulty the company was ordered to hold its advance since it had moved out of range of supporting artillery fire. However, Company K asked for and received permission to attack without artillery. By 1250A the company had seized Objective "B" and was prepared to continue the attack on order.

At 1350A, because 2d Battalion was still engaged in clearing Objective "B" and other areas, the 3d Battalion was ordered to send a company to take Ormesheim, Objective F. Company K was ordered at 1430A to continue its attack toward Objective G, the high ground above the Kinkelbach 05668. It was halted by severe enemy machine gun, mortar, artillery fire and by direct fire from enemy self-propelled guns, the enemy forward positions being located in the woods which surrounds the crossing of grid lines 56 and 68, the enemy artillery being emplaced on the rising ground on the far side of the Kinkelbach. (Note that the enemy infantry was here defending a reverse slope.) The 2d Platoon of Company K moved right from its support position, made its way through an enemy minefield at the edge of the woods and along a covered route in the valley of the Saarbach, so that it outflanked the enemy forward positions. By 1545A, the whole company had moved

through this route and attacked from the woods to overrun enemy rear positions. And by 1700A Company K had seized its part of Objective "G". In the action the Company had destroyed or captured 3 enemy 150m.m. guns, 4 enemy 88 mm towed guns and 2 full-track prime movers; it had also captured 30 enemy prisoners, destroyed a German show wagon, and a light machine gun section had knocked out an enemy tracked vehicle. In less than nine hours after its original attack the company had advanced more than five miles and captured nearly 80 prisoners.

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion had been moving forward through the area to the west of Objective "L" and by 1705A had reached the road at Q550b leading from Ormesheim to Eschringen. At 1825A 1st Bn moved across road and started advancing toward the right half of Objective "G", Ormesheim Q5809 and the area to the west of town to include the slopes on both sides of the Dahlheimerbach, that is to include the northeast quarter of grid square 5808. Company A on the right extended to the western edge of Ormesheim; Company B (minus one platoon, the one helping clear out enemy resistance in the rear around hill 323) advanced on the left along highway 2 leading from Neumehlerhof Q5580b4 north and northeast to Ormesheim adjacent to the Saarbach. By 1930A, an hour after it started, Company A was on the outskirts of Ormesheim and at 2035A was preparing to send a platoon on a raid into the town at the same time that Company B had seized its objective. The battalion was now in a somewhat exposed position. Ormesheim to its rear had not been taken, and on the regimental right flank the 180th Infantry had advanced no further than the high ground around the crossing of grid lines 57 and 64, a position not so far advanced as Objective "B" held by the 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry.

The 3d Battalion had been warned at 1350 to prepare to send a company to seize Ormesheim Q5809, Objective "F". Company I began its attack on the town without aid from tanks because the Commander of Company B of the 70th Tank Battalion was unwilling to risk sending his armor into the place-at 1940 these tanks were ordered to enter the town and help Company I secure it, but by 2400A Company I was still engaged in a fire fight with enemy elements within the town.

At 2226A Company G was ready to move to Ensheim Q5467 to help elements of the 254th Infantry (The town was Objective "L" for that regiment) organize and defend the town.

The first day of the attack, 15 March 1945, by the 255th Infantry ended with the regiment having secured all of its objectives except Ormesheim where resistance was being reduced by Company I and except Ormesheim which was under attack by Company A. The regiment had advanced more than five miles from its line of departure and met quite determined enemy resistance.

At 160200A March 1945 the Regimental Commander issued Operations Instructions #1. It directed that 1st and 3d Battalions be prepared at any time after 0600A 16 March 1945 to push forward in a limited attack on that portion of the Siegfried Line beginning east of grid line 56 (north and west of Ormesheim) but not to advance over grid line 70 (south of Hecken-Dahlheim). This attack, the instructions

directed, must present a picture of real effort to reduce that portion of the line but must not engage the troops so much that they could not be withdrawn later. 2d Battalion was to be prepared to move to Ensheim, pick up Company G, and be prepared to pass through the gap prepared by the 254th Infantry (to the west of the feinting attack), there to defend and block to the west. 1st and 3d Battalions were also to be prepared to pass through this gap and attack to the east to neutralize the Siegfried Line. The feint by the 255th Infantry was to be accompanied by artillery fire and by direct fire from tanks and tank destroyers. The frontal pressure was ordered to be continuous.

The second day of the attack, 16 March 1945, was relatively quiet. At 0030A Company G arrived at Ensheim 55457 to assist the 254th Infantry in defending the town, that regiment beginning its attack on the Siegfried Line at 0200A. Enemy activity continued in and to the right of Omersheim during the darkness. At 0905 the platoon of Company A received a local enemy counterattack of one tank accompanied by infantry, but the platoon held its positions. By 1010A Company had sent a patrol through Omersheim, Objective "F", and found the town clear so that the company moved in, organized the town and sent patrols to the flanks. At 1540A a company of enemy troops was reported to be moving north from Company A, apparently retreating, but at the same time an enemy force of approximately 100 enemy foot troops moving from the direction of 5564710, the high ground southwest of Ober-Wurzbach attacked southeast against Company B's positions at 5569594, the left flank of the company and near its boundary with Company K. Artillery fire repulsed this attack, and a patrol moved out from Company B to check the area. At 0900A the 2d Battalion moved to Eschringen where it was joined by Company G at 2030A, the company having been relieved in Ensheim. At 1925A a patrol from Company L, the left company of the regimental front on Objective "G" had made contact with elements of the 254th Infantry on their Objective "H". During the day plans were made by the Regimental Commander and the commanding officers of their respective units to use the tanks and tank destroyers as a team. The vehicles were to be put into position during cover of darkness.

Operations Instructions 22, issued at 1700050A March 1945, directed that 1st and 3d Battalions, 255th Infantry attack at 0530A 17 March 1945 from their positions, effect and widen a penetration in the Siegfried Line east of grid line 55, and support the penetration by the 254th Infantry. 2d Battalion 255th Infantry was to move to an assembly area in the Betelwald, the wooded area south of Omersheim, preparing to probe the Siegfried Line with a company attack between grid lines 57 and 58, that is, north of Omersheim. The infantry was to be supported - besides the support of the artillery - by a Company G 70th Tank Battalion, Company C 775th Tank Destroyer Battalion, a self-propelled Company, and a company of the 822d Tank Destroyer Battalion.

In accordance with this Operations Instructions, the attack was resumed on the third day, 17 March 1945. The 3d Battalion 255th Infantry, less Company I, attacked at 0545 from its position west of Omersheim on Objective "G" and moved to the high ground south and west of Hecken-Dahlheim in grid square 5569 and part of grid

square 5669, on the left of the regimental front. The forward movement was unopposed and by 0617A Companies K and L were digging in. When visibility improved, however, a short while later, the companies began to receive sniper fire as well as heavy fire from machine guns and mortars. Company I patrolled the streets of Omersheim, to the regiment's right rear, and worked out plans for making a secure defense of the village, because earlier a 1st Battalion patrol had reported being unable to make contact with the 180th Infantry to the right; this regiment's positions were last reported to be much to the rear of the 255th Infantry.

Troops of the 1st Battalion 255th Infantry on the right of the regimental front also launched an attack. At 0530A, in conjunction with the attack the 3d Battalion, the battalion moved forward and consolidated the high ground north of Omersheim at 0570095, Company C seizing the area east of Hecken-Dahlheim, Company A, farther east, taking the ground above and to the east of the highway between Omersheim and Ober Wurzbach to the north. Company B on the left, also shared in the attack and, when it had taken the area along the highway leading northeast into Hecken-Dahlheim, one platoon of the company actually entered the southeastern outskirts of the town. Later this platoon withdrew so that artillery and tank destroyer fire could be placed on the town itself.

At 0805A the 3d Battalion 254th Infantry, on the left of the 255th Infantry received a counterattack, later repulsed, but because of this delay the 255th was unable to use tank and tank destroyer fire as early as it might have. However, at 1000A the tanks and tank destroyers began to fire against Siegfried Line positions in the 1st Battalion area, an action which drew an enemy counterattack to the front of Company B. The armor pounded the pillboxes with fire and at 1130A the tank destroyers moved closer to the position. By noon elements of the 1st Battalion were moving through Omersheim into positions beyond it.

At 1735A, the 1st Battalion having secured its positions, the 2d Battalion moved from its night assembly area south of Omersheim, and advanced to attack the Siegfried positions at 0573708, north and east of Hecken-Dahlheim. For its attack the 2d Battalion moved between and through Company C on the left and Company A on the right. Both of these companies attempted to go forward to support with fire the attack by 2d Battalion; Company A met light resistance, but Company C received heavy artillery fire of large caliber and machine gun fire from pillboxes in the line and was forced to dig in. The enemy artillery positions could not be observed because of heavy smoke and dust to the front. In the face of very heavy resistance the 2d Battalion advanced and captured two pillboxes.

Before the 2d Battalion launched its attack Company B had been moved from its position on the left of its battalion, adjacent to Company L, and had taken up positions on the right of the 1st Battalion, positions in grid squares 5870 and 5970, southwest of Nieder Wurzbach, to protect the right flank and to support by fire, if possible, the attack by 2d Battalion. By 1530A word was received that elements of the 180th Infantry on the right of the 255th Infantry had come up in line below Nieder Wurzbach, moving toward the east-west railroad just below that town.

Thus the right flank of the 255th Infantry was no longer exposed.

Because a reconnaissance party of officers from Company E were subjected to heavy fire and suffered a number of casualties, Company F was the lead company in the attack, followed by Company E and then Company G. By 1800A Company E had reached hill 380, Q5770 and proposed moving on. In this attempt the company received heavy artillery fire and an assault team of tanks and tank destroyers moved to assist the attack. Company F moved in on the right of Company E. At 1905A Company E captured the center pillbox on Hill 380.5 and was attacking the fortifications to either side of it. By 2250A, Company F had taken a pillbox to the right of Company E, Company G was moving in between the two companies, and Companies A, C, and D had moved into position just to the front of the dragons teeth tank barrier.

The last action of the third day of the attack, 17 March 1945, was the order to Company I to move all personnel, less one platoon, astride the Kirchelbach south of Ensheimerhof in grid squares Q5568 and Q5569.

On 18 March 1945, the fourth day of the action, the 255th Infantry continued to exert pressure against the Siegfried defense and prepared for breaching the line. During the early part of the day Company F continued to assault pillboxes on Hill 373.6 northeast of Zecken-Dahlheim at Q575709, to the right of Company E, and captured a total of three pillboxes before 0630A. At this time Company F with Company G (which had been to the right rear of Company F) was withdrawn and moved to the vicinity of Omersheim. Company E on the battalion left had suffered heavy casualties and had to be reorganized. By 1142A the remaining platoon of Company I had left Omersheim and moved to join the company which was digging in in defensive positions on the right flank of the regiment.

At 180545 March 1945 the Regimental Commander issued Operations Instructions 23. These instructions directed that two companies of 2d Battalion relieve Company A and Company B on position immediately after dark on 18 March 1945. These two companies would move to assembly area near Omersheim in preparing to attack the Siegfried Line for a break-through. The 1st Battalion was ordered to attack at 0330A 19 March 1945 and reduce three groups of pillboxes: Group 1, those on Hill 373.6 around the crossroads at Q575703; Group 2, those covering the highway between Omersheim and Ober Wurzbach at Q577112; Group 3, those on Obentaler Berg Q5671. One company was to reduce Group 1 by daybreak of 19 March. A tank-infantry team was to go through this breach at daybreak and establish a road block to the north against enemy attack. To exploit the breakthrough Company C 740th Tank Battalion and Company C 776th Tank Destroyer Battalion were to assist in reducing the pillboxes. Prior to this action Company C 263d Engineers was to clear the mine field at Q579703 for passage by the armor; and during dark on 18 March was to use demolitions to destroy the dragons teeth in the area as well as seven pillboxes. The 63d Field Artillery Battalion was to use smoke to screen observation from the high ground to the rear of the Siegfried Line and to neutralize enemy anti-tank fire. The 3d Battalion was to be prepared to follow the 1st Battalion through the

Breach.

At 2200A 18 March 1945, in accordance with these instructions, Companies F and G relieved companies A and B on position.

At 0530A 19 March 1945, the fifth day of the attack, Company A, moving through the gap in the dragons teeth prepared by the Engineers, advanced toward Hill 373.6. By 0555A it had cleared the pillboxes there, those in Group 1 and was organizing its position. The company had received a good deal of machine gun fire and at 0630A, when the tanks were moving through the dragons teeth, obscured by heavy dust, and the tank destroyers were waiting at the dragons teeth for the signal to move out, Company A called for litter bearers and for more ammunition. (The tanks brought the ammunition along.)

Company B began moving through Company A at 0725A preceded and followed by tanks while the tank destroyers turned left (that is, north) to establish a road block on the road north to Ober Wurzbach. In its initial advance Company B knocked out at least one pillbox in Group 2, but received so much machine gun, artillery, and mortar fire that its first attempt to seize all of Group 2 failed. The company withdrew to reorganize on the hill held by Company A. Having attacked again Company B successfully seized the pillboxes on either side of the highway and held the area. Company C then began to move through Companies A and B to attack Group 3, the pillboxes on Obertaler Berg east of the highway. Because of heavy opposition the attack went forward very slowly. At 1430A, an hour after Company C began its attack, Company F was attached to the 1st Battalion to assist Company C. As the day ended the two companies were still attacking.

The 3d Battalion continued to hold its defensive positions on the regimental right during the morning of 19 March 1945, a period in which it was subjected to increased light artillery fire and to a number of rocket barrages. At 1128A Company I was ordered to move to the north and east and occupy Hacken-Dahlheim. Company I entered the town from the east along the highway coming from Ommersheim - The company encountered mines along the road, and when it had without much opposition cleared the lower half of the village, discovered a road block and, at the eastern entrance to the town, a bridge with unexploded demolition charges. By 1550A in spite of small arms and machine gun fire from Siegfried line positions above the town, Company I had secured its objective and was clearing out civilians prior to their being screened by counter-intelligence agencies.

By the end of the day the regiment had captured 21 pillboxes and was continuing to attack. The 254th Infantry on the regiment's left and the 180th Infantry on the right were also continuing their assault on the Siegfried defenses.

The sixth day of the attack, 20 March 1945, marked the complete breakthrough of the Siegfried defense by the 255th Infantry. With the 254th Infantry, the regiment was the first element of the 7th Army to make this breach.

It was a day of great advances. Company F, continuing the attack which it had shared with Company C the day before, moved forward nearly two kilometers to seize at 1345A the road junction at Q595733, the point at which the highway between Ober- and Nieder - Wurzbach is joined by the highway leading south from Kassel. The road is here adjacent to the rail between the Nieder - Wurzbach and St Ingbert. Company F held the junction until relieved at 1730A by Company K.

The rest of 2d Battalion, less Company F, had also made a great advance. It moved up the highway between Hatten-Dahlheim and St Ingbert to seize an objective approximately 3 kilometers to the northwest of Hatten-Dahlheim. By 1350A it had captured this high ground overlooking the highway and near Reichenbrunn at Q645726. This objective is to the west of the area around Kassel which was the final regimental objective, assigned in Field Order 3, Headquarters 255th Infantry, of 14 March 1945, the order which set the attack in motion. The 2d Battalion held this objective during the rest of the day.

At the same time the 3d Battalion was also attacking but in the other direction, that is, to the northeast. By 1345A it had seized an area along the highway between Nieder-Wurzbach and Kassel, an area to the north of the junction which Company F was capturing at precisely the same time. This hill commands both the highway and the railroad and is the extreme right portion of the regimental objective of Field Order 3.

Meanwhile the 1st Battalion had lost contact with the enemy about daybreak and spent the day mopping up the scattered points of resistance and the stragglers left by the retreating enemy. After much of the armor of the 6th Armored Division had passed through the gap in the Siegfried Line, the 1st Battalion 255th Infantry was placed in regimental reserve.

Thus the sixth day of the attack, 20 March 1945, constituted the real end of the action to breach the Siegfried Line. In the period the regiment had advanced more than eight miles over difficult terrain against strong enemy opposition and finally breached a heavy band of permanent defensive fortifications and defenses.

On 20 March 1945, Colonel Edward A. Chazal 015791 was relieved of the command of the 255th Infantry. Lt Colonel James E. Hatcher assumed command on that day at the Regimental Command Post in Cammerheim, Germany.

The regiment, no longer in contact with the enemy, on 21 March 1945 moved by marching to Homburg, Germany Q7180 a distance of approximately 20 miles. On the same day Lt. Colonel Marion W. Schewe 0250195 was relieved of his post as Executive Officer of the Regiment. Two days later at Birbach, Germany Q6679, an area to which the regiment had moved from Homburg, Lt. Colonel John R. Smock 0304573 assumed the duties of Executive Officer of the 255th Infantry.

After a period of training and rehabilitation in the area around Birbach, the regiment with other elements of the 63d Infantry division moved by truck to an

assembly area around Hochstein MO703, approximately 25 miles to the north and east. Here again the regiment was in reserve and conducted rehabilitation and training programs.

On 28 March 1945, the 255th Infantry moved by truck from the vicinity of Hochstein to cross the Rhine at Hamm above Worms and assemble in a forested area in the vicinity of Lempertheim, Germany, M5311.

Operations Instructions 27, Headquarters 255th Infantry, 291900A March 1945, ordered that the 255th Infantry relieve the 114th Infantry Regiment of the 44th Infantry Division on position north of Heidelberg and attack to seize that city. In the 63d Division the 253d Infantry was in reserve, the 254th Infantry on the Division right (or west) flank, the 255th Infantry on the left with the 63d Reconnaissance Troop maintaining contact between the 255th Infantry and elements of the 3d Infantry and 12th Armored Division to the east. The 255th Infantry was to move to the rear of the 114th Infantry by truck shuttle. The 2d Battalion 255th Infantry was to be in reserve in the vicinity of Leutershausen P5600. The 1st Battalion was to attack to the east and south of Schriesheim P5797 and prepare to seize Objective "Y", Ziegelhausen R7491. The 3d Battalion was to attack southward from Schriesheim to take Heidelberg P5970.

The 3d Battalion completed the relief of 3d Battalion 114th Infantry at 0430A on 30 March 1945. Half an hour later it attacked to the south of Schriesheim along Highway 1 leading to Heidelberg. By 0626A, Company L, the leading company had seized Dossenheim, encountering much tactical wire but little or no resistance. By 0810 the whole battalion was in Neuenheim and Company L, on the river front, finding that all bridges across the Neckar River had been destroyed, located a boat-house and began crossing the river in row boats and canoes. When the 1st Platoon was across, it was ordered to return the boats, and a process of ferrying Company I and the rest of Company L across into Heidelberg. An hour later the battalion was in possession of the city, Company L on the right or west of the north-south highway, the Ronerstrasse, through the city, Company I on the left. Only moderate artillery fire had fallen on Neuenheim, almost the sole evidence of resistance by an enemy who appeared withdrawing to rear positions. Heidelberg was captured intact.

The 1st Battalion had also attacked moving east from Schriesheim and then south. By 0925A it had taken Ziegelhausen R7491 and was flushing the high ground and woods to the right and left of the town, ground overlooking the Neckar.

Thus in the third attack of March 1945 the 255th Infantry was the first element of the army to cross the Neckar River in the vicinity of Heidelberg. Among the 7 enemy officers and 74 enemy enlisted men captured by the 3d Battalion in this operation was General Major Ernst Robert Carl Rodenwaldt, formerly a bacteriologist of Heidelberg University.

On 31 March 1945, a trestle bridge having been established across the Neckar nearly all elements of the regiment crossed into the city. The 1st Battalion moved

into regimental reserve from Ziegelhausen to Heidelberg. The 2d Battalion took up positions on the south side of the river in the zone assigned to the 253d Infantry which on this day attacked across the front of the 255th Infantry. The 3d Battalion, having attacked to the south and seized its objective, asked for and received permission to take the town of Leimen 8693837. When the town had been captured the battalion prepared to continue the attack.

HEADQUARTERS 255TH INFANTRY
APO 410 U S ARMY

30 April 1945

OPERATIONS IN EUROPE

April 1945

PART I

SECTION I : REGIMENTAL HISTORY

SECTION II : CASUALTY SUMMARY

The following are the map sheets referred to by the co-ordinates used in this text:

Germany	1:100,000	Mannheim	Sheet	U-3
Germany	1:100,000	Rothenburg	Sheet	U-4
Germany	1:100,000	Karlsruhe	Sheet	V-3
Germany	1:100,000	Ellwangen	Sheet	V-4
Germany	1:100,000	Ulm	Sheet	W-4
Germany	1:100,000	Augsburg	Sheet	W-5
Germany	1:100,000	Ravensburg	Sheet	X-4
Germany	1:100,000	Weilheim	Sheet	X-5
Germany	1:25,000	Eberbach	Sheet	6519
Germany	1:25,000	Zwingenberg	Sheet	6520
Germany	1:25,000	Oberschefflenz	Sheet	6521
Germany	1:25,000	Adelsheim	Sheet	6522
Germany	1:25,000	Boxberg	Sheet	6523
Germany	1:25,000	Eppenbach	Sheet	6524
Germany	1:25,000	Mosbach	Sheet	6620
Germany	1:25,000	Dallau	Sheet	6621
Germany	1:25,000	Sennfeld	Sheet	6622
Germany	1:25,000	Ingolfingen	Sheet	6623
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Germany	1:25,000	Rappeneau	Sheet	6720
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Note: map sheets (contd)'

Germany	1:25,000	Untergroningen	Sheet 7025
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Germany	1:25,000	Moggingen	Sheet 7125
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Germany	1:25,000	Heidenheim	Sheet 7326
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30 April 1945

REGIMENTAL HISTORY
APRIL 1945

During the month of April the 255th Infantry was, from 1 April 1945 until 23 April 1945, continuously attacking or preparing to attack. In this attack it advanced during these four weeks from the vicinity of the Neckar River near Heidelberg and moved south and east to reach a position approximately sixty miles beyond the Danube River, a position near Landsberg.

1 April 1945

On 1 April 1945 the 255th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Lt. Colonel James E. Hatcher (-156357), occupied positions to the south of Heidelberg, Germany, the city which it had taken the previous day. The 3d Battalion, which had crossed the Neckar River in row boats and canoes to seize Heidelberg, had asked and received permission to continue the attack to the south. ON 1 April the battalion held positions around Leimen B5953, some six kilometers south of Heidelberg on the main road running south of that city.

The 2d Battalion was in the vicinity of Waldhilsbach, B7586 southeast of Heidelberg, in positions to which it had moved to the forward element to relieve the 253d Infantry which, having crossed the Neckar River at Mannheim, had moved east through the area and parallel to the front of the 255th Infantry and was preparing to attack to the east.

The 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry was still, as the month opened, on the north side of the Neckar River near Ziegelhausen B7491, the town which it had cleared in an attack the preceeding day. This battalion was prepared to cross h the river.

At 0140A 1 April the Regimental Command Post in Neuenheim B5991 was closed and the Command Post moved across the river into Heidelberg, crossing on a tread-way bridge which, rapidly constructed, now spanned the river. Two hours later the 1st Battalion was also moving to cross to the southern bank.

Operations Instructions No. 23, issued by the commanding General of the 63d Infantry Division, arrived at the 255th Infantry Regimental Command Post at 0330A. It directed that the 63d Infantry Division, now assigned to the VI Corps, regroup and prepare to continue to attack in zone., attacking in Combat Teams which, having been discontinued prior to the Rhine crossing, were to be formed again.

This order read in part as follows:

Operations Instructions No. 23, Headquarters 63rd Division, 31 March 1945: 1. 63rd Inf Div Asg'd VI Corps 010001A Apr 45, 100th Inf Div Reln Elms 63rd Inf Div on Posn by 010600A Apr 45. Div regroups and prepares to continue Atk in zone. New Div Bd effective 010001A Apr 45. Units will withdraw from zone of KK French Corps on relief by Elms of KK French Corps. Cts effective at once. 2. In conduct of Atk, resistance will be reduced on lines of Comm and organized by groups in intervals between lines of Comm will be determined by Rcn and Destroyed. ... 5. 255th CT (Reinf): Atchd: 753d Tk Bn (-Co A & Co C) and 822d TD Bn (Towed) (= Co A). Atks in zone to seize Obj. Gains contact with 253d CT on left and Elms 100th Inf Div and /or II French Corps on right. ...

Within two hours of the receipt of these Operations Instructions the Commanding Officer of the 255th Infantry had issued Field Order No. 4 and was holding a conference with the Commanding Officers of the three battalions and of the special units. This Field Order directed the regiment to attack to the east and south with two battalions on line, the 2nd Battalion on the left or north and the 3d Battalion on the right or south, the 1st Battalion in reserve behind the 3d Battalion.

Both of the attacking battalions were to be reinforced with tank, tank destroyer, and assault gun elements and were to attack with all speed and violence along roads between enemy strongpoints, using reconnaissance to seek out and destroy organized enemy resistance in the intervals between the lines of communication. The attack hours was 0900A 1 April 1945.

This order read in part as follows:

Field Order No. 4, Hq C/T Blue (255th Inf); R591394, 010530A Apr 45. Maps: Germany 1/25000, Sheets 6618, 6619, 6718, 6719.

1. a. C/T Blue atks in Z w/all possible speed and violence to seize objectives M, K and L. Time of atk: 0900A 1 April 1945.

b. 1st Bn: Initially in C/T reserve in vic RCHRBACH will follow 3d Bn by bounds on Regtl O.

c. 2d Bn: Atk (see overlay) and seize obj G, H, I, J, K, and L.

d. 3d Bn: Atk (see overlay) and seize obj A, B, C, D, E, M, and F.

e. At Co: Provide At protection for C/T, paying particular attention initially to the S Flank.

f. 863d FA Bn: In D/S of Regt, Cn Co atchd.

2. Atchdts:

a. 2d Bn:

D Co (-1 Plat) 753d Tk Bn (Light)

1 Plat B Co 753d Tk Bn (Med)

1 Sect (3 guns) Assault guns, Hq 753d Tk Bn

b. 3d Bn:

B Co (-1 Plat) 753d Tk Bn

1 Plat D Co 753d Tk Bn

1 Sect (2 guns) Assault Guns, Hq 753d Tk Bn

- c. 753d Tk Bn:
 - a. Atchd 2d Bn
 - D Co (- 1 Plat)
 - B Co 1 Plat
 - 1 Sect (3 guns) Assault guns
 - b. Atchd 3d Bn
 - B Co (-1 Plat)
 - 1 Plat D Co
 - 1 Sect (2 guns) Assault guns
 - d. 822d TD Bn (-):
 - B and C Co: G/S
 - 4 SP Guns atchd 2d Bn.
 - Rcn Plat protect C/T R Flank and maintain contact w/ elements of 10th Armd Div a/o II French Corps on the S.
 - e. Engr Platoon clear roads and mine fields.
 - x. a. All Bns will speed their advance between enemy strong points by making maximum use of roads together with thorough rcn.
 - b. Adv elms rpt promptly condition of bridges and highways suitable for armor.
3. Adm Details later.

The following are the objectives referred to in Field Order No. 4 Hq C/T Blus, 010530A Apr 45:

For the 2d Bn:

- Objective G- The town of Gauangelloch R7482.
- Objective H- The town of Reilsheim R7583.
- Objective I- The wooded hill (235 meters) at R8276, overlooking crossroads and road junction at R821774.
- Objective J- The town of Mauer R7782, Northeast of Objective I and across the Elsenz from it.
- Objective k- The town of Meckesheim R7880, on the right or south flank of that part of the division and regimental objective which lay in the 2d Bn zone.
- Objective L- The town of Monchzell R8182, on the left or north flank of the part of the regimental objective which lay in the 2d Bn zone.

For the 3d Bn:

- Objective A- The two wooded hills (319 meters and 317 meters) at R7082 and R7083 approximately 2 kilometers southeast of Leimen R6963.
- Objective B- The town of Maisbach R7281.
- Objective C- The town of Ochsenbach R7252.
- Objective D- The town of Schatthausen R7480.
- Objective E- The wooded hill (223 meters) at R7560, to the east of Schatthausen.
- Objective F- The wooded hill (240 meters) at R7577 and R 7677 overlooking Unternhof, and lying on the left or north flank of that part of the regimental obj-

ective included in the 3d Bn zone.

Objective M- The town of Unterhof, R7577 on the right or south flank of that part of the regimental objective included in the 3d Bn zone.

The boundaries of the regimental zone in this attack were as follow;

On the left or north flank of the sector, the boundary, which the 255th Infantry shared with the 253d Infantry, ran southeast from above Gaiberg (included) to a point approximately at R769842 on the north-south highway between Neckargemünd R7783 and Mauer R7782; thence almost straight east, north of and parallel to Grid Line 84, turning southeast again beyond the north-south Grid Line 80.

On the right or south flank of the sector, the boundary, which the 255th Infantry shared with the 100th Infantry Division, extended southeast from the vicinity of Nussloch R7081 to the vicinity of Horrenberg R7676. Near Baiertal R7378 the regimental boundary overlapped the more nearly east-west boundary of the VI Corps and II French Corps.

Within the regimental zone the battalion boundaries were as follows; On the north or left was the 2d Battalion. On the right of the 2d Battalion the boundary, which the battalion shared with the 3d Battalion, extended from a point at approximately R728840 southeast to include Gauangelloch R7482, continuing southeast and roughly parallel to the highway between that town and Meckesheim R7886.

The regiment was attacking, therefore, to the southeast with two battalions on line, the 2d Battalion on the left and the 3d Battalion on the right.

The 1st Battalion was initially in reserve in the vicinity of Rehrbach R6987, to follow 3d Battalion by bounds on regimental order.

The attack of the 2d Battalion went forward virtually without resistance, and the battalion had seized the final objective of its attack order by 1512A, advancing approximately 14 kilometers in less than seven hours. This attack of the regiment's left element began in the vicinity of Walchilsbach R75850 the battalion moved first west and south to seize Gaiberg R7385, then almost straight south to its first objective, the town of Gauangelloch R7482, three kilometers away.

Here Company G, the lead company, turned left or northeast up the road to Reilsheim R7583 and captured that town by 1055A.

From here Company G, now the left element of the battalion, advanced south and east on the main road toward Mauer R7782. Leaving the highway elements of the company moved to the left to approach the objective from the north along the highway which traverses the main street of the town.

By 1245A Company G had taken Mauer and occupied positions there awaiting the clearing of Meckesheim R7830 by armored elements. Meanwhile on the battalion right to the south, Company E, singly, since the reserve, Company F, and other elements of the battalion had followed the route of Company G, moved out of Gauangelloch along the road leading southeast and by 1144A had cleared without resistance the steep triangular area formed at R7582 and the sector to the east by a road junction one fork of which continued southeast toward Meckesheim and the other led to Mauer. This area to the east overlooks the crossing of two main roads south of Mauer. By 1430A the armored elements, having moved through the main force of the battalion Mauer and crossed the bridge, still intact, over the Elsenz southwest of the town, had seized Meckesheim R7830, the center of the regimental objective. The troops then advanced to the northeast to take Monchzell, the final objective of the battalion. The action resulted in the capture of 118 prisoners of war. The 2d Battalion command Post was moved at 1745A from Mauer to Meckesheim.

The 3d Battalion attack on the regimental right had met with somewhat greater opposition. At 0900A the battalion moved from the vicinity of Leimen R6963, and an hour later Company K, the lead company had taken the wooded hill, road junction and crossroads R7082, the first objective. The company advanced first north and then east to Ochsenbach R7282 while Company L continued southeast to Maisbach R7281. Both of these objectives were overrun in less than an hour. The two companies then moved toward Schatthausen R7480, Company K from the north, company L from the west. At R735808 on the road between Ochsenbach and Schatthausen Company K came upon an anti-tank mine field and called for it to be cleared by a mine squad. Company I, the reserve company, and the other elements of the battalion were following Company K on the left side of the battalion sector. By shortly after noon the battalion command Post had been established in Ochsenbach, Company I had moved along the transverse road between Ochsenbach and Maisbach, the battalion Observation Post was on the high ground R7380 overlooking Schatthausen from the north west, and Company K was just short of the point at which the road from Ochsenbach joins the highway between Schatthausen and Baiertal.

At 1207A Company L was pinned down for a time by enemy small arms fire which was directed against it from the high ground west of Schatthausen, terrain overlooking the valley with its road and stream down which Company had overcome the resistance, had moved to and across the highway between Schatthausen, which Company K had taken from the north, and Baiertal; Company L was proceeding along the easterly road over the high ground between the two towns.

It was thus moving into a position to attack Unterhof R7577, the southernmost part of the regimental objective. Company I was now following the same route as Company L.

By 1500A Company to the left, having seized Schatthausen and the hill to the east of the town, had entered Oberhof R7679. But Company L was meeting some difficulty and asked for information about the unit to the regimental right because there were tanks in the area around Baiertal and artillery fire, apparently from friendly troops was falling on Company L. At 1540A, while Company K was moving south from Oberhof toward the hill north of Unterhof, the town from which Company L was encountering resistance from approximately 125 enemy troops supported by two tanks and four half tracks, the Battalion Commander decided to commit Company I, his reserve company, to the left of Company L. Company L was at the road junction R750791, north of Unterhof and east of Baiertal. At the same time the Battalion was ordered to send a patrol to make a reconnaissance of Baiertal (excluded from its sector) to make contact with the friendly troops there, troops from which artillery fire was falling on Company L. By 1700A Company I, followed by Company L, had entered Unterhof R7577, the final regimental objective, and were organizing their positions. The battalion Command Post had moved from Schatthausen to Oberhof.

Company K moved from the hill north of Unterhof toward Zuzenheim R7973 and one platoon, meeting no resistance, had entered the town by 1835A, and encountered friendly armor there. Shortly thereafter air observation reported that some 400 enemy troops with twelve or fifteen vehicles which were withdrawing into Balmfeld R7675, southeast of Unterhof, had scattered into the woods on the approach of American armor, later the same source reported a heavy concentration of enemy troops in Dielheim R7276 with artillery batteries and eight tanks. At the same time Company I moving to the high ground east of Unterhof toward Horrenberg R7576 had used tanks and tank destroyers against enemy withdrawing in half-tracks.

The 3d Battalion attack was finished by 2000A, eleven hours after it began. The battalion had encountered light though almost continuous opposition from enemy small arms and automatic weapons as well as a slight amount of artillery and the resistance of tanks in Unterhof. It had captured three officers and 170 enlisted men, prisoners of war and suffered 2 officers and nine enlisted men casualties in an advance of more than 16 kilometers.

One of the difficulties of the operation was the maintaining of communications, the forward movement being much too rapid for telephone lines, the terrain making radio uncertain, and the traffic, especially of friendly armor greatly slowing messenger vehicles. The rapid advance also made the maintaining of contact with adjacent troops a problem.

During the day the 1st Battalion moved forward, and at 1130A the regimental Command Post was moved from Heidelberg to Gaiberg R7385.

Late in the day on 1 April 1945, the 1st Battalion was motorized and prepared to move to seize Helmsstadt R9081, approximately nine kilometers east of the regimental left flank and just outside the regimental boundary. This action was the first of those ordered by Operations Instructions No 29, issued by the Regimental Commander at 2100A 1 April; the rest of the was to follow the 1st Battalion, which was given the name Task Force Able.

Other elements in the attack: The regimental Anti-Tank Company provided anti-mechanized defense in the regimental area and guarded installations in the vicinity of Heidelberg. The 822 Tank Destroyer Battalion (-), provided anti-tank defense in the regimental zone. The 553d Field Artillery Battalion, with regimental Cannon Company attached, was in direct support of the regiment. The 753d Tank Battalion provided armored support in the regiment zone. Units adjacent to the regiment; The 253d Infantry on the left of the 255th Infantry attacked to the east and seized its assigned objective. The 397th Infantry, on the right of the 255th Infantry, attacked to the southeast and seized objectives in the assigned zone.

Weather: Fair: visibility, excellent.

PWs Captured

	Officers	Enlisted Men
	1	118 by 2d Bn
	0	129 by 3d Bn
Totals	1	247

Status and Casualties

1 April 45

Officers

	Asgd	Eff	Kia	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	33	29	—	—	—
2d Bn	34	30	—	—	—
3d Bn	37	33	1	2	—
Art Co	5	4	—	—	—
At Co	7	6	—	—	—
En	17	17	—	—	—
Sy	15	14	—	—	—
Med	10	10	—	—	—
Total	153	143	1	2	—

Enlisted Men

Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
765	739	—	—	—
733	762	—	2	6
763	723	3	14	—
99	95	—	—	—
145	133	—	—	—
127	120	—	—	—
121	121	—	—	—
124	117	—	—	—
2934	2315	3	16	6

On 2 April 1945 the 255th Infantry Regiment continued to attack. At 1700A 1 April 1945 Major General Louis E. Hibbs, commanding General of the 63d Infantry Division, had issued Operations Instructions. These read in part as follows:

Operations Instructions No. 24, Hq 63d Inf Div, 01 1700A Apr: 1. 63d Inf Div atks at once in Z to seize Div obj BETTELBRONN (S1584)- BAD WIMPFEN (S0372) area. 2. In conduct of A tk resistance will be reduced on lines of com and organized by groups in intervals between rods will be determined by Rcm and destroyed. ... 11. Pattern of Operations: a. Press forward rapidly in two or three columns according to width of CT zone. B. Adv Gds of columns Mtd by placing Adv parties on Tks, spts in Trks. c. Main bodies follow on foot to outflank and destroy resistance.

To these instructions there was issued an addendum which in part read as follows:

Addendum to O I No. 24, Hq 63d Inf Div, 01 1815A Apr 45: 1. 255th Inf Mtd 1 Bn, Atch 1 plat tks, Mv without delay to seize HEIMSTADT (9081). On arrival patrol S E to (945775) and contact Elms C C A. Use own Trns to include that of Atch Trs. ... 2 (This Bn) Reinf co-ordinate with Armored forces, move thereafter closely behind armor to Div Cbj: 4. Report to this Hq hour of departure of task forces and expected time of arrival at HEIMSTADT.. 5. Other Elms of Div Atk in Zs specified by OI #24 as soon as practicable tonight, mop up by groups.

In compliance with these instructions the Regimental Commander issued, these operations instructions:

Operations Instructions No. 29, Hq C T Blue (255th Inf), 01 2100A Apr 45: Map: Germany 1/100,000, Sheets U-3 (MANNHEIM), V-3 (KARLSRUHE): 1. 63d Inf Div atks at once in Z to seize Div Obj BETTELBRONN (S1584) - BAD WIMPFEN (S0372) area. ... 3. 253d Inf C T (Reinf): No change in atcmnts. Upon completion of pres mission atks to the S E securing sector of Div Cbj, establish and maintain contact with Elms of First French Army on the S. Withdraw from Z of II French Corps when relieved by Elms II French Corps. 5. 2d Bn (Task Force Baker) advances on route Baker to Div Cbj. Attachments:

No change from F O 4
253d F A Bn (-)
Regtl Hq Co
Hq sec Med Det
"C" Co 253d Med
1 Squad Co "C" 253 Engr Bn

6. 3d Bn (Task Force Charley) advances on route Charley to Div Obj.
Attachments:

No change from F O 4 except
1 Plat Co "B" 753d Tk Bn
Plus: "C" Btry 863d F A Bn
Cn Co
822d T D Bn (-)
753d Tk Bn (-)
1 Squad Co "C" 263d Engr Bn

8. March CP- Regtl follow foot Elements of Task Force Baker.

The following are the objectives and check points given on the overlay to O1 No. 29, Hq CT Blue (255th Inf), O1 2100A Apr 45:

Route Baker:

NECKESHEIM R7580
Point 1 ESCHENBERGEN R8280, R8281
Point 2 NEIDENSTEIN R8380
Point 3 Waibstadt R8678
Point 4 RJ & Railway R8779 (870794); one fork of junction NE to
overpass & two bridges Helmstadt, the other SE to
Neckarbischofsheim
Initial Objective Helmstadt R8981, R9031
Point 5 NECKARBISCHOFSEIM R8877
Point 6 HELMHOF R9176
Point 7 UNTERGIMPERN R9275
Point 8 Obergimpern R9473
Point 9 RJ R971742, one fork of junction NE to Siegelbach R9875, the
other toward Point 10
Point 10 R987740 point where Rd E to Kohlhof R996740 joins N-S Rd
between Siegelbach R9875 and Rappenzau R9972
Point 11 ECHENSTADT S0272

Route Charley:

ZUZEHEIM R7978
Point 12 Hoffenheim R8075
Point 13 GR R8373 W of Sinsheim R8473
Point 14 Alersbach R8874
Point 15 Hasselbach R9074
Point 16 RJ R938728 North of Oberbiegelhof and S of Obergimpern
Point 17 Babstadt R9672
Point 18 Rappenzau R9972
Point 19 Bad Wimpfen S0571

At 0600B 2 April 1945 (The first day of the change in time zone) the 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry Regiment moved out along Route "B" to seize its objective Helmstadt R9081. This attack was in accordance with the addendum to operations Instructions No. 24 which ordered that one battalion be motorized for an attack on that town. Earlier in the day the battalion had had some difficulty in completing its motorization because radio contact between the battalion and the regiment was virtually destroyed by interference.

By 0735B, however, the battalion had completed its preparations; had moved forward with tanks, assault guns, half-tracks and trucks; and had reached Check Point "1" in the vicinity of the town of Eschelbronn R8280. The Battalion had moved from Schatthausen R7480, east through Meckesheim R7880 so that it approached Eschelbronn by going northeast along the highway which runs parallel to a railway and north of and parallel to the stream called the Schwarzbach. Here at the little settlement called Apsere Muhle R819814 the leading elements of the battalion found that the bridge across the Epfenbach, a tributary of the Schwarzbach, had been destroyed. Had the bridge been intact the battalion would have crossed it and the bridges leading from the northeast across the Schwarzbach and the artificial stream, the Neubach, into Eschelbronn itself. The battalion would then have gone east to Heidenstein, R8380. Instead the Battalion Commander decided to move north and east along the highway and stream to Epfenbach R8582 and then south to Waibstadt R8678.

By 0855B, an hour after it had reached the blown bridge north of Epfenbach, but other elements of the column were receiving enemy fire from Eschelbronn. But this resistance was reduced, and the column continued through Eschelbronn. From there the battalion meeting no other resistance turned south and entered Waibstadt R8678 at 0900B. An hour later having sent motorized patrol along the roads leading out of Waibstadt, the battalion had advanced beyond the town northeast toward Helmstadt along R3981 Landstrasse No. 1 to its junction with Landstrasse No. 2 leading south east to Neckerbischofsheim R3977. Near this junction there is an underpass where the railway between Helmstadt and Waibstadt crossed Landstrasse No. 1. There is also a bridge where Landstrasse No. 1 crosses a tributary of the Schwarzbach and another bridge where Landstrasse No. 2 crosses the Schwarzbach and another bridge where Landstrasse No. 2 crosses the Schwarzbach itself.

The railway overpass and the bridge to Helmstadt had both been blown up. The armored vehicles were forced to remove their guns to go through the underpass, but the bridge though destroyed, could still be used. The result was that the battalion proceeded and by 1030 B had made contact with rear elements of the 253d Infantry near Helmstadt R8881. By 1130 B the battalion had taken its objective. Having cleared Helmstadt the 1st Battalion in accordance with the Addendum to Operations Instruction No. 24, sent patrols south and east along Kreisstrasse No. 2 through Flinsbach R9175 and Bergen R9375 to Wollenberg R945775. This village was the final point specified by the Addendum, was in the hands of the patrols by 1340 B.

At this time battalion, having completed its mission, requested information about the area it was to occupy. At 1450B the battalion was ordered to push into the area north of Hohenstadt SO272 to secure any bridge across the Neckar River. Two hours later, the bridge over the Neckar at Bad Wimpfen SO371 having been reported intact, the battalion was ordered to attempt to cross the river at that point and establish contact with friendly armor on the east bank. The battalion had reached Bad Wimpfen by 1700B where it found the bridge destroyed. By 1800B it had been ascertained that all bridges across the Neckar between Bad Wimpfen and Heilbronn SOS61 had been blown up, and the battalion had left Bad Wimpfen, which was under some enemy artillery fire, and moved to the vicinity of Hohenstadt SO272 prepared to check bridges to the north of Bad Wimpfen and to organize, if necessary, the area along the Neckar from Bad Wimpfen to the vicinity of Gundelsheim SO577, that is, to the left or north boundary of the regimental zone.

The activity of the 1st Battalion for 2 April 1945 ended with the Battalion having established its command post in Bad Wimpfen SO37711, attempting at 2250B to make the destroyed bridge across the Neckar passable to foot troops. Meanwhile, the 2d Battalion, converted into a task force by its attachments, moved out at 0700B along Route B, a route which was later to be followed by the regimental Command Post and other headquarters elements. At 6335 B the battalion was ordered by the regimental commander to put as many men as possible on vehicles and to make the Battalion Command Post into a march command post. A few minutes later the battalion reported that all elements were riding.

With Company F in the lead the head of the Column, having followed thus far the route taken earlier by the 1st Battalion, reached Eschelbronn R3280. From here still following the route of the 1st Battalion, the 2d Battalion moved northeast to Epfenbach R8582, then (leaving the route of the first 1st Battalion) turned back southeast to approach Neidenstein R3380 from the east bank of the Schwarzbach. At 1100B the battalion was sending a platoon to make a hasty reconnaissance of that town. A few minutes later the leading elements of the battalion had passed Waibstadt R3678 from which, once again following the route the 1st Battalion had taken, they moved northeast along Landstrasse No. 1 to its junction with Landstrasse No. 2 at R876794. Here where the 1st Battalion had found the road bridge and the railway overpass blown up along the route it was to take to the northeast, the 2d Battalion found the road bridge in Landstrasse No. 2 leading southeast to Neckarbischofsheim R8377 also destroyed but passable. The leading elements of the 2d Battalion reached Neckarbischofsheim at 1135B.

In preparation for following this route the Regimental Command Post at Ludwigsberg R7385 had been closed at 0430B and established an hour later at Hader R772823. At 0610 the Regimental Commander had gone to the 1st Battalion area to observe and supervise the motorization of that unit, and

at 0715, upon his return, the Regimental Command Post with other headquarters elements was converted into a march command post to follow the route of the 2d Battalion. With the rest of the column the Command Post passed Neckarbischofsheim at 1145.

At the same time the lead elements of the column had moved into Helmshof R9170 where it found the bridge across the Krebsbach destroyed. This bridge led into the south part of town and was not on the route of advance of the battalion. Instead the battalion, proceeding along Kreisstrasse No. 2 parallel to the railway down the steep and narrow valley of the Krebsbach, the Forstthal, met enemy mortar and machine gun fire from the vicinity of Untergimpeln R9275. This was the first resistance the battalion had met in its attack.

Reorganizing from a motor march to an infantry assault force elements of the battalion moved against Untergimpeln toward which according to a civilian in Neckarbischofsheim, the enemy had withdrawn the previous day with a force that included about fifty walking wounded. By 1352B, though receiving artillery fire on the west edge of the town, was beginning to clear out Untergimpeln. Half an hour later the report came that a motor and foot patrol from the 253d Infantry, making a reconnaissance of the area on the right boundary of its regiment, had been captured by the enemy. The American prisoners were loaded on the three one-quarter-ton trucks of the patrol's motorized elements and taken in the direction of Obergimpeln R9473. Shortly thereafter the 2d Battalion of the 255th Infantry had taken Untergimpeln, reorganized as a motorized attack column and started toward Obergimpeln. It had captured 27 prisoners of war in the former town, seven of whom were helping the battalion medical personnel. There were two known enemy dead.

In approaching Obergimpeln R9473 the battalion again encountered resistance—sniper fire from a factory building R940744 to the left of the road about halfway between Unter- and Obergimpeln, a little further on a road block of felled trees (which could be by-passed through the fields), a road block of steel beams just outside Obergimpeln, mortar and artillery fire falling on the road approaching the town, and grazing machine gun fire from R945735, the hill overlooking the road from the south just west of the town. Against this resistance and that in the town the 2d Battalion advanced so that by 1620 B elements had moved through the town and shortly later were sending out patrols to flush the surrounding area.

By 1827B the 2d Battalion, having entered Siegelbach R9875 to the northeast end, after learning that the other checkpoints on its route were already in the hands of friendly troops, having made contact with elements of the 1st Battalion, reported that it was awaiting further orders.

While the 2d Battalion had thus advanced along Route B against spotty enemy resistance, the 3d Battalion had been encountering more determined opposition. At 0610B Company K, the lead element of the task force, advanced along Route C through Zuzenhausen R7978 where some of the column was strafed by enemy aircraft. The Battalion Command Post was moved forward to Zuzenhausen by 0900B while the forward units proceeded toward Hoffenheim. In Zuzenhausen the bridge at R79257810, not on the route, was found to be mined with anti-tank mines. At 0942 the battalion requested that engineers move forward with the advance troops, because of the need for mine clearing and for bridge repairing, and reported that in accordance with instructions all elements had been mounted on tanks, tank destroyers and trucks and that the Command Post was becoming a march command post and displacing forward to the end of the column.

At 1000B Company K and the tanks of the forward elements, having cleared through Hoffenheim R8075 (toward which the rest of the battalion was moving) and passed through Sinsheim R8473, were encountering heavy resistance from the edge of Rohrbach R8473, resistance which included fire from an enemy tank. Two hours later the rear elements of the battalion, having captured six prisoners of war in Hoffenheim, were advancing toward Sinsheim where they also encountered resistance, of the Elsenz River. By as late as 1430B the battalion was still receiving both 88 millimeter and 105 millimeter artillery fire which fell into the central area of Sinsheim. Meanwhile Company I which had followed Company K was also encountering fire from the enemy tank in Rohrbach. Because the bridges in Sinsheim had been destroyed the battalion was having difficulty in clearing the southern half of the town, tanks being unable to cross to that section.

At 1545B, still receiving artillery fire, the lead elements of were entering Rohrbach R8473 and moving northeast toward Adersbach R3374. The rest of the battalion was still in Sinsheim and still receiving heavy 88 millimeter fire. At 1610 the battalion was ordered by the Regimental commander to clean out Sinsheim before going on. And an hour later the battalion had requested engineers who were needed to clear a mine field west of Adersbach—the location of the forward elements—because the field would hold up the whole of the mechanized column. Half an hour later the battalion had moved into Rohrbach to the east of Sinsheim and the motor elements were moving up behind the forward units at Adersbach, prepared to continue along Route C to Bad Rappenau R9972.

In general the battalion had advanced against very heavy enemy artillery and mortar fire from positions to south of their route of advance but had encountered very little resistance from enemy infantry.

The Commanding General of the 63d Infantry Division issued the following instructions:

Operations Instructions No. 25, Hq 63d Inf Div, 021830 Apr 45:

1. 63d Inf Div continues on mission to seize Div Obj. 2. 253d Inf:
 - a. Hold MOSBACH (S0284). b. Protect bridge site (R988831). c. Seize and hold BERNBRUNN (S0879) and NEUDENAU (S1178). d. Relieve Co A 254th Inf in BERNBRUNN (S0879).
3. 254th Inf:
 - a. Withdraw Co A from BERNBRUNN (S0879) upon relief by Elms 253d Inf. b. Seize and hold RITTELBRUNN (S1483). c. Continue mission to seize OSTERBURKEN (S2293); seize and hold ADELSEHEIM (S2090).
4. 255th Inf:
 - a. Seize and hold BAD WIMPFEN (S0370). b. 3d Bn 255th Inf Vic SINSHEIM (R8373), break off any present contact with Ey; move by way of ADERSBACH (R8874) - OBERRIEGENHOF (R9372). BABSTADT (R9672) to seize and hold RAPPENAU (R9972).
5. Other Elms Div: No Change.
6. Elms 100th Inf Div relieve 63d Inf Div in sector S of Army Bd Vic SINSHEIM (R8373), and maintain contact with 63d Inf Div.

Adjacent units: The 1st Battalion of the 253d Infantry, motorized near Helmstadt, R9081, crossed the Neckar River in assault boats and assembled in the vicinity of Gundelsheim S0377.

Weather: mild; visibility, fair.

PWs Captured:

Officers	Enlisted Men
0	51 by 2d Bn
4	42 by 3d Bn
0	16 by Anti-tank
Totals 4	109

Status and Casualties

2 April 45

	Officers:					Enlisted Men				
	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reif
1st Bn	53	29	-	-	-	765	739	-	-	-
2d Bn	34	30	-	-	-	785	758	-	5	-
3d Bn	37	33	-	1	-	774	704	4	17	-
Cn Co	5	4	-	-	-	99	95	-	-	-
At Co	7	6	-	-	-	145	138	-	-	-
Wg Co	17	17	-	-	-	127	120	-	-	-
Sv Co	15	14	-	-	-	121	117	-	-	-
Med Det	10	10	-	-	-	124	117	-	-	-
Totals	153	143	-	1	-	2940	2792	4	22	-

At 0300B on 3 April 1945 the Regimental Commander issued Operations Instructions No 30. Hq C/T Blue (225th Inf), HOHENSTADT, Germany, 030300B Apr45, which complied with Operations Instructions No. 25 issued by the Commanding General of the 63d Infantry Division. The Regimental Command Post had been established in HOHENSTADT S010725 at 0005B.

At the end of the 2 April 1945 the 1st and 2d Battalions had been established in the area around Bad Wimpfen S0370. The 3d Battalion, having been relieved by reconnaissance elements of the 100th Infantry Division in Sinsheim, was moving to the area of Rappnau R9972. Its motor convoy encountered no opposition after 2030 B 2 April 1945 at which time it had received heavy artillery fire at the edge of Rohrbach R8473. The Battalion continued to move on foot and to shuttle on all available transportation to reach Rappnau by 0700B on 3 April 1945.

The combat team spent the early part of the period in rehabilitation and reorganization and also in sending out patrols to the surrounding area. These patrols continued to capture prisoners and one of them from 1st Battalion, patrolling toward Unter Elsasheim S0667, ran into a fire fight with the enemy across the Neckar River and found the bridges in that area defended by machine guns; one of the bridges was that across the eastern stream of the Neckar River R072697 leading into Kockendorf.

At 1425B all elements of the regiment were alerted for possible move to an assembly area. At 2220B the Regimental Command Post was closed at Hohenstadt S010725 and established at 2333B at Siegelbach R986754. At the same time units of the regiment were being relieved by elements of the 398th Infantry Regiment of the 100th Infantry Division. The 255th Infantry was moving north and east across the Neckar River.

Weather: Cool; visibility, fair to poor.

PWs Captured:

Officers	Enlisted Men
0	16 by 1st Bn
0	0 by 2d Bn
1	6 by 3d Bn
Totals 1	22

Status and Casualties

Officers

Enlisted Men

		Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	Bn	33	29	-	-	-	755	739	-	-	-
2d Bn	Bn	34	31	-	-	-	785	757	-	-	-
3d Bn	Bn	37	33	-	-	-	776	707	-	1	3
Cn	Co	5	4	-	-	-	99	95	-	-	-
At	Co	7	6	-	-	-	145	133	-	-	-
Hq	Co	17	17	-	-	-	127	120	-	-	-
Sv	Co	15	14	-	-	-	121	121	-	-	-
Med		9	9	-	1	-	119	112	-	1	-
Totals		157	143	-	1	-	2937	2789	-	2	3

4 April 1945

The 255th Infantry Regiment passed the day of 4 April 1945 moving to an assembly, going by motorized march to a new area across the Neckar River to relieve the 254th Infantry and prepare to continue to attack.

By 0530B the 1st Battalion had assembled in the vicinity of Siegelbach R9375 where the Regimental Command Post was located; the 2d Battalion had assembled in the vicinity of Huffenhardt R9777, the Initial Point of the motor march.

The Regimental Commander issued the following instructions:

Operations Instructions NO. 30, Hq CT Blue (255th Inf), Siegelbach, Germany 040600B April 1945: Maps: Germany 1/100,000 (V3-Karlsruhe, U-3 MANNHEIM, U-4 ROTHENBURG): 1. 255th CT (Reinforced) atnd: 753d Tk Bn- 1 Plat light tanks and 2 guns x Btry. Co "B", Co "C" 822d TD Bn. a. Upon relief bb Elms 100th Inf Div move to new sector and relieve Elms of 254th CT. b. Destroy Ey in part on Div 1st Obj in new sector in initiate Rcm to E. c. Prepare to cont the atk to the E on order. 2. 2d Bn relieve Bn of 254th CT in left sector of new regtl Zone. 3. 1st Bn relieve Bn of 254th CT in right sector of new regtl Zone. 4. 3d Bn in res. 5. Order of mvmt (For route see overlay No. 2), start marching 0500: a. 2d Bn b. Cn Co c. AT Co (-one Plat) d. 1st Bn e. 863d FA Bn f. 1 Plat AT Co g. Regtl Hq Co h. Hq Sec Med Det 1. 3d Bn. 6. Attachments: a. 2d Bn (1) Co "C" 822d TD Bn; b. 1st Bn (1) one Plat Co "B" 753d Tk Bn

(2) 2 Platoons Co "C" S22 TD Bn (3) 2 Guns x Btry 753d Tk Bn. 7.
Transportation: a. Regt will be motorized. Trs will be placed on tks, TD's
artillery, AT, Cannon trks. b. Regt To will furnish the following:
1) 2d Bn - 4 two-and-one-half T Trks (2) 1st Bn - 2 two-and-one-half T
trks (3) 3d Bn - 8 two-and-one-half T Trks.

The route of march began at Haffenhardt R9777, moved northeast along a
main highway to the Neckar River at Emsmershaim S0378, then northwest along
the west bank of the river toward Neckarelz to cross the bridge at R989828
into Neckarelz, then northeast along Landstrasse No. 1 through Mosbach S0284
Neckarburken S0387, Dallau S0588, Auerbach S0789, to Oberschefflenz S1291.
From here the regiment was to attack eastward across the Seekack River with
two battalions on line—the 2d Battalion on the left or north, the 1st Bn
on the right or south, and the 3d Battalion in reserve. The regiment was to
seize the middle portion of the division's first objective, having the 254th
Infantry on the left and on the right boundary of the 255th Infantry the Jagst
River beyond which on the regimental right was the 253d Infantry. This por-
tion of the division's first objective included the towns of Sdelsheim S2090,
Sennfeld S1988, and Roigheim S1686 on the Seekack River, and extended as
far east as ober Kessach S2786.

The 2d Bn at the head of the column moved into the new area and est-
ablished a Command Post at Egerenstadt S2389 at 1207 B; by 1530 B the 2d Bn
had moved its command post to Adelsheim S202902 where it was located at
the end of 2 April. In the vicinity of Adelsheim also were the command post
the 863d Field Artillery Battalion and Companies F and G. Company E was ac-
ross the Seekack River at S2090 and S2089.

The 1st Battalion moved into its area and established its command post
at Bittelbronn S149834 at 1345. Two hours later Companies B and C were
moving out toward Roigheim S163863 with the intention of sending a patrol
east and north to Sennfeld to see whether the bridge across the Seekack
were intact. By 1810B a patrol had pushed beyond Dippach S2083 where it had
found the bridge destroyed but reported that the crossing would probably pre-
sent no difficulty to vehicular traffic. By 2240B a patrol from the 1st Batt-
alion had secured two bridges at 2138, northeast of Sennfeld. The bridges
were intact at the end of the period the 1st Battalion Command Post and Comp-
any A were in Bittelbronn S1483, one platoon of Company B was in Sennfeld
S1988, the rest of Company B was holding the heights to the north and west
of Roigheim S1686, and Company C was across the river on the heights at 21785

At 1507B the 3d Battalion closed into its reserve location and at the
end of the period the battalion command post and Company L were in the vicin-
ity of Waldachshof S1691, Companies K and I were to the north and East in
the area of S1892 and S1891.

At 0715B the Regimental Command Post at Siegelbach was closed. The new
command post was established at Oberschefflenz S121918 at 1405B.

The Regimental Commander issued the following instructions:

Operations Instructions NO. 31, Hq CT Blue (225th Inf), Oberscheffenz, Germany, 04100B April 1945, Map: Germany 1/100,000 (U-3 MANNHEIM, U-4 ROTTEMBERG): 1. a. 255th Inf atks (see overlay), destroy or capture all E in zone and initiate Rcm to E. LD pres pos. b. prepare to cont the atk to the E on O. c. Assist atk of 3d Bn 253d Inf. 2. 1st Bn atks at 05070b to seize obj in z, maintain contact w/1st Bn on R and elms 254th Inf on L, and initiate rcm to E. 4. a. 3d Bn in res prepare to follow on Regtl O. Prepare plans to repel C/A w/special reference to S flank. b. will furn 1 rifle plat w/2 At guns and crews fr AT Co atchd to 3d Bn to rel plat 253d Inf (Reinf), protecting bridge site at R988330. Protect bridge. 5. 863d FA Bn in S/S. 6. Cn CO atchd to 863d FA Bn. 7. AT Co protect flanks and rear of Regtl sector giving particular attn to S flank. 8. Atchmts N/C. a. 2d Bn (1) Co "B" (2) 753d Tk Bn (2) 1Plat Co "D" 753d Tk Bn (2) Co "C" (-) 822d TD Bn (3) 2 gun x Btry 753d Tk Bn 9. I&R plat maintain contact w/253d Inf. 10. CP opens ADMLSEEM 0700B. 11 Bns rpt dispositions of Elms at least once every hr. 12. OCR 10th Armd Div passes to E thru area 254th Inf night 4-5 Apr 45.

At 2200B the Commanding General of the Division sent the following message: Atching 1 Plat Light Tks and 2 Guns x btry of 753d Tk Bn to Co of Med Tks atchd per 01 26 753d Tk Bn (-) to be Div Res detached from 255th Inf.

At the end of 4 April 1945, therefore, the 255th Infantry was prepared to attack.

Weather: cool; visibility, good.

PWs Captured:

Officers	Enlisted Men
0	0 by 1st Bn
0	7 by 2d Bn
0	0 by 3d Bn
Totals 0	7

Status and Casualties

<u>Officers</u>							<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
		Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	Bn	33	29	-	-	-	765	739	-	-	-
2d Bn	Bn	34	31	-	-	-	785	757	-	-	-
3d Bn	Bn	37	33	-	-	-	776	707	-	-	-
Cn	Co	5	4	-	-	-	99	95	-	-	-
AT	Co	7	6	-	-	-	145	138	-	-	-
Hq	Co	18	18	-	-	-	126	119	-	-	-
Sr	Co	15	14	-	-	-	121	121	-	-	-
Med		9	9	-	-	-	119	119	-	-	-
Totals		156	144	-	-	-	2936	2788	-	-	-

5 April 1945

On 5 April 1945 the 255th Infantry attacked to the east in its zone. The attack began at 0700B the 3d Battalion on the regimental left advanced from the vicinity of Adelsheim S2090 and the Seckach River to seize without resistance the towns of Hergenstadt S2389. Finally, the battalion took Ober Kessach S2786 and the area to the north, the battalion section of the divisions first objective. It then sent out screening patrols and by motor patrols established contact with the 254th Inf on the left and 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry on the right.

The 1st Battalion, also attacking at 0700B, moved forward. Company A, in reserve, moved to Reigheim S1686 and sent a platoon to Sennfeld S1988 to relieve a platoon of Company B. Company B on the right and Company Cn on the left moved without resistance to take Hagenbach S1985, Korg S2085, Volckhausen S2285, and Unter Kessach S2384. The Battalion had seized its part of the regimental objective by 1605 the high ground to the east of Unter Kessach. The battalion then sent out reconassance patrols to the east.

The Commanding General of the division issued a memorandum which read in part as follows:

Operations Memorandum No. 2, Eq 63d Inf Div, 051715B Apr 45:

1. a. 63d Inf Div continues Atk to the E to seize Div 1st Obj. Institute Plan to the E and prepare to Atk to the E on Corps order. b. one Bn 100th Inf Div will make contact with ELms 253d CT Vic Ober Griesheim (S0674) and will maintain contact to the E (Tp CG 100th Div).
2. 253d CT (Reinf): a. Continues present mission. New Bds (overlay).

b. Send 1 Co immediately to Mockmuhl (S1781) to relieve Elms 253d CT therein. c. Move remainder of Bn without delay, take up posns MOCKMUHL (S1781), SWn along W bank of JAGST Riv to NEUDENAU (S1178) inclusive. d. Replace Wpnsg; be prepared to assist 253d CT by fire 6 Apr 45. e. Continue to protect bridge (R988830). 5. 63d Rcn Tr: a. Provide Rcn screen Neudenu (S1178) exclusive, S along W bank JAGST Riv to OBER GRIESHEIM (S0674).

In compliance with this memorandum the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry, in regimental reserve in the vicinity of Waidachshof S1591, sent Company I south to relieve elements of the 3d Battalion of the 253d Infantry. Later the rest of the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry moved south to outpost the north bank of the Jagst River between Mockmuhl and Neudenu S1178 to the west. It was prepared to assist by fire the attack of the 253d Infantry on the following day.

Adjacent units: The 253d Infantry, having crossed the Jagst River at Ober Griesheim S0774, attacked to the north and east to seize Herbolzheim S1176 and the surrounding area. But the attack was opposed by heavy small arms, mortar, and artillery fire. The 2d Battalion 253d Infantry, adjacent to the 255th Infantry, attempted at 0855B to cross the Jagst River at Mockmuhl S1381. The crossing was made on a foot bridge and was completed at 1243 B. Later the battalion was relieved by Company I of the 255th Infantry.

Weather; cool and rainy: visibility, fair

PWs Captured:

<u>Officers</u>	
	0
	0
	0
Totals	0

<u>Enlisted Men</u>	
8	by 1st Bn
7	by 2d Bn
0	by 3d Bn
15	

Status and Casualties

	<u>Officers</u>					<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
	Asgd	Mff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Mff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	33	29	-	-	-	765	739	-	-	-
2d Bn	34	31	-	-	-	783	755	1	-	-
3d Bn	37	33	-	-	-	776	707	-	-	-
Cn Co	5	4	-	-	-	99	95	-	-	-
AP Co	7	6	-	-	-	145	133	-	-	-
Hq Co	16	15	-	-	-	125	119	-	-	-
Sv Co	15	14	-	-	-	121	121	-	-	-
Med	9	9	-	-	-	119	112	-	-	-
Totals	158	144	-	-	-	2934	2766	1	1	-

The Regimental Commander issued the following instructions:

Operations Instructions NO. 32, Hq C/ Blue (255th Inf), LEIBENSTADT, Germany, 060700Z Apr 45: 1. 63d Inf Div atks to seize CHRINGEN (S2858) - HOMBACH (S4070) - NITZENHAUSEN (S4978) Area 6 Apr 45. 2. 255th C.T (Reinf): a. Atks to seize initial objective in Regtl Zone. b. Initiate rcm to the SE and prepare to cont the attack to seize FORSTENBERG (S3273) - KUPFENZELL (S4271) - KUNZELSAU (S4277) area on order. c. Upon capture of above obj institute active rcm to Graffebach (S5254). 3. 1st Bn on order atks in Z to seize initial obj, seize crossings over Jagst R and initiate rcm to the SE. Prepare to cont the atk on order. Protect rt flank as adv is made. 4. 2d Bn on order atks in z to seize initial obj, seize crossings over Jagst R and initiate to the SE. Prepare to cont the atk on order. Maintain contact with 1st Bn on right and Elms 254th Inf on left. 5. 3d Bn (-) cont on pres mission. Revert to Regtl control when fires are masked by advances of 253d C/T moves to Leibenstadt (S2287) when relieved. 6. 863d FA Bn in D/S (Cn Co atchd). 7. AT Co (-) protects flanks and rear of Regtl sector giving particular attn to S flank. Furnishes AT Mine Plat as part of Regtl Reserve. 8. Attachments: a. 1st Bn (-) 1 plat Co "A" 753d Tk Bn. b. (2) Co "C" (- 2 platoons), 822d TD Bn. c. 2d Bn (1) 1 Plat Co "B" 753d Tk Bn. (2) 1 Plat Co "C", 822d TD Bn. c. 3d Bn (1) 1 Plat AT Co. (2) 1 Plat Co "C", 822d TD Bn. 9. Regtl Reserve: a. Initially LEIBENSTADT (S2253). Prepare plans to repel c/a w/special reference to S flank, b. Composition: (1) Co "B" (-), 753d Tk Bn - (Co Comdr in command of Regtl Res). (2) 1 Plat Co "D", 753d Tk Bn. (3) AT Co Mine Plat, plus atchd composite sqd. (4) I and R Plat (-) 10. 1 Sqd, I and R Plat maintain contact w/253d Inf.

The change of boundary noted in Operations Memorandum No. 2 assigned the area north of Jagst River between Mockmühl S1781 and Neudenu S1178 to the 255th Infantry instead of to the 253d Infantry.

During 6 April 1945 the 255th Infantry attacked to the east in accordance with Operations Instructions No. 32. In general the attack moved the regiment to the west and northwest bank of the Jagst River and involved the capture of a number of towns; the attack proceeded against moderate fire from the enemy, and when the objectives had been taken, elements of the regiment patrolled the river bank seeking crossing points and prepared to continue the attack.

The Regimental Command Post was established at Ober Kessach S2736 at 1925B

Specifically, the 2d Battalion on the regimental left flank attacked from positions in the vicinity of Ober Kessach to take the following objectives: the high ground S2736 to the north and east of Ober Kessach, the town of Asch Hausen S3187, the high ground of the Walterberg above the Erlbach in the vicinity of S2036 between Asch Hausen and Bieringen 3084, the high ground

of Grid Squares S3289, S3389, 3489, 3589, 3388, and 3438 north and east of the town of Erlenbach, the town of Gommers Dorf S3587, the towns of Marlach S3586, Westernhausen S3284, and Winzenhofen 3335. These last four towns are all along the Jagst River.

The 2d Battalion launched its attack at 1000 B and met no resistance until it approached the Jagst River line, though at 1330 B enemy artillery fire was falling in Aschhausen which was being approached by Company G. By 1500 B, the battalion had cleared all of Bieringen S3064 which lay on the west side of the river but was still getting small arms fire from across the river answered by Company E which held the town. This fire continued for more than an hour, Company G took Aschhausen S3187, followed by Company F which, minus one platoon in battalion reserve, posted local security in the town. Motor patrols were sent to Winzenhofen S3335 and north along the Jagst River to Gommersdorf S3587 on the battalion left flank. The patrol found a road block, unmanned, to the north of Gommersdorf.

The 1st Battalion also attacked at 1000B. It moved from the area east of Unter Kessach eastward toward the river. By 1125 B one platoon of Company C had entered Jagsthausen S2580 on the battalion right flank had cleared the town of Schontal S2882 at 1155B and three hours later had cleared all the houses on the west side of the river in both Schontal and Berlichingen S2782. Being unable to cross the company dug in in positions along the river, sending patrols to make a reconnaissance of the river for possible bridges or bridge sites. Company A sent riflemen attached to the Regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon into Widdern S2281. The bridge there was found to have been destroyed and the force withdrew under sniper fire. One man of the Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon was killed at the bridge;

The 3d Battalion acted in accordance with the following instructions:

Operations Instructions NO. 6, Hq 3d Bn 255th Inf, 5 April 1945: Enemy forces are known to be in strength south of the Jagst River. The 253d Inf attacks to east in zone. The 3d Bn 255th Inf will outpost sector along N b ank of the Jagst River from Mockmühl to Neudenu with mission of defending assigned sector and assisting advance of 253d Inf (6 April) by fire and by feinting action towards Mockmühl S1731 and Siglingen S1479. Bn will defend with 3 companies on line - L on right (vic Neudenu S1173, K in center, I on left (vic Mockmühl). Company defensive sectors (see overlay). Co L will defend the town of Neudenu with one platoon and section of L M G s; two squads will organize and defend the high ground which extends between Neudenu and small woods in grid square 13-73. Sq defenses will include one plat L M G s. Co I will organize and defend high ground extending generally between Seehof S1580 and Reihertshausen S1460 (see overlay). Co K will be prepared to make a feint toward Siglingen S1479 by fire only. This feint will be made on Bn order. One plat L M G s will be attached to Co K and will be prepared to fire a long range fire on targets of opportunity with particular reference to Siglingen vicinity.

Co I will organize and defend Mockmühl and high ground to west. Plans will be made to repel possible counterattack from south and southeast, also be prepared to make a feinting attack with fire only south of Mockmühl. This action will begin on Bn order. Co I will be prepared to support by fire the advance of the 253d Inf. Co M 1st Plat atchd Co L, 3d Plat atchd Co K, 3d Plat atchd Co I, Plat AT Co atchd 3d Bn, G/S of Bn. AT Plat reconnoitre for positions, especially in Co K sector. A and P Plat reconnoitre for condition of roads in Bn sector, repair roads where needed. Jx overlays of 253d Inf plan and objectives will be furnished to companies. Administrative details: Hot breakfast 0600; bed rolls available at Bn release point, Bittelbronn. Current SOI in effect. Radios in full operation until further notice. SCR 300s and relay station if necessary. Bn CP, Bittelbronn; ... Bn Aid Sta - Bittelbronn.

In accordance with these instructions the 3d Battalion moved to new positions the battalion foot troops, minus Company I, left the reserve positions at 2011 B 5 April 1945 and closed into Bittelbronn S1463 at 02005. The Companies K and L then marched to assigned areas where they organized positions generally parallel to and north of the Jagst River. So Company K moved into Reicherts hausen Bn an Enemy patrol ambushed two guards of a one-quarter-ton truck and captured 3 light machine guns, three 60-millimeter mortars, 2 bazookas, and company ammunition as well as well as the vehicle. The guards escaped. Company I received 83-millimeter artillery fire and 80 millimeter mortar fire in the morning falling at the rate of about 20 rounds per hour. Enemy troops occupied houses in the part of Mockmühl across the river from Company I four of the houses were destroyed by our artillery fire which placed several direct hits on the houses, using both high explosive and white phosphorous rounds. Company K received mortar fire from a destroyed and abandoned prime-mover in the woods north of Reicherts hausen S1332, the enemy having not yet withdrawn across the Jagst River in this area. Companies I and L, in towns, received sniper fire. The battalion assisted the advance of the 253d Infantry during the day by small arms fire and by feinting action. One platoon of Company L remained on guard of the pontoon bridge and one squad continued to guard the German Ammunition train.

Adjacent units: The 253d Combat Team continued to attack on the south flank of the 255th Infantry. The 1st Battalion of the 253d Infantry, assisted by the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry, advanced four kilometers against very strong resistance. The town of Kressbach S1477, just south of the sector of the 3d Battalion 253d Infantry was forced to withdraw to the western edge of the town at dark.

Weather: cool and Cloudy; Visibility, fair.

REGIMENTAL HISTORY 6 Apr 45 (Cont'd)

PWs Captured:

<u>Officers</u>		<u>Enlisted Men</u>	
	0	5	by 1st Bn
	0	4	by 2d Bn
	0	4	by 3d Bn
Totals	0	13	

Status and Casualties

<u>Officers</u>						<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	32	28	-	-	-	774	735	1	4	-
2d Bn	34	31	-	1	-	784	742	-	7	-
3d Bn	37	31	-	-	-	773	704	-	-	-
Cn Co	5	4	-	-	-	99	95	-	-	-
AT Co	7	6	-	-	-	145	137	-	1	-
Hq Co	18	18	-	-	-	139	130	1	-	-
Sv Co	15	14	-	-	-	121	121	-	-	-
Med	9	9	-	-	-	119	112	-	-	-
Totals	157	141	-	1	-	2950	2776	2	12	-

7 April 45

The Regimental Commander issued the following Instructions.

Operations Instructions No. 33, Hq CT Blue (255th Infantry), Ober Kessach, Germany, 07 1230 B Apr 45: 1. 63d Inf Div cont atk to seize GERINGEN (S2353), ECHENBUCH (S4070), and NITZENHAUSEN (S4978). 2. CT Blue (Reinf) a. Crosses JAGST R in Z and atks to seize Div obj in its Z (see overlay). 3. 1st Bn (-Co "A"): a. Crosses JAGST River in Z b. Atks to se to seize objs in Z. c. Blocks to se to cover L (E) flank of 3d Bn. 4. 2d Bn (-Co "F") crosses JAGST R in Z, atks to se to seize obsn of JAGST R crossing in Z, and cont atk to SE. 5. 3d Bn (-) on O crosses JAGST R (see overlay). atks to SW in dir S2650 to seize LAMPOLDSHAUSEN (S2178). 6. 2d Bn FA Bn in D/S (On Co Atchd): Priority of fires to 3d Bn. Smoke obsn of crossing at BIERINGEN. 7. AT Co (-) protects flanks and rear of Regt 1 sector. 8. Atchmts: a. 1st Bn (-) 1 Plat Co "B" 753d Tk Bn (2) Co "C" (-3 Plats) 822d TD Bn b. 2d Bn (1) 1 Plat Co "B" 753d Tk Bn (d) 1 Plat Co "C" 822d TD Bn c. 3d Bn (1) Co "B" (-O 753d Tk Bn (2) 1 Plat Co "D" 753d Tk Bn (#) 1 Plat Co "B" 822d TD Bn. 9. At Mine Plat reverts to AT Co. 10. Regt 1 Res initially in vic ROSSACH (S2785) prep to cross river on Regt 1 Co. 11. Co "F" (-1 Plat protects R flank & Regt. 12. Co "C" 2d Bn Engr C Bn prepare ford crossing of JAGST R at BIERINGEN for veh and thereafter repair bridge at that site for veh traffic.

13. Foot trs cross JAGST R in respective z. 14. Arm'd veh ford JAGST R at BIERINGEN and support atk. 15. Other veh cross JAGST R at BIERINGEN on Regt'l O when ford is improved to permit crossing of wheeled veh.

Wheeled veh will be held in defilade until crossing is prep for them. 16. Maintain contact from L to R. I and R Plat maintain contact w/253d and 254th Inf. 17. Time of atk 1530.

During the early part of the period the 2d Battalion was under fire from the enemy, a patrol being fired on at 1230B from the vicinity of Westernhausen S3284 (east of Bieringen) by enemy machine gun and small arms fire. At 1230 B too, an enemy patrol in Bieringen captured five men from the 2d Battalion and knocked out 2 one-quarter-ton and 1 two- and one half ton trucks, enemy artillery fire fell on the high ground S317830 northeast of Bieringen and on Aschhausen S3187 between 1400B and 1430B, and at 1455B small arms and machine guns fire came from the high ground S3183 overlooking Bieringen from the southeast. At 1645 B Bieringen itself was under artillery fire. During the period the troops were strafed by ME 109's.

The 2d Battalion launched its attack from Bieringen attempting to cross the Jagst River at that point at 1405 B. Company E, the lead company of the attack, was pinned down by enemy small arms and machine gun fire from the heights to the south of the river at 1455B. Later company E withdrew. At 1730B Company G renewed the attack in that area and succeeded in capturing the high ground at S3183. Company E followed Company G in crossing the river and then turned to the right to seize, the high ground S3083 just south of the town. The companies prepared defensive positions and sent out contact and security patrols, by the end of the period the 2d Battalion had moved its command post to Bieringen and Company F held positions on the high ground to the north and east of the town.

The 1st Battalion launched its attack across the Jagst River, the foot troops crossing the river in zone at 1300B. Heavy artillery was placed on Berlichingen S2732, virtually flattening the town. Company B then moved across the river reduced the remaining resistance in the town and then moved through the town to organize defensive positions on the high ground to the southeast. Company C crossed the river behind Company B, moved through B's positions and attacked Schontal S2682 from the southeast. When the town had been cleared, Company C organized defensive positions on the high ground to the southeast. Company A moved to regimental reserve in the vicinity of Rossach S2685. One platoon of Company B held Berlichingen. The battalion command post was established at Lauterstal S2562 with a forward command post in one of the houses situated just across the river from Berlichingen.

During the first part of the period the 2d Battalion remained in defensive positions along the Jagst River between Neudienau and Mockmühl,

receiving mortar fire in the Mockmuhl area. At 0115B the battalion received orders that it was to be relieved by the 63d Division Reconnaissance Troop. The relief was completed at 1105B and the battalion moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of Unterkensach S2384 to await orders. The battalion closed into the assembly area at 1630B. At 1730B a reconnaissance patrol from the battalion was fired on by snipers in the vicinity of Widdern S2251.

The Commanding Officer of the 3d Battalion issued instructions as follows:
 Operations Instructions No. 7, Hq 3d Bn 255th Inf, WIDDERN, Germany, 7 Apr 45: ... 3d Bn moves from present assembly area at 2100B for WIDDERN, crosses JAGST River and establishes beachhead south of JAGST River (see overlay) and be prepared to continue attack to SW in the morning. Bridgehead positions (see overlay). Route (See overlay). Formation: column of companies--of companies--I, K, L, M, Hq. Co B (-) 753d Tk Bn atchd to 3d Bn, 1 Plat Co 822 TD Bn atchd to 3d Bn. Co I move by marching at 1930B from present assembly area to Widdern, clear town and be prepared to cross JAGST River and organize pos as shown on overlay. Co will be prepared to repel possible counter attack from S or SE. 1 Plat Medium Tanks atchd to Co I. Co K move by marching at 2100B from present assembly area to Widdern, cross the JAGST River, organize and defend bridgehead positions as shown on overlay. Be prepared to continue attack tomorrow morning. Be prepared to repel possible counterattack from S and SW. Co L move by marching at 2100B, follow Co K at 100 yards. Cross JAGST River and proceed to reserve position in beachhead. Organize and defend positions as shown on overlay. Be prepared to follow Co I tomorrow as the reserve co. Co M--Plat atchd to Co I, Plat atchd to Co K. Mortars follow Co L in general support ... Tanks and TD proceed to Widdern at once and take positions so as to cover approaches into city. Annex to Operations Instructions No 7: ... 3d Bn continue attack from assembly area on Mag A 251 and gain contact with 3d Bn 253d Inf. Continue the attack to SE on Mag A z 164 to objective LAMPOLDSHAUSENS S2175 (see overlay). Pay particular attention to area in which no firing is allowed. Co I on left, Co K on right, Co L in reserve following Co I at 400 yards with mission of protecting left flank of Bn. ... Time of attack 0600B. LD edge of woods SW of assembly area.

By the end of the period the 3d Battalion had assembled around Widdern S2251, and Company I had started to cross the river to seize high ground south of the town in the face of machine gun fire.

Adjacent units: The 253d Infantry continued to apply pressure in its zone on the right of the 255th Infantry. On the left of the 255th Infantry the 254th Infantry continued to attack and established a line generally west from Mollenbach S520383.

Weather: cool; visibility, good.

PWs Captured:

Officers0
0
0
0Enlisted Men0 by 1st Bn
50 by 2d Bn
2 by 3d Bn
52Status and Casualties

		Officers					Enlisted Men				
		Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st	Bn	32	28	-	-	-	774	735	-	4	-
2d	Bn	34	31	-	-	-	784	742	-	7	-
3d	Bn	21	28	-	1	-	764	697	-	1	1
Cn	Co	1	4	-	-	-	99	94	-	-	-
AT	Co	7	6	-	-	-	142	137	-	-	-
Hq	Co	13	13	-	-	-	131	125	-	-	-
Sv	Co	15	14	-	-	-	121	121	-	-	-
Med		9	9	-	-	-	114	110	-	-	-
Totals		153	138	-	1	-	2931	2761	-	12	1

8 April 45

At the end of 7 April 1945 the regimental commander issued the following instructions:

Operations Instructions NO. 34, Hq CE Blue (255th Inf), OBER KESSACH, Germany, 072300Z Apr 45: 1. 63d Inf Div cont atk to seize Div Obj. 2. 253d Inf (Reinf) atks 080600Z Apr 45 in conj with CE Blue to reduce ey resistance in S part of Div z. 3. 254th Inf (Reinf) cont atk to secure Div Obj in Z. 4. CE Blue cont atk at 080600Z to seize Div Obj in Z. 5. 1st Bn- CO A atks at 080600Z and seizes obj in Z as far as phase line Red and be prepared to cont atk immediately on O. 6. 2d Bn - Co F atks at 080600Z and seizes obj in Z as far as phase line Red and be prepared to continue atk immediately on O. 7. 3d Bn: a. Secures brnd across JAGST R to S vic WIDDERN (S2281). b. Atks at 080600Z Apr 45 and in conj with 253d Inf on its R seize LAMPOLLSHAUSEN (S2175) and destroy by within temp Bd. 8. 2d Bn in D/S (On Co etcd). Priority of fires to 3d Bn. 9. AT Co N/C. 10. Atchnts E/C. 11. Co F (-1 Plat) cont mission. Reverts to 2d Bn on Regtl O. 12. 1st Plat Co E 353d AAA (Stt) Bn assists in establishing brnd vic WIDDERN (S2281) by providing artificial moonlight fr pos vic (S2285).

13. 263d Engr C bn (-) a. Improve ford vic Widdern (S2281) foll establishment of brhd by C1 Blue. b. Provide br vic BIERINGEN (S3084). 14. No fire line eff 080900B Apr 45. 15 Regt1 Res N/C. 16. Atks will orgn to make max use of all organic and atchd wps to secure all possible speed and violence in ea atk. 17. Maint contact fr L to R. I & R Plat maint contact with 254th Inf.

The 3d Battalion had entered Widdern S2281 at the end of 7 April in the face of enemy sniper fire. Company I had advanced to cross the river, but because of the resistance only one platoon was at first able to cross. At 06310B some of the enemy machine gun fire caused a house in Widdern to catch fire and an hour later two more houses in the town were set aflame. The light from these blazes caused any troops trying to cross the river to be silhouetted. Nevertheless by 0440 all of Company I had crossed and an hour later half of Company K was across the river. By 0655, when all the infantry had moved to the south bank, the tanks began to move across the river. The tank destroyers were held back to protect the battalion rear. Company I was subjected to enemy counter-attack at 0810 when the entire battalion was on the south side. The enemy attacked with approximately 100 men but was repulsed. During the morning the engineers cut down the river bank with a bulldozer to make the fording point possible for wheeled vehicles. At 0935B company I on the right and Company K on the left were ready for a coordinated attack. As they advanced Company K received heavy small arms fire from enemy on its left, and Company I encountered fire from an enemy tank. During the day at least four enemy tanks were reported in the area. At 1145B two enemy, having infiltrated behind the lines, stopped litter bearers 800 yards south of Widdern and forced them to turn back. The battalion advanced against very strong opposition from enemy small arms and automatic weapons as well as mortar and artillery fire. At 1325B the Commanding Officer of the Battalion, Lt. Colonel Maurice K. Schiffman 0306113 was wounded in the back by shrapnel. The battalion however was able to push forward, and at 1800 had passed Seehaus S211739 and reached the roadjunction at S197789, the coordinating point at which the battalion was to meet element of the 253d Infantry attacking from the west.

At 1700B Company A, minus one platoon which remained with the 1st battalion, was attached to the 3d Battalion for operations and ordered to move by truck to Rossach S2635 and then to a wood north of Widdern S2281 where they were to detruck, move into Widdern, cross the river and push in to the left of the 3d Battalion to clear out pockets of resistance along the river. By 2253B the 3d Battalion, having reported road blocks between Seehaus and the coordinating point and on the road south of the coordinating point, was organizing defensive positions in accordance with oral instructions from the Regimental Commanding Officer. These instructions, issued to both the 3d and 1st Battalions, at 2100B, ordered the troops to have all around defense, tying back to the river on both flanks, operating interior patrols, maintaining communication to listening posts which were to be checked every

hour by the duty officer, as was each company; fifty percent of the the men were to be awake.

The 2d Battalion launched an attack in the vicinity of Bieringen S3034. Company G move out first to flush the draws to the south and right of the river crossing at that town because there had been considerable enemy movement there during the night. In fact the engineers who were attempting to construct a Bailey bridge in the vicinity of Diergen were forced to discontinue their work during the early hours of the period because of enemy fire. After an hour, however, they began work again and worked on the bridge during the day. By 1240B Company E which had attacked to the south having cleared Hill 337 S3182, was in Halsberg receiving heavy enemy fire and calling for artillery. Company G had turned back from flushing the draws to the south of Biergen and was in Westernhausen S3264 and had knocked out an anti-tank gun. By 1405 Company G had cleared Westernhausen and in the woods to the south of the town where it was mopping up some resistance it had by-passed earlier. Continuing its attack southward in this wood Company G made contact with Company E which had been advancing southeast from Halsberg. The contact was made in the area S3232.

At 1515B Company F was ordered to move by motor to Mockmühl S1731 to clear out the town, German patrols having infiltrated across the river and driven back elements of the 63d Reconnaissance Troop. In conjunction with elements of the 322d Tank Destroyer Battalion, Company F moved into the town at 1730B and by 1925B had secured the town and driven the enemy back across the river. Company F then reverted to regimental control and moved by marching to Dippach S2083 as part of the regimental reserve.

At 1818 it was reported that, because of a change ordered in the regimental left boundary, Company E of the 254th Infantry was moving into Marlach S3536 in what had been the 2d Battalion area.

In the 1st Battalion attack Company B moved out from the area south of Berlichingen S 27 82 at 0600B.m Company C on the left waited until Company B came abreast of it to begin its attack. By 0845 when the tanks and tank destroyers had crossed the river Company V had taken the wooded area S2330 and Company C was advancing eastward to the left of that area. Enemy resistance was extremely determined. By 1305, however, Company B had taken all of the wooded hill in grid squares S2330 and 2950, and Company C had taken half of the wooded hill in grid squares S3030 and 3130 north of Eichelshof S3080, a town which Company C captured a couple of hours later. Enemy resistance which had been very stubborn against the advance of the two companies on the two hills diminished and Company C took Schleierhof S3331 and began moving to Muthof S3179. These two towns were on the phase line which the Battalion had been ordered to reach. It had been planned, once this phase line was reached, to commit Company A to clear the area to right of the 1st Battalion and establish contact with the 3d Battalion,

but by the time the 1st Battalion had reached its objective Company A had already been committed as an attachment of the 3d Battalion. The first Battalion organized defensive positions in accordance with orders from the Regimental Commander.

During the day one platoon of Company L with two anti-tank guns attached, which had been guarding the bridge at R9883 (that is, the bridge across the Jagst River below Neckarelz) was relieved of its guard duty and moved to Ober Kessach S2785 as part of the regimental reserve.

The Regimental Command Post remained in Ober Kessach.

Adjacent units: The 253d Infantry launched its attack at 0600B in conjunction with the 3d Battalion 255th Infantry, encountered heavy resistance, took the town of Zuttlingen S1578 on the Jagst but failed to reach coordinating point designated for it and the 3d Battalion 255th Infantry.

Weather: fair; visibility, good.

PWs Captured:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
	0	9 by 1st Bn
	0	58 by 2d Bn
	0	0 by 3d Bn
Totals	0	67

Status and Casualties

	<u>Officers</u>					<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
	Asgl	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgl	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	32	23	-	1	-	764	723	7	9	-
2d Bn	32	30	-	-	-	761	721	5	15	-
3d Bn	34	23	-	-	-	764	797	-	-	-
Cn Co	4	4	-	-	-	99	94	-	-	-
AT Co	7	6	-	-	-	144	137	-	-	-
Hq Co	18	18	-	-	-	131	125	-	-	-
Sv Co	15	14	-	-	-	121	121	-	-	-
Med	9	8	-	-	-	114	109	-	-	-
Totals	151	130	-	1	-	2398	2732	12	24	-

The 255th Infantry continued to attack with success on 9 April 1945. By the end of the period the 2d Battalion, on the regimental right, having attacked to the south and southeast against moderate enemy resistance, had established a bridgehead across the Kocher River at Weissbach S3479. By the end of the period Company G on the right was still north of Kocher and north of Weissbach in positions on the highground on both sides of the Langerbach which runs south into the Kocher. Company G's positions were in grid squares S3460 and S3580. Companies E and F, however, had crossed the river at Weissbach and held positions at S3473 on high ground in the vicinity of Duthof. They were supported by a section of heavy machine guns. During the day the battalion had captured the towns of Schleierhof S3381, Crispenhofen S3581, Halberg 3530 south and east of Crispenhofen, and Weissbach S3479 on the Kocher River. The heaviest resistance had come from enemy small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, and artillery fire at the crossing site. One platoon of Company B 753d Tank Battalion was detached from the 2 Battalion and attached to the 254th Infantry.

The 1st Battalion had attacked and moved forward to take positions on the high ground above the Kocher River. These positions were to the right of those held by the 2d Battalion and were in the regimental center. At the end of the period the 1st Battalion, having secured the towns of Eichelshof S3060, Muthof S3179, and Buschelshof S3379, held these positions: Company C was on the battalion right. One platoon of the company was at S3379 in the vicinity of Buschelshof. To the right one platoon of Company C held the high ground S3279 on either side of the Wulfungerbach north of and across the river from Fpfrchtenberg S3278 on the south side of Kocher River. The right platoon of Company C was on the high ground S3179 of Eichelshof and to its right another platoon of Company B occupied defensive positions S2879 astride the road between Edelmannshof S2879 and Ensbach S2973 on the Kocher. The Battalion's right element was a platoon of Company A which held the high, wooded ground S2779 above and to the north of the east-west road between Edelmannshof S2379 and Mittel Pfitzhof S2578 and therefore just south and east of Stolzennhof. The battalion was in defensive positions here because it had encountered very active enemy patrolling during the preceding night and was prepared for a counter-attack.

The 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry, still attached to the 253d Infantry for operations, and still with Company A of the 255th Infantry attached (minus one platoon) pressed forward in its attack. At 1252B the battalion made contact with elements of the 253d Infantry at the coordinating point, the cross roads at S197769. From here the two battalions launched a coordinated attack and seized Lampoldshausen S2175 at 2030B and continued the attack and moved southeast to secure the bridge at Hoplingen S3373. About 1500B the attack had met moderate resistance from enemy infantry and artillery fire which slowed the advance. In the vicinity of Lampoldshausen the battalion captured four prisoners who reported that they were from three companies of the 37th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 17th SS Division.

Originally each company had a strength of 100 to 120 men but all had suffered many casualties, and the 12th company was now attached to the other three. The armament of the three companies, not including that of the 12th or weapons company, included 2 heavy machine guns and 2 light machine guns per company. The prisoners reported that their unit had withdrawn from Kockmühl at 0700B on 9 April, the day of their capture, with a 1st Sergeant in command, the unit having no officers. At the end of the period the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry held these positions: on the right, Company A occupied the high ground S2275 east of Lampoldshausen; Company I in the battalion center was defending the hill at S2375; and Company L was in defensive positions on the slopes S2375 and S2476 in the vicinity of Buchhof and overlooking the southflowing Kocher River to the east.

Company A, minus one platoon, which had shared in the attack, withdrew to Widdern, the 3d Battalion command post, and at 2300B reverted to the control of its own battalion. By the end of the period Company A was enroute Schental S2852.

In these positions at the end of the period there was a break in the regimental lines of three or four kilometers between the left element of Company L in the vicinity of Buchhof and the right element of that platoon of Company A which was still attached to the 1st Battalion and holding positions in the vicinity of Stolzendorf.

Adjacent units: The 3d Battalion of the 253d Infantry attacked at 0700B and in conjunction with the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry seized Lampoldshausen S2175 against resistance moderate to heavy.. Other elements of the 253d Combat Team also attacked to the east and southeast. The 254th Infantry, on the left of the 255th Infantry, launched its attack at 0800B, and by the end of the period elements of the 254th Combat Team were in Ingelfingen S2979. During most of the period the 254th Combat Team encountered moderate resistance, but at 1345B the enemy, in the estimated strength of one company, counter-attacked in the vicinity of Balsenberg S4180. The counter-attack was repulsed.

The 363d Field Artillery Battalion, with the regimental Cannon Company attached, was in support of the 255th Combat Team; the regimental Anti-Tank Company continued to provide anti-mechanized defense for the regimental zone, the mine platoon of the company being a part of the regimental reserve.

The 255th Infantry Regimental Command Post was established at Bisingen 53034.

REGIMENTAL HISTORY 9 45 (Cont'd)

Weather: fair; visibility, excellent.

PWs Captured

	<u>Officers</u>
	0
	0
	0
Totals	0

<u>Enlisted Men</u>	
0	by 1st Bn
18	by 2d Bn
16	by 3d Bn
34	

Status and Casualties

	<u>Officers</u>						<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	
1st Bn	32	28	-	-	-	764	728	-	1	-	
2d Bn	31	30	-	-	-	764	708	4	5	-	
3d Bn	33	27	-	-	-	750	657	3	7	-	
Cn Co	4	4	-	-	-	93	93	-	-	-	
AT Co	7	6	-	-	-	144	138	-	-	-	
Hq Co	18	18	-	-	-	131	125	-	-	-	
Sv Co	15	15	-	-	-	122	122	-	-	-	
Med	9	8	-	-	-	114	109	-	-	-	
Totals	149	136	-	2	-	2887	2680	7	13	-	

10 April 1945

The regimental Commander issued the following instructions:

Operations Instructions No. 34, Hq CT Blue (255th Inf), Bieringen, Germany, 100500B Apr 45; 1. A 63d Inf Div continues to atk to seize Div Obj. b. New bd between CT's effective 100500B Apr 45. 2. 253d CT (Reinf) (Atchd 63d Rm Tr) a. Continues active patrolling in Z developing hostile def pos. b. Maintains contact w/elms 100th Inf Div on right and 255th CT on left. 3. 254th CT (rein): Continues the atk to seize portions of Div Obj in Z. 4. 255th CT (Rein): A. Establishes bridgehead vic WEISSBACH b. Atks in vector to seize Div Obj (New bd: overlay). 5. a. 1st Bn: Seize the line of KOCHER R in its Z and thereafter block along the line of the KOCHER R. b. 2d Bn: Cont present mission of enlarging bridgehead at WEISSBACH and seize all cy observation of WEISSBACH bridge site. c. 3d Bn: Upon relief by 25d Inf, assemble in Regtl Res vic CRISPENHOFEN (S2561) prepared to follow 2d Bn in exploitation of bridgehead by atk to the SE (Overlay). 6. 263d FA Bn in Spt (On Co atchd). 7. AT Co (2) protects flanks and rear of Regtl Sector. 8. Attachments: a. 1st Bn:

(1) 1 Plt, Co "B",) 53d Tk Bn (Upon relief of 3d Bn in present sector, reverts to 1st Bn). (2) Co "C" (-2 plt) 822d TD Bn. b. 3d Bn : (1) 1 Plt, Co "D", 753d Tk Bn. (2) 1 Plt, Co "C", 822d Td Bn. 9. 63d Div Engineer provides building material and bridge for crossing WEISSBACH (S3479). 10. Armored beh will cross KOCHER R at WEISSBACH (S3479) upon completion of bridge. 11. Maintain contact left or right. I and R Plt maintain contact with 253d Inf.

The new boundary moved the left or east flank of the 255th Infantry to the west, reducing the regimental zone, so that the new left boundary which the 255th Infantry shared with the 254th Infantry now ran approximately from S3485, excluding Marlach already held by elements of the 254th Infantry, southeast to S3979, excluding Ingelfingen also already held by the 254th Infantry, to S4377 including Kunzelsau, and then to S4776 excluding Kocherstetten.

The activity of the day was relatively light. The 1st Battalion, already holding the high ground to the north of the Kocher River and to the west of the 2d Battalion bridgehead on the south bank of the river, slightly reorganized its positions, particularly the right part of the battalion sector, to protect the right flank of the regiment. Company A, relieved of its attachment to the 3d Battalion, cleared the town of Mittel Pfitzhof S2578 without opposition. The battalion manned observation posts, made reconnaissance for river crossings and maintained contact patrols within the sector, being prepared to attack on order.

The 2d Battalion launched an attack to enlarge its bridgehead south of the Kocher to the south of Weissbach. Company G moved from its positions north of the river near Weissbach S3479 to take the positions of Company B on the high ground south of the river at S3476. Company F moved south and east to take positions S3578 beyond Guthof. Company E moved to positions on hill 371 S3577 and S3677 north of Hermersberg. Company K was attached to the 2d Battalion at 2000B, and moved into position on the high ground S3678 and S3773 on the left flank of the battalion and south of Niedern hall, overlooking to the east the valley of the Mühlbach, a northward flowing tributary of the Kocher River.

The 3d Battalion was relieved on position by elements of the 253d Infantry. When the relief was completed at 1905B, the battalion moved by shuttling to an assembly area near Crispenhofen S3581. The shuttle was completed by 2315B, and the battalion, minus Company K, conducted active reconnaissance patrols in the regimental area.

The Regimental Command Post was moved from Bieringen to Crispenhofen S3581.

REGIMENTAL HISTORY 10 45 (Cont'd)

Adjacent units: The 253d Infantry continued to defend its positions to the right of the 255th Infantry and relieved the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry on position. On the left of the 255th Infantry the 254th Infantry, against very heavy resistance Jagstberg S4984, Railhof S4851, and Kugelhof S4777.

Weather: warm; visibility, good

PMs Captured:

<u>Officers</u>		<u>Enlisted Men</u>	
	0	6	by 1st Bn
	0	18	by 2d Bn
	0	3	by 3d Bn
Totals	0	27	

Status and Casualties

<u>Officers</u>						<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	29	26	-	-	-	722	699	2	-	-
2d Bn	30	27	-	-	-	735	684	3	10	-
3d Bn	32	27	-	-	-	743	640	-	13	-
Cn Co	4	4	-	-	-	97	91	-	-	-
At Co	7	6	-	-	-	144	136	-	-	-
Hq Co	18	18	-	-	-	131	125	-	-	-
Sv Co	15	15	-	-	-	122	122	-	-	-
Med	9	9	-	-	-	114	109	-	-	-
Totals	144	131	-	-	-	2608	2605	5	23	-

11 April 1945

The Regimental Commander issued the following instructions:

Operations Instructions No. 35, Hq CT Blue (255th Inf), CRISPERFROGEN, Germany, 110400Z Apr: 1. (a) 63d Inf Div cont atk to seize Div Obj. (b) 10th Arm Div moves to assembly area (overlay) and cns atk to the SW when c bridges are available over sector 254th or 255th CT. 2. New Regtl Bds eff active at once. 3. 253d CT (Reinf) no change fro Ol No. 34, this Hq, dtr 10 Apr. 4. 254th CT (Reinf) cont atk to the S and SE to seize Div Obj in revised Z. 5. 255th CT (Reinf) (a) Blacks sector SEDRINGER (S2677) to FORSTENBERG (S3273, exclusive. (b) Cont atk in blacks sector SEDRINGER (S2677) to FORSTENBERG (S3273) exclusive.

(b) 2d Bn atks at 110900B fr pres pos to seize Red Phase Line (Overlay)
 (c) 3d Bn crosses bridge at Weissbach (S3479) at 110700B, atks to SE to
 seize successive phase lines (Overlay). 7. Artillery, Special Units—
 No change. 8. Atchmts — No change with the following exception— 1 plat
 Co "B", 753d Tk Bn, atchd to 1st Bn, released fr atchmt and atchd to 3d
 Bn. 9. TD's operations to the front will be kept well fwd. 10. 1 sqd,
 At Mine Plat atchd to 3d Bn. 11. Maintain contact left to right. I and R
 Plat maintain contact with 253d Inf.

The Red phase Line which the 2d Battalion was to seize was a series of
 hills or promontories running from Forchtenberg S3278 south-eastward, over-
 looking the valley of the Kupfer River a tributary of the Kocher. The
 successive phase lines, White, Blue, and Black, which the 3d Battalion was to
 seize were north-south lines to the east. The White Phase Line was the north-
 south road running over high wooded ground between Niedernhall S3679 and
 Neufels S3774; the Blue Phase Line was the high ground on the west side of the
 valley of the northward-flowing Forellenbach which enters the Kocher at Nie-
 dernhall; the Black Phase Line was the high ground to the east of this valley
 looking toward Lipfersberg S3978.

Throughout the day the 1st Battalion continued to hold its blocking pos-
 itions to the north of the Kocher River.

The 2d Battalion in its bridgehead south of the Kocher in the vicinity
 of Weissbach S3479 repulsed a number of enemy counter-attacks early in the pe-
 riod. The largest enemy counter-attack occurred at 0645B and consisted of
 four companies. It was successfully repulsed and the enemy consisted of
 four companies. It was successfully repulsed and the enemy withdrew to the
 southwest. Because of this activity the 2d Battalion did not begin its attack
 until 1415. When the battalion did attack it seized the Red Phase Line.
 Company G was on the two promontories S3377 and S3477 along the Kupfer valley
 just south of Forchtenberg. Company F, on the hills to the south S3476 and
 S3576, faced westward just southwest of Hermersberg S3577. Company E on the
 battalion left flank held the southward facing slope S3576 to the south-
 east of Hermersberg. Late in the period Company G sent a platoon into the
 Forchtenberg S3278 to assist elements of the 10th Armored Division in seizing
 and clearing the town which had already received a good deal of artillery.

The battalion encountered enemy resistance during the entire period from
 small arms, automatic weapons, mortar, and artillery fire. During the night
 the enemy continued to send patrols into the sector.

The 3d Battalion moved from the vicinity of Grispenhofen S3581 to cross
 the Kocher River at Weissbach S3479 and launch an attack to the south at
 0900B. Company K, which had been attached to the 2d Battalion and was
 already across the river holding positions on the left flank of the 2d
 Battalion sector at S3576 and S3778 south of Weidenhall, reverted to the
 3d Battalion. The battalion advanced against determined resistance receiving
 heavy sniper fire as well as artillery fire from the enemy 88 millimeter
 multi-purpose gun and other pieces. At 0935 when the battalion had just
 launched its attack, it was forced to repel an enemy counter-attack. By the
 end of the period Company K on the battalion right had occupied positions
 facing south and south east at S3576 and S3777. Company I to the left held
 positions S3777 above the valley of the Muhlbach or Forellenbach, having

reached the northern end of Phase Line Blue. Company L had moved to the rear of these positions into the sector occupied on the preceding day by Companies E and K. Enemy groups forming to the battalion front at 1750B and at 1805B for what appeared to be counter-attacks were dispersed by artillery. The battalion at the end of the period had established security and contact patrols. Company L in the battalion support position was alerted to move to Neufels S3774 early on 12 April 1945 to hold the town, a key point on the supply line of the 10th Armored Division.

Adjacent Units: the 253d Infantry on the right of the 255th Infantry continued to hold its defensive positions. The 254th Infantry on the right launched an attack at 1430B and its 1st Battalion crossed the Kocher River under heavy artillery fire and captured Lepfersberg S3978 south of Niedernhall.

The Regimental Command post remained at Crispenhofen S3581.

Weather: warm; visibility, good.

PWs Captured:

<u>Officers</u>		<u>Enlisted Men</u>	
	0	0	by 1st Bn
	0	83	by 2d Bn
	0	3	by 3d Bn
Totals	0	86	

Status and Casualties

<u>Officers</u>				<u>Enlisted Men</u>							
	A	SGd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	29	26	-	-	-	-	720	673	-	-	-
2d Bn	30	27	-	-	-	-	720	657	5	15	-
3d Bn	33	27	-	1	-	-	731	614	5	7	2
Cn Co	4	4	-	-	-	-	98	92	-	-	-
LT Co	7	6	-	-	-	-	143	137	-	-	-
Hq Co	16	16	-	-	-	-	134	128	-	-	-
Sv Co	15	15	-	-	-	-	122	122	-	-	-
Med	8	8	-	-	-	-	111	87	-	-	-
Totals	144	131	-	1	-	-	2779	2510	12	25	2

During the daylight of 12 April 1945 the 255th Infantry continued the attack. By 0826B Company L had moved to Neufels S273742 with elements of the 10th Armored Division and secured the town.

At 1400B the 1271st Engineer Combat Battalion was attached to the regiment. By 1400B it had relieved the 1st Battalion in its defensive positions on the north bank of the Kocher river between Sindringen S2677 and Forchtenberg S3278. The 1st Battalion then crossed the river and moved by marching to Forchtenbach from which it attacked to the south and west.

By conducting aggressive patrolling and flushing the wooded areas in their sector during the early daylight hours and by attacking against moderate resistance, the battalions, all three on line, had reached positions on a main line of resistance where by the end of the period they held defensive positions and prepared to continue the attack.

The 1271st Engineer Combat Battalion had also moved forward and at the end of the period held positions on the regimental right flank. Company C of these engineers was to the right of the regiment in positions S3175 in the vicinity of Brendelsall. Company A of the 1271st Engineers was on commanding ground to the west of the town, and company B was in the rear in the vicinity of Edelmanshof S2379, not yet across the river.

The Companies of the 255th Infantry held these positions at the end of the period: Company A was on the Regimental right at S3174 north of Tiefsall; Company C was in positions at S3273, S3272, and S3373, facing south-west in the area south of Metzdorf and northwest of Stolzneck. Company B was in the rear in the vicinity of Schwarzenweiler S3376.

The 2d Battalion, all three companies on line, was in the central sector of the regimental front. Company G at S3471 north and east of Dottenweiler, Company E on the battalion left at S3770 in the Vicinity of Wuchern along the heights above the Hirschbach.

The 3d Battalion had advanced from positions south of Nidernhall so that Company K was abreast of and to the east or left of Company E. Company K therefore held positions at S3871 south of Mangoldshain. Company L was two or two and a half kilometers to the north or rear of the left element of Company K and held positions at S3973, south of Weckhof and northeast of Fuesbach. Company I was to the east of Company L and at S4173, north of Reckbach.

The regimental Command Post was established at S3278. Weissbach S3479 at 2000B, a new command post was established at Forchtenberg S3278 at 2330A.

Adjacent units: The 253d Infantry on the right of the 255th Infantry launched an attack at 1500B and met heavy resistance. The 254th Infantry on the right of the 255th Infantry continued to attack to the southwest and took the towns of Maudorf S435768, Schloss-Stetten S431763, Kunzelsau S440774, and high ground north of Gaisbach S418749 and northwest of Morsbach S446768.

Weather: warm; visibility, good.

Prs Captured;

<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
0	2 by 1st Bn
1	25 by 2d Bn
0	40 by 3d Bn
Totals 1	67

Status and Casualties

			<u>Officers</u>			<u>Enlisted Men</u>						
			Asgd	Eff	EIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	EIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	29	25	-	-	-	-	-	720	673	-	-	-
2d Bn	30	26	-	-	-	-	-	736	678	-	-	-
3d Bn	33	27	-	-	-	-	-	701	618	-	-	-
Cn Co	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	98	91	-	-	-
AF Co	7	6	-	-	-	-	-	143	137	-	-	-
Hq Co	18	18	-	-	-	-	-	134	127	-	-	-
Sv Co	15	15	-	-	-	-	-	122	122	-	-	-
Med	8	8	-	-	-	-	-	110	97	-	-	4
Totals	144	130	-	-	-	-	-	2764	2543	-	-	4

13 April 1945

The activity of the 255th Infantry on 13 April 1945 consisted in moving forward against relatively light opposition three or four kilometers in the division objective, securing more effective positions and maintaining active patrolling.

At 0930B a task force, called Task Force La Morte because of the officer in charge, consisting of Companies B and L and other elements attacked to clear the area in the vicinity of Eichach S2075, an area in a bow of the Kocher River near Sindringen. This area to the south of the river was outside the regimental boundary to the west or left and had not been cleared because of the resistance which the 253d Infantry had met to its attack.

Weather: warm; visibility, good.

PWs Captured:

<u>Officers</u>		<u>Enlisted Men</u>	
	0	2	by 1st Bn
	0	2	by 2d Bn
	0	21	by 3d Bn
Totals	0	25	

Status and Casualties

13 April 45

		<u>Officers</u>					<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
		Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st	Bn	29	25	-	-	-	720	673	-	-	9
2d	Bn	31	27	-	-	-	747	692	-	-	-
3d	Bn	32	26	-	-	-	742	654	-	-	-
On	Co	4	4	-	-	-	98	91	-	-	-
AI	Co	7	6	-	-	-	145	140	-	-	34
Hq	Co	18	15	-	-	-	134	130	-	-	-
Sv	Co	15	15	-	-	-	122	122	-	-	-
Med		8	8	-	-	-	108	111	-	-	-
Totals		144	130	-	-	-	2816	2523	-	-	49

14 April 1945

The 255th Infantry spent the day of 12 April 1945 in shifting its boundary to the left & east and in consolidating its positions in a somewhat narrower sector than it had been holding.

Company C, which had moved south and west to Chringen S2858 outside the regimental zone, was relieved on position by elements of the 253d Infantry reverted to regimental reserve. Company B was still in reserve in Kirchensall S3572. The 1st Battalion Command Post was in Langeneall S3572 and Company A was in positions around the crossroads to the west of town.

The 2d Battalion Command Post was in Loachenhirschbach S358709, and the battalion, after being relieved in some by elements of the 253d Infantry occupied defensive positions in that area, with one platoon of Company G near the command post at S3570 across the road to the south of the town. Company E held positions at S3568 and S3769, southeast of Bareppach (where the command post of Company C of the 822d Tank Destroyer Battalion was established) and south of the railway, that is on the south slope of the valley of the Eppach and to the north of Kesselfeld. Company F, minus one platoon

maintained defensive positions in and around Grumbuhl S3769. Company G, which had been attached to the 3d Battalion, occupied a sector at S3869 in and to the south of the town of Lohe. South of Company G and south of and along the east west road, Landstrasse No. 2 running eastward from Newenstein. Company G had set up a defensive position on the left flank of the battalion.

The Command Post of the 3d Battalion was established in Wengoldsall S383717. All three Companies of the battalion were one line, Company K at S4069 along the east west road, Landstrasse No 2, to the east of Company G and just west of Hoheluch Farm around a crossroads; Company L at S3970 and S4070 just outside and to the northwest of Belzhag, holding high ground and a road net; Company I to the east on the battalion and regimental left flank at S4170, the high ground and road net east of Belzhag. The battalion instituted active patrolling during the period.

The Regimental Command Post was established at Puffbach S3673.

Adjacent units: On the left of the 255th Infantry, The 253d Infantry having relieved elements of this regiment, attacked to the southeast against light resistance and seized that part of the Division Objective which lay in its zone. The 254th Infantry, to the right of the 255th Infantry, continued active patrolling.

At 1200B the 1271st Engineer Combat Battalion was detached from the regiment.

Weather: warm; visibility, excellent.

PWs Captured:

	<u>Officers:</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
	0	1 by 1st Bn
	0	3 by 2d Bn
	0	0 by 3d Bn
	0	4 Anti-Tank
Totals	0	8

		<u>Status and Casualties</u>									
		Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st	Bn 29	27	-	-	-	-	748	722	-	-	-
2d	Bn 30	27	-	-	-	-	742	687	-	-	-
3d	Bn 32	26	-	-	-	-	736	662	-	-	2
4th	Co 4	4	-	-	-	-	100	99	-	-	-
5th	Co 7	6	-	-	-	-	143	139	-	-	-
6th	Co 13	18	-	-	-	-	135	131	-	-	-
7th	Co 15	15	-	-	-	-	122	122	-	-	-
8th	Med	8	-	-	-	-	111	111	-	-	-
Totals	153	131	-	-	-	-	2837	2673	-	-	-

The Regimental Commander issued the following instructions:

Operations Instructions No. 35, Hq 255th Inf Fuesbach, Germany, 1501003 Apr 45, Map: Germany, 1/25,000: 1. 63d Inf Div cont atk 1509003 Apr 45 to secure Sulzbach (S5442) - STEINBACH (S7055) area. 2. New Bds eff immediately. 3. 253d Inf (Atchd Co "A" 753d Tk Bn, Co "A" 822d TD Bn): (a) atks seizes sector of Obj "A" in Z. (b) Cont atk in Z to Div Obj 4. 254th Inf (Atchd Co "C" and 1st Plat "D" 753d Tk Bn, 822d TD Bn (-): (a) atks in Z seizes Obj "D". b. Cont atk to Div Obj. 5. 255th Inf (atck Co "B" and 3d Plat Co "D" 753d Tk Bn, Co "C" (-1 Plat) 822d TD Bn): (A) Atks at 15009003 Apr 45 to seize sector of Obj "A" in Z. (b) assists 253d Inf in capture of Obj "A". (c) Captures Obj B and C. (d) cont atk in Z to Div Obj. 6. 1st Bn rel Co "E" prior to daylight is Apr 45, atk in Z, quickly overrun Kesselfeld (S371683), seize high ground (Obj W), assist 2d Bn in the capture of Obj X by flanking action from the SW and cont the atk in its Z to Div Obj: Maintain contact with Elms 253d Inf on R, protect their L flank and assist their adv by fire and mmt within own Regtl Z. 7. 2d Bn (- "F" Co) seize Obj "X" and cont adv in its Z to Div Obj. Maintain physical contact with Elms 1st Bn. "F" Co in Regtl Res initially in Grumbühl (S3770), prepared to move on Retl O. 8. 3d Bn Seizes quickly towns at Cr Pts 8, 10 and 12 and cont adv in Z to Div Obj, mopping up all Ry resistance Enroute. Maintain contact with Elms 2d Bn on R and Elms 254th Inf on L. 9. At Co provide At protection to Regt, paying particular attn to L flank and Z of 3d Bn. 10. 263d FA Bn (On Co atchd) spt atk with priority of fires initially to 1st Bn, smoke hostile obsn in Z of 1st and 2d Bns. Smoke to be lifted on call.

11. Atchmts:

- (a) 1st Bn
 - (1) 1 Plat Co "B" 753d Tk Bn
- (b) 2d Bn
 - (1) 1 Plat Co "B" 753d Tk Bn.
 - (2) 1 Plat Co "C" 822d TD Bn.
- (c) 3d Bn
 - (1) 1 Plat Co "B" 753d Tk Bn
 - (2) 1 Plat Co "D" 753d Tk Bn
 - (3) 1 Plat Co "C" 822d TD Bn

12. Engrs in general spt.

In this renewal of the attack the 255th Infantry still occupied the center portion of the division zone with the 253d Infantry on the left and the 254th Infantry on the right. Again the attack was to be to the southeast. The left boundary of the 255th Infantry, which it shared with the 253d Infantry, ran generally southeast, following approximately the valley of the southward flowing Biber River (part of the zone therefore lay in the southern sloping watershed toward the Danube instead of the northward sloping watershed of the Neckar and the Rhine). The boundary extended from near Eschelbach S3567 southeast along the Biber River to Michelfeld S4257 (excluded), then east to Egenbach S4457 (included), and so south and southeast along Highway 19.

The right boundary of the 255th Infantry, which it shared with the 254th Infantry, also extended generally southeast on a line roughly from Kupferzell S4271 to the vicinity of the Sontheims (Excluded) S5753. The objectives referred to in Operations Instructions No. 35 were the following:

That portion of Objective A which lay in the zone of the 255th Infantry and more specially in the zone of the 1st Battalion, was in general the high wooded ground to the east of the Biber valley, including Gailenkirchen S4252 south to S4258. Objective B included the high ground on the north and south sides of the Kocher River valley in the vicinity of Unter Muncheln S4553 and Enslingen S4764 from Sulzburg S4462 east and slightly north to Schonenberg S4765. Objective W was the peak or high plateau at S3756 in the vicinity of Streithof and southwest of Waldedburg. Objective X was the mountain S3567 surmounted by the village and castle of Waldenburg. Check point 8 was the railway and road underpass at S3768 near Waldenburg Bahnhof; check point 10 was Hesselbronn S4269; and check point 12 was the town of Westernach S4269. The place where the 1st Battalion was to relieve Company E was the area south of Oberappach S2569.

The 255th Combat team began its attack at 0900B to seize objective A, the high ground on the east side of the Biber River. During the entire day the regiment encountered stiff enemy resistance, sometimes so determined as to be fanatical.

The 1st Battalion attack was launched with Company A in the lead followed by Company C, which had reverted to the battalion from 3d Battalion control at 0700B, and with Company B initially in Battalion reserve. Company A cleared the town of Kesselfeld S371683 and continued the attack to the south. Company C on the right of Company A advanced approximately two and a half kilometers south of Kesselfeld but was forced to withdraw to ground more suitable for the defense and more advantageous as a position from which to attack. At 1500B Company C was committed with the mission of moving to the left through Streithof S3766 to the left boundary of the battalion. There the company was to seize and hold blocking positions. At the end of the period, unable to advance, the companies held positions along the east west road in the grid squares S3666, S3766, and S3866 with Company C on the right on a forward slope, Company A in the center, and Company B on the right beyond, that is south of Streithof. One incident is worth noting: At 1530B a number of the enemy came out of the front of Company A with their hands as though to surrender. When some elements of Company A went forward to accept the surrender, the enemy began a counter-attack. This action was repulsed, and the two enemy who entered Company A's lines were quickly taken care of.

The 2d Battalion, which had received artillery fire during the night also began its attack at 0900B from positions to the north of Waldenburg S3567, Company G in the lead and Company E which had been relieved on positions to the west following. At 0003B the companies began to receive machine gun fire from the castle in Waldenburg S35672, and shortly later began to receive

mortar and artillery fire which continued throughout the day. At 1400B the enemy knocked out of action with a Panzerfaust one of the tanks of the 753d Tank Battalion.

At 1500 a curious incident occurred: The enemy sent out from Waldenburg under a flag of truce two men who asked for a cease-firing period of one hour during which the enemy could remove civilians from the castle and the town. They said that the troops were determined to resist to the very end and added rather boastfully that once the civilians were moved out the enemy troops would show the Americans fighting that was fighting. It was decided by conference between the Battalion Commander and the Regimental Commander, and with the Commanding General, that the attack plan would continue without interruption. Then arose the problem of what to do with the two soldiers of the enemy who had come with the truce proposal. Since they had come under flag of truce, which had been recognized, and with a legitimate truce proposal they would have to be returned to their lines. But they had entered our lines and our command post without being blindfolded and had therefore acquired a great deal of information. It was decided to hold them for a time, make the changes in installations and positions necessary to negating their knowledge and then release them blindfolded for a return to their units. Depending on circumstances one of them might be kept for a time as a hostage.

According to information from civilians and prisoners four companies of enemy troops were dug in in defensive positions on the wooded slopes below the castle. The castle is so situated on a high and very steep peak as to command the area for many miles around.

In spite of the enemy's strength and very great advantage of position, the Regimental Commander decided its attack from the north (the castle is at the north end of the village). Company E had already entered and a second platoon was entering the village from the west against strong resistance and very heavy sniper fire. Though the manœuvre reduced the opportunity of the tanks and tankdestroyers to fire into the castle, by an hour later the whole of Company E was in the town and the castle had begun to burn. While plans were being made to reduce the castle by artillery fire if necessary the period ended with the original attack plan continuing.

At the end of the period then the second battalion was in these positions: The Battalion Command Post was in Rebbigsdahl S3868. Companies G and E were at S3867 and S3967, Company G attacking from the north of Waldenburg and Company E attacking within the town from the west and south. Company F was on the battalion left having against severe opposition seized the railway and road underpass near Waldenburg Bahnhof in blocking positions at S 3966 and S3868.

The 3d Battalion attacked at 0900B and almost immediately began to receive fire from enemy infantry and artillery weapons which slowed the advance. For a while at 1130B Company K was repulsing a small counter-attack.

By the end of the period the 3d Battalion Command Post was established in Hesselbronn S4269, and Companies K and L had cleared Westernach and taken up positions near the town, Companies K at S4168 to the west Company L at S4268 to the south of the town. Company I was at S4369, south of Stegahle, on the left of the battalion and regiment.

At 1830B the Regimental Command Post was moved from Fussbach S3572 to Mangolshheim S3571.

Because of the movement of troops and vehicles in the areas to the enemy's rear, the day was a good one for tactical air activity.

At the end of the period the 3d Battalion was alerted because elements of the 10th Armored Division were to move through the battalion sector on the following day, advancing in three columns, and the battalion was ordered to make plans to motorize one rifle company to be ready to move on one hour's notice and to prepare to motorize the whole battalion to be ready to move on three hours notice. The troops prepared defensive position for the night and were ready to continue the attack on the following day.

Adjacent units: The 253d Infantry, on the right of the 255th Infantry attacked to the southwest against moderate resistance, seize with the assistance of the 1st battalion of the 255th Infantry, the northwest portion of the part of Objective A which was in its zone and prepared defensive positions for the night. The 254th Infantry, to the left of the 255th Infantry, attacked at 0900B against resistance which was light in the morning but stiffened during the afternoon and advanced to a line from Eschenal S4569 to Nesselbach 5371.

Weather: warm; visibility, good.

PWs Captured:

<u>Officers</u>		<u>Enlisted Men</u>	
0		1	by 1st Bn
0		10	by 2d Bn
0		30	by 3d Bn
Totals	0	41	

Status and Casualties

		<u>Officers</u>				<u>Enlisted Men</u>			
		Asd	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asd	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	31	25	1	-	-	752	699	13	-
2d Bn	30	25	-	1	-	733	674	17	-
3d Bn	32	25	-	-	-	715	632	24	-
Cn	4	4	-	-	-	99	92	-	-
AT	7	6	-	-	-	142	139	-	-
Hq	13	13	-	-	-	135	131	-	-
Av	15	15	-	-	-	122	122	-	-
Ad	3	3	-	-	-	120	110	1	-
Totals	169	169	1	1	-	2624	2699	60	90

On 15 April 1945 the 255th Infantry continued to attack to the south and southeast.

After daylight the 1st Battalion attacked from position which it occupied during the night, Company C on the right and Company A on the left attacking in Zone. Company B was in reserve and remained in position. By 1440Z the companies had seized the mountain, the Buchberg, S3965, or Objective Y. Company C organized position on this mountain while Company A, moving to the north and east into the zone of the 2d Battalion, seized the northeast extension of this mountain at S4065, the peak called the Friedrichsberg or Objective Z of the Operations Instructions. Company A held these positions, digging in under mortar fire until late in the day when it was relieved by the 2d Battalion. Then Company A moved back into its own zone and renewed the attack with Company C, advancing to take the next ridge line. During the period resistance was not heavy. Elements of the 10th Armored Division entered the sector.

At the end of the period the 1st Battalion occupied these positions: The Battalion Command Post was at S387668, in the settlement of Bierhaus. Company B was to the rear of the other companies at S3365 the mountain peak of the Buchberg near Goldbach. Company C on the left was S3964, the high ground to the east of the valley of the Biber River, near Laurach. Company A on the right held positions at S4064 near Goldbach and facing southeast on the north side of the valley of the Altenhaubachle.

The 2d Battalion renewed its attack on Waldenburg S3966 and finally cleared the castle and village. The battalion then launched its attack to the southeast to clear all the surrounding area at 1530Z, moved southeast to the Friedrichsberg which had already been seized by Company A, relieved Company A and continued. During the day Company F relieved Company G which went in to reserve.

At the end of the period the 2d Battalion held these positions: The battalion Command Post was in Waldenburg S6639 with Company G in reserve in that area. Company E was at S4065 and S4155 southwest of Beltersrot and on the northeast-facing slope of the Muhlberg. Company F was on the left at S4165 and S4166 in Beltersrot.

During the early half of the period the 3d Battalion maintained the defensive positions which it had occupied the evening before. Through most of the period enemy resistance was sustained and stubborn, and the companies received a great deal of artillery and mortar fire. At 1205Z Company I sent a combat patrol into the town of Bauersbach S4368 and met slight resistance. The whole company then entered the town, cleared it of enemy resistance slackened, probably because of the advance of the 2d Battalion on the right and the 254th on the left of the battalion. Elements of the 10th Armored Division and of the 2d Battalion of the 254th Infantry passed through the sector.

Against this lighted opposition the 3d Battalion moved forward late in the day and by the end of the period held these positions: The Battalion Command Post was at Westernach S4268; Company L was in Kupfer S4366; Company K at S4367 and S4467 held the road net between Kupfer and Brachbach, in positions southeast of Kupfer and North of Ubrigshausen S4465; Company I was at 4467 and 4567 in the vicinity of Brachbach on the battalion and the regimental right.

The Regimental Command Post was moved from Mangoldshain to Hohenbuch Farm S339-94 on 21153.

Adjacent units: The 253d Infantry, left of the 255th Infantry, moved forward against light resistance and established a line generally from S352639 to S387043; the 2d Battalion of the 253d Infantry was relieved by Companies A and C, minus one platoon of each, of the 263d Engineers; having been relieved on position the 2d Battalion 253d Infantry reverted to Corps control. The 254th Infantry, on the right flank or to the east of the 255th Infantry, also continued its attack to the southeast, and, meeting slight resistance, established a line generally from Arnadorf S485683 through Niedersteinach S524695, capturing seven town during the period; the 2d Battalion of the 254th Infantry was motorized and during the period moved with elements of the 10th Armored Division through the sector of the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry.

Weather: warm; visibility, good.

PWs captured:

<u>Officers</u>		<u>Enlisted Men</u>	
0		23 by 1st Bn	
2		49 by 2d Bn	
0		12 by 3d Bn	
Totals	2	84	

Status and Casualties

<u>Officers</u>					<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn 28	25	-	-	-	742	692	3	2	-
2d Bn 29	25	-	1	-	700	645	6	3	-
3d Bn 31	27	-	-	-	738n	667	-	2	41
4th 4	4	-	-	-	95	93	-	-	-
5th 7	6	-	-	-	142	135	-	-	-
6th 13	18	-	-	-	133	129	-	-	-
7th 15	15	-	-	-	122	122	-	-	-
Head 8	8	-	-	-	120	110	-	-	-
Totals 140	123	-	1	0	2795	2596	9	7	41

On 17 April 1945 the 255th Infantry continued to attack to the south and east making relatively great advance especially in the 2d Battalion area, elements of which entered Schwabish Hall.

The 1st Battalion on the regimental right attacked against slight resistance from its positions of the preceding night, but when the troops reached the high round near Rinnen S410603, enemy opposition increased. The opposition in Rinnen was reduced by placing artillery and mortar fire on the town. When this fire was lifted the riflemen entered and cleared the town by 1830G. Companies C and A then continued the attack to the south-east. At the end of the period the 1st Battalion was defending these positions: The Battalion Command Post was in Rinnen S410603. Company B in reserve held positions near the town, one platoon at S4160 to the east of the town along the road called the Altestrasse, one platoon at 4060 to the south of the town astride the road on the slope looking south over the Hinnerer Bachle, and one platoon at 4057 still further south on a slope overlooking the Bibers River to the west. Company C was at S4258 and S4259 on the mountain top, peak 4912, called the Strelesberg. Company A was to the northeast of Company C and in positions at S4259 across the valley on an eastward-facing slope.

The 2d Battalion also advanced with slight opposition during the early part of the attack, moving forward so fast and so far ahead of the other battalions that they were warned of the danger to their flanks. But as the battalion approached Schwabisch Hall resistance increased sharply. However with Company E blocking to the west, Company F coordinated its attack with elements of the 10th Armored Division and of the 2d Battalion of the 254th Infantry, and moved to the right to attack the city from the west through Gottmollshausen. There were anti-tank mines in the road at S4459 leading into Hall and a crater and road block at 443603 near Gottmollshausen as well as a blown up road over-pass across the railway to the north of that town. By 1800G Company F was entering the city on the highway east of Heimbach. By the end of the period it had cleared much of the city.

At the close of the day the 2d Battalion held these positions: Company E was west of Hall at 4459 along the north-south road north of Heimbach, Company F held southward-facing positions S4458 and S4558 south of and extending to the west of Hall in the vicinity of Reifendorf: these were blocking positions for both companies. The 2d Battalion Command Post was in Hall itself. Company G, in regimental reserve, was located near Gailenkirchen S4263.

The 3d Battalion attack launched at 0600G also encountered very little opposition at first in the sectors of Companies L and K to the right and in the center of the battalion area, but resistance in the sector of Company I was very stiff during the whole day. The advance was impeded because all the bridges in the area had been destroyed. Nevertheless Company L crossed the Moser at Untermunkheim S4563 and Company K crossed the river at Haagen S4653. Later Company I was able to clear Esslingen S4764, cross the river and move to the south.

By the end of the period all three companies held positions on the high ground to the south of the Kocher River, Company L at Erlach S4562, Company K at S4562 and S4762 east of Untermunkheim and south of Haagen, and Company I at S4763 on the highground of the south side of the Kocher valley south of Enslingen. The battalion Command Post was at Untermunkheim S4563. Thus the 3d Battalion on the regimental left was to the north and east of Hall. Between 2200B and 2308B the enemy launched a counter attack against each of these companies. All the attacks were repulsed.

Late in the day the engineers and the 3d Battalion Ammunition and Pioneer Platoon were constructing a ford across the Kocher at S450634, east of Untermunkheim, and the engineers were building a bridge over the river at S457631, just to the south of Untermunkheim.

The Regimental Command Post was established at Beltersrot S416572, at 1425B and moved to Gailenkirchen S4263 at 2330B.

Adjacent units: The 253d Infantry attacked against light resistance and forward elements reached a position at S390615, somewhat to the rear of the 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry to the east.

The 254th Infantry, attacking at 0900B, advanced against moderate small arms and artillery fire and reached a line approximately at Geislingen S4965, Hessefelden S5466, and Horlebach S5666, positions somewhat to the rear of the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry to the west.

Weather: warm; visibility, good.

PWs Captured:

		<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
		2	35 by 1st Bn
		1	62 by 2d Bn
		0	6 by 3d Bn
Totals	3		103

Status and Casualties

<u>Officers</u>						<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
	Asgd	Eff	KIA	# wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	28	25	-	-	-	761	710	2	-	2
2d Bn	30	25	-	-	-	700	654	1	1	8
3d Bn	31	25	-	-	-	731	659	2	-	-2
Cn	4	4	-	-	-	99	94	-	-	-
AT	7	6	-	-	-	142	137	-	-	-
Ng	18	18	-	-	-	135	128	-	-	-
Sv	15	15	-	-	-	124	122	-	-	2
Med	8	8	-	-	-	120	106	-	-	-
Totals	141	127	-	-	-	2513	2510	5	1	14

On 13 April 1945 the 255th Infantry continued its attack in the vicinity of Schwabisch Hall.

The 2d Battalion continued mopping up enemy resistance in its sector around Hall itself. Company G reverted to the battalion from regimental reserve. At the end of the period all elements of the battalion were in Schwabisch Hall except Company F which had organized positions S4557 to the southwest of Hall astride the highway in the vicinity of Eagenbach and Reifenhof. Having organized defensive positions the Battalion instituted vigorous patrolling in the area.

The 3d Battalion to the northeast of Hall began its action at 0300B attacking from south of the Kocher River. The attack met stiff enemy opposition but went forward inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy and resulting in the capture of many prisoners. During the day the battalion cleared the towns of Eltershofen S4762, Bülbershamern S5063, Veinau S4961, and Weckrieden S4760. At the end of the period the 3d Battalion Command Post was in Eltershofen S4762 with all of Company K except one Platoon; Company L on the left was in the vicinity of Weckrieden S4760, and Veinau; and Company I was on the right in the area around Veinau S4961. The battalion established defensive positions for the night and conducted active patrolling.

The 1st Battalion attacked at 0500B in its zone against light resistance and had reached its objective by 0950, where it organized defensive positions on the high ground. At 1430B the battalion moved by motor to Heimbach S4453, just west of Hall, and then by motor about twenty or twenty-five kilometers to the northeast to a new sector in the vicinity of Michelbach S5674 where it continued its attack in a new sector. At the end of the period the 1st Battalion Command Post was in Michelbach S5674. Company B on the battalion right held the high ground S5771 around Elpershofen on the north side of the Jagst River. Company C in the battalion center was at S5872 on the high wooded ground east of Company B and across the valley of the Breuach, a tributary of the Jagst. Company A was at S5971 on high wooded ground to the south and east of Company C and to the north of Hessenau on the Jagst River.

Adjacent units: The 253d Infantry continued its attack at 0800B moving to the southeast. At approximately 1400B elements of the regiment were motorized and attacked to establish a line through Sanzenbach S4253, Rieden S4553, Unterhofen S4554 to the south and southwest of Hall. Resistance was light during the morning, and there was no resistance at all in the afternoon. The 254th Infantry attacked at 100B against stiff resistance in the morning but against rapidly decreased opposition in the afternoon, so that as the period ended Company C was advancing toward Wolpertsdorf S5262 unopposed. Company B was in Wolpertshausen S5355.

Company Min Rudelsdorf S5665, and Company I in Rumpertshofen S5868, in a line northeast of the 3d Battalion of the 255th Infantry and to the north and east of Hall.

Weather: warm; visibility, good to excellent.

PMs Captured:

PWs Captured:

Officers
0
0
5
Totals 5

Enlisted Men
0 by 1st Bn
14 by 2d Bn
124 by 3d Bn
138

Status and Casualties

	Asgd	Eff	KIA	wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	23	25	-	-	-	761	710	-	17	-
2d Bn	30	26	-	3	-	731	686	-	58	15
3d Bn	31	24	-	3	-	739	645	5	18	22
Cn Co	4	4	-	-	-	100	94	-	-	-
AB Co	7	6	-	-	-	145	140	-	-	-
Hq Co	18	12	-	-	-	135	128	-	-	-
Sv Co	15	15	-	9	-	124	122	-	-	-
Med	8	3	-	-	-	120	106	-	2	-
Totals	141	126	-	3	-	2647	2631	5	95	37

The Regimental Commander issued the following instructions:

Operations Instructions No. 35, Hq 255th, Gailenkirchen, Germany, 182300B Apr 45: 1. a. 63d Inf Div cont pres mission until passed through by 44th Inf Div 190600B Apr 45. b. 63d Inf Div (Reinf) passes to control XXI Corps 190001B Apr 45. c. Upon atchmt XXI Corps, Div cont adv to contact with 44th Inf Div at JAGSTERM (S6957) and cont atk to S in Z indicated. Maintains contact with 44th Inf Div on the L and Elms VI Corps on the R. d. Protects Corps R flank. e. CTs dissolved eff 190600 B Apr 45. 2. 253d Inf: Upon being passed through by the 44th Inf Div 190600B Apr 45 rels 117th Cav Sq (-) and 1st Bn 255th Inf in Z prior to 191600B Apr 45. 3. 254th Inf: a. Cont atk in new Z. b. 2d Bn 254th Inf reverts to control parent unit upon rel by Elms 44th Inf Div 190600B Apr 45. 4. 255th Inf: a. Cont atk in new Z (see overlay). 5. 2d Bn 255th Inf (-) cont atk in new Z. Protect R flank of Corps. 6. 3d Bn: Cont atk in new Z. 7. 1st Bn Upon being rel'd by Elms of 253d Inf moves by motor to assembly area to be designated in Regtl Res. Nine 2 1/2-T Trks furn by S-4 available to 1st Sgt In Bn at Regtl CP at 191400B Apr 45. 8. AB Co: Protects flanks and rear of new Regtl sector. 9. Cn Co: Atchd to 863d FA Bn. 10. Atchmts: N/O. 11. Maintain contact fr L to R. I & R Plat maintain contact with 114th Inf. 12. Regtl CP opens Untermunkheim (S4565) 190600B Apr 45.

This order meant a shift of the regimental front to the north and east and a shift of the regimental zone to the east so that now the regiment was to attack almost due south in an area wholly to the east of the Kocher River. The order meant also that for a change the regiment would attack with only two battalions on line instead of three. The 1st Battalion continued to attack in its new zone to the north and east of the rest of the regiment. Late in the period it was relieved in this area by elements of the 253d Infantry and the battalion, minus a reinforced company was moving at the end of the period to an assembly area S4558 and S4559 just to the east of Hall in the vicinity of Oberimpurg, where it would be on the regimental right.

It was badly needed in this area because in its new zone the regiment had both flanks exposed. The reinforced company was sent to sweep the wooded area S5479 in the vicinity of Bruchlingen.

The 2d Battalion, minus Company G, continued its attack in its new zone on the regimental right where it protected the right flank of the XXI Corps. The battalion cleared Hesselental S4857, and S4959. The Battalion then withdrew to positions favorable for defense for the night and prepared to continue the attack. At the end of the period the Battalion Command Post was in Hesselental S48758b; Company E on the right was at S4753 and S4358 in and to the west of Hesselental and covering the highway between Hall and Hesselental; Company F on the left was at S4858, S4958, and S4959 in and to the east of Hesselental along the highway and near the airfield. Company G, in regimental reserve, was in Weobrieden S4760.

The 3d Battalion attacked 1000B in its new zone on the regimental left. It cleared the towns of Altenhausen S5060 and Tüngental S5150. Resistance to this attack was unyielding and very heavy. Tüngental had to be assaulted three times before it was taken. The enemy used not only the infantry weapons of mortars and heavy machine guns but also 88 and 150 millimeter artillery, rockets, and tanks. For the night the battalion established defensive positions with Company K at S5059 near Altenhausen, Company L in the center at S5159 and S5160 to the west of Tüngental, and Company I on the left at S5159 and S5160 to the east of Tüngental. The 3d Battalion Command Post was S498517 in Veinau.

The Regimental Command Post was moved from Gailenkirchen to Unteraunkheim S457634 at 0810B, where the regimental train was also set up.

Adjacent units: The 253d Infantry when passed through by the 114th Infantry at 0600B moved to a new sector no longer adjacent to the 255th Infantry. The 114th Infantry in the VI Corps and on the right of the 255th Infantry passed through the 253d Infantry and attacked to the south in zone against light resistance having gone beyond Gschwend 470105 by the end of the period. The 254th Infantry still on the right of the 255th Infantry continued its attack in its new zone against heavy resistance. By the end of the period leading elements and cleared Otterbach S5360.

Weather: warm; visibility, good.

PWs Captured:

Officers
2
0
0
Totals 1

Enlisted Men
0 by 1st Bn
24 by 2d Bn
13 by 3d Bn
37

Status and Casualties

<u>Officers</u>						<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
	Aug'd	Eff	Kia	Wounded	Reinf	Aug'd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	23	25	-	-	-	701	710	-	-	-
2d Bn	29	25	-	-	-	744	703	1	-	14
3d Bn	30	22	-	2	-	719	637	1	10	-
Cn Co	4	4	-	-	-	100	95	-	-	1
AP Co	7	6	-	-	-	146	141	-	-	-
Hq Co	13	18	-	-	-	133	126	-	-	-
Sv Co	15	14	-	1	-	123	120	1	-	-
Med	8	8	-	-	-	116	107	-	-	-
Totals	139	122	-	3	-	2842	2639	3	10	129

20 April 1945

The 255th Infantry, minus Company C, continued to attack in zone to the south.

Company C reinforced continued on its separate mission near Raboldshausen S5879.

The 1st Battalion completed its move by motor to the assembly area near Hall S4053 at 0150B. Company A was moved from this area and placed in position to protect the regimental right flank, being attached to 2d Battalion. At 1600B Company A reverted to battalion control, and the battalion minus Company C moved to a new assembly area S433573 just south of Hesselental, completing the move at 2130B.

The 2d Battalion continued to attack to the south against light resistance. At 12115B Company G ceased to be in regimental reserve and reverted to battalion moved around the right flank of the regimental zone and southward along the highway and railroad to clear the populated areas of Gipsdielenbachhof S4347, Gipsdielenfabru S4346, Rauenbretzinger S4345, and Michelbach-am-der-Bilz S4344. At the end of the period the battalion Command Post was in Michelbach at S431544 with Company G, minus two platoons in reserve in the same area. One platoon of Company G was at S4754 along the railway running south to Hirschfelden; another platoon of Company G was at S490546 holding a wooded peak to the east of Michelbach. Company F was on a wooded peak at S4353 to the east of Hirschfelden in positions around a road net. Company E was in positions S4354 on high, wooded ground to the east and a little south of Michelbach.

At 0930B the 3d Battalion continued its attack on the regimental left. Company I was mounted on tanks and tank destroyers for this action against light resistance. The battalion overran an airplane assembly plant in the area between S510585 and S5105 and leaving a guard in that vicinity moved east to take up defensive positions for the night. The 3d Battalion Command Post was at S439583 on the highway northeast of Rauenbretzinger. Company K minus one platoon was at S5024 on high ground overlooking the Brühlbach to the south.

The other platoon of Company K was at S511549 on the highway running southeast into Herlebach. Company I was holding positions at S5155 and S5255 on the high ground north of the Lambach. Company I was blocking to the east at S5255 two and a half kilometers north of Herlebach and on the high ground to the north of the Alte Fischbach.

The Regimental Command Post was at Hesselstal S487583.

Adjacent units: The 114th Infantry, beside the 2d Battalion on the regimental right, attacked south against light resistance and leading elements reached Schwabisch Gmund S5124. The 254th Infantry, to the left of the 3d Battalion and of the regiment, attacked at 09003 against moderate resistance on the right (the sector adjacent to the zone of the 255th Infantry) and against heavy resistance and advanced to a line running generally northeast from Sulzdorf S5358.

Weather: warm; visibility, good

PWs Captured:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
	0	0 by 1st Bn
	0	7 by 2d Bn
	0	6 by 3d Bn
Totals	0	13

Status and Casualties

	<u>Officers</u>			<u>Enlisted Men</u>		
	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	
1st Bn	28	25	-	-	-	784
2d Bn	29	25	-	-	-	758
3d Bn	30	22	-	-	-	783
Cn Co	4	4	-	-	-	775
AT Co	7	6	-	-	-	684
Hq Co	18	18	-	-	-	100
Sv Co	15	15	-	-	-	99
Med	8	9	-	-	-	145
Totals	139	123	-	-	-	145
						126
						123
						120
						107
						114
						2959
						2884
						3
						7
						128

The regimental Commander issued the following instructions:

Operations Instructions No. 37, Hq 255th Inf, HUSSENTHAL, Germany, 211400B Apr 45;

1. 255th (-) moves by mtr to vic UNTER BOBINGEN (S6027) and SULZBACH (S4443). 2. 2d Bn (Task Force Thompson) adv on route "C-7" by mtr, seize HUSSENTHAL (S5525) - UNTER BOBINGEN (S6027) area. Seize undestroyed bridges over Rens R in sector. Cross IP Br at SCHWABISCH HALL (S4559) at time to be designated. Extend N to meet 3d Bn moving S fr SULZBACH area (S5442) and thereby protect VI Corps: L flank. Composition of Task Force: Comdr: Lt Col Thompson; Convoy: No. C-7; 2d Bn, 863d FA Bn (-Btry "C") plus 1 Btry 718th FA Bn, 1 Plat Co "C" 822d Bn, 1 Plat Co "B" 753d Tk Bn, 1 Plat Co "D" 753d Tk Bn, 1 Plat Co "C" 263d Engr Bn, 1 Plat AT Co. 3. 3d Bn (Task Force Boyd) adv on route "C-6" by mtr to vic of SULZBACH (S5442) area and prep to cont to the S. Seize undestroyed bridges in vic over KOCHER R. Cross IP 15 min after TF THOMPSON. COMPOSITION OF TASK FORCE: Comdr: CAPT BOYD, Convoy: No. C-6; 3d Bn, Btry "C" 863d FA Bn, Co "C" (-) 822 TD Bn, Co "B" (#) 753d Tk Bn, B 1 Plat Co "C" 263d Engr C Bn, 718 th FA Bn (-), AT Co (-) 1st Plat (-), Regtl Hq Co, HqSec Med Det Co "C" 363d Med Bn. 4. 1st Bn (-) (Task Force FORBES) rels 2d and 3d Bn and cont atk to destroy Bz in Z. Atchd to 254th Inf immediately. Composition: 1st Bn, Cn Co, 1 Plat Co "C" 822d TD Bn, 1 Plat Co "B" 753d Tk Bn, 1 Plat AT Co. 5. 10 min between march units. Advise this Hq number veh per serial, number march units per serial without delay. 6. March CP: rear of 3d Bn.

The route of this motorized advance went from Schwabisch Hall S4559 southwest into the zone of the 44th Infantry Division through Bibersfeld S4255 to Ober Rot S4048, then southeast toward Fichtenberg S4445, turning south west through Kirchenkirnberg S4240 and south to Schwabisch Gmund S5124, here turning east back into the zone of the 255th Infantry and proceeding along the northbank of the Rens River into Unter Bobingen S6027, a total distance of about sixty kilometers.

During the early part of the day, 21, April, 1945, the 255th Infantry continued to attack to the south in its zone to the east of Schwabisch Hall. At 1230B the 1st Battalion, minus Company C, was attached to the 254th Infantry, and relieved the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 255th Infantry on positions. The 2d and 3d Battalions of the 255th Infantry on position. The 2d and 3d Battalion were organized into Task Forces Thompson and Boyd in accordance with the operations instructions and proceeded to their assembly areas. Task Force Thompson, the reinforced 2d Battalion, crossed the initial point of its route at Schwabisch Hall at 1700B, provided security and reconnoitered as a preliminary to its attack early on the following day. At the end of the period the regiment minus the first battalion was disposed as follows: The 3d Battalion and the other elements of Task Force Boyd were in an assembly area at Rotenhar S5040. The 2d Battalion and the elements that comprised Task Force Thompson were en route, the forward unit already passing through Schwabisch Gmund S5124.

REGIMENTAL HISTORY 21 Apr 45 (Cont'd)

Adjacent units: On the regimental flanks, the 114th Infantry to the right and the 254th Infantry to the left continued to attack. When the 1st Battalion of the 255th Infantry was attached to the 254th Infantry, the zone of that regiment was widened to include a part of the area of the 255th Infantry.

Weather: rainy; visibility, poor.

Fms Captured:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
	0	0 by 1st Bn
	0	2 by 2d Bn
	0	4 by 3d Bn
Totals	0	6

Status and Casualties

<u>Officers</u>						<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
Asgd		Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	28	25	-	-	-	784	758	-	-	-
2d Bn	31	26	-	-	-	735	737	-	-	-
3d Bn	29	21	-	1	-	775	657	-	-	-
Cn Co	4	4	-	-	-	100	99	-	-	-
AT Co	7	6	-	-	-	145	145	-	-	-
Hq Co	21	21	-	-	-	134	127	-	-	-
Sv Co	15	14	-	-	-	123	120	-	-	-
Med	9	9	-	-	-	114	107	-	-	-
Totals	144	126	-	1	-	2961	2730	-	-	-

22 April 1945

The 255th Infantry continued its attack. The motorized 2d Battalion as Task Force Thompson attacked to the east at 0325, from Schwabisch Grund S5124 and seized its objectives, Russenhofen S5525 and Unter Bobingen S6027. To here the battalion had been advancing with Company E on the left, Company F on the right, and Company G in reserve. On entering Unter Bobingen across a bridge, which had been seized intact, over the Reus River, Company F established a guard around the bridge and the town and prepared positions for the night. Companies E and G attacked to either side of the highway between Schwabisch Grund and Unter Bobingen and cleared the towns of Herlikhofen S5425 and Zimmern S5726. By the end of the period the 2d Battalion Command Post was in Iggingen S5728 with Company E less one platoon. That platoon of Company E was in Schwabisch Grund S5124. One Platoon of Company G was at Russenhofen S5525 and the rest of the company in Zimmern S5726. Company F was furthest east in Unter Bobingen.

At 0600B the 3d Battalion launched its motorized attack from Gschwend S4739 northeast to Sulzbach S5442 which it had seized by 1130B. The battalion then advanced to the south on foot, clearing the towns of Seifertshofen S5436, Helpertshofen S5435, Vellbach S5334, and swept the woods in the areas S5437, S5633. It then moved to protect the Corps left flank. During the day the Battalion had seized a bridge across the Kocher River at Laufen S5640. At the end of the day the battalion occupied these positions: On the north or left flank of the battalion one platoon of Company K was in the vicinity of Batschenhof S5635 on high ground overlooking the Kocher River to the east. The rest of Company K was around Hemnaten S5635. Company I was to the south of these positions at S5535 and S5534 commanding the road toward Eschach. Company L was still further south on the right flank of the battalion in the vicinity of Utzstetten S5532 and S5531. The 3d Battalion Command Post was also located in Utzstetten.

The 1st Battalion, still attached to the 254th Infantry, had attacked at 0625B. It had relieved the 2d and 3d Battalions on 21 April 1945 in positions where those units had been advancing to the south against light resistance so that they had seized the towns of Hirschfelden S4753, Buchhorr S4752, Adolbach S4850, Eutendorf S4849, and Winzenweiler S5148. Taking up this attack on 22 April 1945, the 1st Battalion moved through Eutendorf and Winzenweiler to Gaildorf S4946, six or seven kilometers to the northwest of Sulzbach. The units encountered no enemy but were delayed by road blocks and mines.

The Regimental Command Post was established at Ruppertshofen S5233.

The Commanding General of the Division sent to the Commanding Officer of the regiment an information copy of the following letter which was addressed to the Commanding Officers of the 253d and 254th Infantry: "The absence of organized enemy groups in your zone today, and in the area of the 4th Division far to the South, and in the area to which the 255th Infantry sent its motorized battalions, justifies the risk of moving on roads, by motor, where practicable, in order to secure an increased rate of movement to the south.

"Until enemy resistance requires deployed formations you will move columns on roads and reduce the searching of your zone to that which may be necessary to determine the presence of large organized bodies of enemy. It is suggested that you use small motorized patrols for this purpose where such use is applicable and that where foot patrols to distant points are necessary, that they perform their mission and rejoin the main body holding up the advance of your main bodies.

DAILY SUMMARY

The Commanding Officer, 253d Infantry, will maintain contact with the 4th Division elements by utilizing 63d Recon Tr."

The Commanding General also issued the following instructions:

Operations Instructions No. 33, Hq 63d Inf Div, 221345B Apr 45: 1. New Bds effective at once (overlay). 2. 253d Inf: Cont Adv to Div Obj in Z (overlay). 3. a. 254th Inf Cont present mission in Z to Div Obj. b. 1st Bn 255th Inf reverts to control parent unit upon reaching Sulzbach 35442. 4. a. 255th Inf Cont present mission to Div Obj. ... 5. 9 Etry, 353d AAA SLT Bn (-): move lights to cover entire Div Z with artificial moonlight. ...

The new boundary assigned to the 255th Infantry a zone on the right flank of the division and of the XXI Corps extending south in an area about four or five kilometers wide roughly parallel to and between north-south grid lines 53 and 57 or 58. The division objective was the area along the Rens River to the east of Schwebisch Gmund. Unter Bobingen which the 2d Battalion had already taken was excluded from the regimental zone.

Weather: rainy; visibility, fair to poor.

PRs Captured:

OFFICERS

0
0
Total 0

ENLISTED MEN

1 by 2d Bn
2 by 3d Bn
3

22 Apr 45

Status and Casualties

OFFICERS

ENLISTED MEN

	Asgd	EFF	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	EFF	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	28	25	-	-	-	784	758	-	-	-
2d Bn	31	26	-	-	-	785	736	-	-	-
3d Bn	29	22	-	-	-	775	679	-	-	-
Cn Co	4	4	-	-	-	100	99	-	-	-
AT Co	7	6	-	-	-	146	145	-	-	-
1st	21	21	-	-	-	134	126	-	-	-
3d	15	14	-	-	-	128	125	-	-	5
4th	9	9	-	-	-	114	107	-	-	-

23 April 1945

On 22 Apr the 1st Battalion 254th Infantry continued at 0500B its advance to the east of Gaildorf. It reached Sulzbach 35442 at 0901B. It was then relieved from its attachment to the 254th Infantry and moved by marching and motor to an assembly area in the vicinity of Wellbach 35384. The 2d Battalion occupied defensive positions and patrolled in the part of the division objective which it held until it was relieved of that part of the objective which was assigned from the zone of the 254th Infantry. When its relief by the 254th Infantry was completed at 2000B, the 2d Battalion moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Tattersbach 35426. The 3d Battalion occupied defensive positions until passed through by elements of the 254th Infantry. It then moved to an assembly area in the vicinity of Gaildorf 35382.

DAILY SUMMARY

The Regimental Command Post was still in Ruppertshefen S5233.

Adjacent units: The 254th Infantry on the right and the 114th Infantry on the left of the regiment both continued to attack in zone.

Weather: rainy; visibility, fair to poor.

P.W.s Captured:

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	
	0	3	by 1st Bn
	0	0	by 2d Bn
	0	0	by 3d Bn
Total	0	3	

23 Apr 45

Status and Casualties

	OFFICERS			ENLISTED MEN						
	ASGd	SWF	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	ASGd	SWF	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	23	26	-	-	-	739	733	-	4	24
2d Bn	31	26	-	-	-	775	723	-	-	-
3d Bn	29	22	-	-	2	757	699	1	-	25
Cn Co	4	4	-	-	-	100	94	-	-	-
AT Co	7	6	-	-	-	146	145	-	-	-
Hq	21	21	-	-	-	134	126	-	-	-
Sv	15	14	-	-	-	128	125	-	-	-
Tod	9	9	-	-	-	114	107	-	-	-

24 April 1945

CI 34 issued by the 63d Inf Div at 231200B stated that the 63d Inf Div was to continue to advance with all possible speed, securing crossings of the Danube River and relieving elements of the 12th Armored Division in its zone. It was to then prepare to effect a crossing of the Danube River and advance in a general S.E. direction on order. It was to maintain liaison with the left unit of the XI Corps. It was to protect the Corps right flank, it being the right flank unit of the XII Corps.

The 255th Infantry was to have the following attached units: CoB, 753d Tz Bn - 3d Plat Co D, 753d Tz Bn - Co C, 822d TD Bn.

The 255th Inf was to advance until passed through by elements of the 253d and 254th Inf at which time it was to revert to Division Reserve assembly area vic Ruppertshefen S5426. It was to prepare plans without delay for advance on Div. order in sector of 254th Infantry, completely motorized, and was to maintain liaison with the 254th Infantry, determining routes and crossings for motorized advance.

Upon receipt of CI 34 the Regimental Commander of the 255th Inf issued at 2300B CI 35 containing the following instructions to the units of his command:

The Regiment was to attack in the general direction of south and southeast with all possible speed. The Battalions were to be motorized in order from front to rear utilizing attached tanks and TDs and 2 Service Company trucks. The Battalions were to follow a "dugout" system rpt lines closely following the 63d Inf Trps. Rear

DAILY SUMMARY

Battalions were to thoroughly search areas passed through by "leap-frogging" Bns and destroy any enemy in the zone.

The order of march was to be: 2d Bn was to reconnoiter to Report Line Washington. This was a line extending from S577-187 on the left boundary of the Regimental Sector to point S537-190 on the right boundary of the Sector. The 1st Bn was to be motorized initially and reconnoiter from rpt line Washington to rpt line Polk. This line cut across the Regimental Sector from S567145 to S550133 on the right boundary. The 3d Bn was to be ready to move by motor to rpt line Polk and reconnoiter on foot to rpt line Jackson. The rpt line Jackson ran from point S550030 on the right boundary of the Regimental Sector. Regimental Hq. Co. and 1st Inf Mod Det were to follow in that order.

The respective Battalions were to have the following attachments: 2d Bn: 1 Platoon Co 1, 7334 Pk Bn - 1 Platoon C, 322d TD Bn - 1 Platoon AT Co - 1 Squad AT Line Platoon - 1 Platoon Cannon Co - 1 Platoon Co 2, 99th Chemical Mortar Bn (D/S)

1st Bn: 1 Platoon Co B, 7334 Pk Bn - 1 Platoon Co B, 7334 Pk Bn - 1 Platoon Co Co - 1 Platoon Co B, 99th Chemical Mortar Bn (D/S)

3d Bn: 1 Platoon Co 1, 7334 Pk Bn - 1 Platoon Co C, 322d TD Bn - 1 Platoon AT Co - 1 Squad AT Line Platoon - 1 Platoon Cannon Co - 1 Platoon Co 2, 99th Chemical Mortar Bn (D/S).

Attacking Bns were to report on reaching rpt lines. Each Battalion was to sweep its respective zone and be prepared to entruck for its next rpt line. In addition, reports of disposition of troops were to be submitted hourly on the quarter-hour by the fastest possible means.

The I and R was to maintain contact with elements of the 44th Inf Div and with radio accompany 33d Ren Tr Bn in Regimental Zone and maintain contact.

Captain Hominsky was to be in charge of 9 - 2 1/2 T trucks used to move Bns to rpt lines. March CP was to be in the rear of the 2d Bn in the element.

In accordance with the Regimental orders as set forth in CI 54 the 2d Bn reported crossing the L.D. in the vic of Hussenhofen S567358. This Battalion was to sweep the area on foot as far southward as the rpt line Washington before being motorized for the next phase. By 0814 the Battalion Commander reported that forward elements of Co C were in the vic of Bettringen S5523, and by 0830 E Co was moving into Bargau, S5823. A road block was encountered in the vic of Bettringen S550237, but no enemy resistance was offered. By 1230 the town of Weiler S5720 had been cleared and the Bn CP was moving in. No enemy resistance was offered, but an abandoned enemy ammunition dump was found at this point. By 1410 the Commanding Officer of the 235th Infantry Regiment was able to report to the Commanding General that all elements of the 2d Bn had reached their initial objective, the report line, Washington. This was the point where they were to be motorized and "leap-frogged" ahead of the other two Bns after they had taken their immediate objectives. During this phase of operations a number of road blocks and one mined road had been encountered, but no real resistance had been met and no real contact with the enemy had been made.

In the meantime the 1st Bn, which was located in the general vicinity north of Schmalbach Grund, A and C Co's being in the vic of Seifertshofen S533 and B Co and 1st Bn Hq in vic of Vellbach S334, was motorized as ordered. It moved by this means to the vic of Weiler S5721. It detrucked at this point and attacked on foot in its assigned zone between rpt line Washington and rpt line Polk. By 1400 this Battalion had reached the rpt line Washington without meeting enemy resistance, mountainous terrain being the greatest obstacle. By 1605 the main elements of the Battalion had progressed approximately two-thirds of the distance

BRIEF SUMMARY

to be covered by them in this phase of their operations. Still no resistance had been met, but movement was hampered by a very mountainous terrain. Fields and roads were found to be mined in the vic just north of Degenfeld S5716. At point S935173 a hangar containing 25 gliders and parts was discovered. By 1850Z the C.O. of the 255th Infantry Regiment reported that the 1st Bn had reached the polk report line. The main element of the enemy had not been located and it was becoming apparent that no stand was planned in this particular area.

At 1600Z the Regimental Commander, following Division Order as set forth in Change #1 to OI,35, issued Change #1 to OI,38 which shifted one of the boundaries of the Regimental Zone as well as that of the XXI Corps of which the 255th Inf was the right element. Beginning in the vic of 5610 and extending in a S.E. direction the right boundary line was shifted to the left on an average of two kilometers. This change cut almost in half the width of the zone to be cleared by the 255th Inf. The boundaries of the 254th Inf which was on the left flank of the 255th., remained unchanged. Likewise, the boundaries of the 253d Inf, which was to the left of the 254th, remained unchanged. This Change #1 to OI,35 also called for rapid movement in the clearing of zones to the Danube River, the seizure of any intact bridges, and the crossing of the river on Division Order.

In the meantime the 3d Bn which was in an assembly area in the vic of Wetzstein S5531, was motorized and prepared to move out as ordered. The companies loaded their troops on all available transportation and moved forward at 1510Z. Its zone was to lie between the rpt line Polk and the rpt line Jackson. By 2400 I Co had reached the report line and K Co was in Steinentkirch S6119. The zone had been covered and no enemy resistance had been met.

Towards the end of the 24 hr period, in the absence of any contact with organized elements of the enemy, the Regimental Commander, following an order from the Division Commander, ordered a modification of the original plan of operations. When the leading elements reached the vic of Ravenstein S5910 the 2d Bn was motorized and ordered to move directly to the Danube River, a distance of approximately 35 kilometers. The remainder of the Regiment was to follow by marching clearing the rear areas as it went forward. Regimental Hqs moved forward from Weisenstein S5814 at 2215Z. The 2d Bn., motorized, moved out at 2320Z. At 2400Z the 1st Bn was moving forward from the vic of Henningen S6314.

During the day's operations the Regiment moved forward by the method of "leap-frogging". Battalions a distance of almost 20 kilometers beyond the L.D. It searched the areas within the Regimental zone, much of which was wooded and mountainous terrain. Organized enemy resistance was not encountered. Road blocks were unmined and served only to delay the advance of the motorized elements.

Weather: Fair; visibility, fair to good.

Losses Captured:

1. TO 120

2. TO 120

9
10

7
22

by 2d Bn

DAILY SUMMARY

24 Apr 45

Status and Casualties

		OFFICERS					ENLISTED MEN				
		Asgd	MT	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	MT	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st	Bn	28	26	-	-	-	789	753	-	-	-
2d	Bn	31	26	-	-	-	775	723	-	-	-
3d	Bn	29	22	-	-	-	757	699	-	-	-
Cn	Co	4	4	-	-	-	100	94	-	-	-
MT	Co	7	6	-	-	-	143	145	-	-	-
Hq		21	21	-	-	-	134	126	-	-	-
Sv		15	14	-	-	-	128	125	-	-	-
Med		9	9	-	-	-	114	107	-	-	-

25 April 1945

The plan to move rapidly to the Danube River was put into operation shortly before midnight on 24 April when the 2d Bn was fully motorized and instructed to continue in this manner until the Danube was reached. This Battalion moved out from the vic of Leiszenstein S5814 at 22153 and continued S.E. within the boundaries of the Regimental zone without opposition. By 03003 it was in the vic of S6502 and still moving forward. At 07303 it had reached the small town of Zahringen S632011 and had picked up 23 prisoners of war. By 1220 this Battalion had reached point X 736930 and had taken approximately 175 prisoners without suffering a single casualty. It continued to move forward as planned meeting from this point on scattered small arms fire but no concentrated defensive stand on the part of the enemy.

At 12253 the Commanding General of the 63d Division ordered the 255th Inf Regt into an assembly area in the vic of X8090. The 2d Bn continued its attack until it reached Riedheim X8168. It then closed into the assembly area in the general vic of Langenau X7691, at 18003.

In the meantime the 1st and 3d Bns continued to sweep the rear areas. The main resistance encountered was that of road blocks, craters, and abatis. At approximately 10003 Company X apprehended 3 civilians. After interrogation by CIC one was placed under arrest because of his high position in the Nazi Party. At 1101 a Company I Patrol reported seeing enemy in S663005. Company I later attacked the group, killed 3, wounded 1, and took 144 prisoners. The enemy did not fire on our troops. By 1800 these two Battalions had completed their operations of clearing the woods within their respective areas and had moved into the Assembly Area in the vic of Langenau X7691.

At this point the 255th Inf was placed in Division Reserve. Local security was established and the Regiment began the reorganization and rehabilitation of its troops. At the close of the 24 hr period it still remained in Division Reserve.

Weather: fair, cool; visibility, fair to good.

P.S. Captured:

OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN
0	2
0	19
1	2
1	20

by 1st Bn
by 2d Bn
by 3d Bn

25 Apr 45

Status and Casualties

	<u>OFFICERS</u>					<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>				
	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>ET</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Reinf</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>ET</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>Wounded</u>	<u>Reinf</u>
1st Bn	23	26	-	-	-	789	753	-	-	-
2d Bn	31	26	-	-	-	768	721	-	-	-
3d Bn	30	23	-	-	-	757	698	-	-	-
Cn Co	4	4	-	-	-	100	94	-	-	-
AT Co	7	6	-	-	-	151	145	-	-	-
Hq	18	18	-	-	-	139	129	-	-	-
Sv	15	14	-	-	-	123	125	-	-	-
Med	9	8	-	-	-	114	109	-	-	-

26 April 1945

At the beginning of this period the 256th Inf was still in Division Reserve in the vic of Langemau X7691. The Regimental C.P. was at Langemau.

At 0300B the Regimental Commander issued Cl#39, following receipt of Division Cl#37, issued at 0200L. The 256th Inf (Reinf) was to move commencing at 0730B, to an Assembly Area in the vic of X8883. It was to cross the Danube River upon order, pass through elements of the 253d Inf and continue the attack to the S.E. in the zone with all possible speed. It was to maintain liaison with elements of the 103d Inf. Div. on the right.

The 1st Bn was to move, commencing at 0730B, to the Assembly Area in the vicinity of the Bridge X8883, cross the Danube River on order, and pass through elements of 253d Inf and continue the attack to the S.E. in the zone with all possible speed.

The 2d Bn was to move on order to Assembly Area in the vic of Bridge X8883, cross Danube River on order, and remain as Regimental Reserve initially in the vic of Gunzberg X8887.

The 3d Bn was to move, commencing at 0850, to the vic of Bridge X8888, cross the Danube River on order, and continue the attack to the S.E. in the zone with all possible speed.

For this operation Cannon Company was to be attached to the 863d PA Bn. The 1st Bn was to have the following attached elements: 1 Plat Company B, 753d Tk Bn - 1 Plat Company D, 753d Tk Bn. 1 Plat Company C 322d TD Bn - 1 Plat AT Company, 1 Squad AT Mine Plat. The 2d Bn was to have the following attachments: 1 Plat Company B, 753d Tk Bn - 1 Plat Company C, 322d TD Bn - 1 Plat AT Company - 1 Squad AT Mine Platoon. The 3d Bn was to have the following attachments: 1 Plat Company B, 753d Tk Bn - 1 Plat Company C, 322d TD Bn - 1 Plat AT Company and 1 Squad AT Mine Platoon.

The Inf. Div. was in order and to be reorganized utilizing attached tanks, tank company and service company vehicles. Again the Bns were to be "leap-frogged" in their report lines. The rear areas were to be cleared by the Bns on foot. The 1st Bn was to report on reaching report lines. Each Bn in turn was to sweep the disposition of troops and be prepared to enter for its next report line. Reports of disposition of troops are to be submitted hourly on the quarter-hour by the fastest possible means.

The 1 and 2 Platoon was to maintain contact with elements of the 103d Inf Div. It was to accompany with radio the 33d Recon elements in Regimental Zone and maintain contact. Priority of crossing the Danube was to be as follows:

DAILY SUMMARY

1st Bn - 3d Bn - Regimental Hq Co - 2d Bn - Hq Section of the Medical Detachment.

At 0730G the 1st Bn began its movement from the vic of Langenau X7691 towards the new Assembly Area north of the Danube River in the vic of Gunzburg X8888. By 0955G this Bn had arrived at assembly point and awaited further orders. At 1900G the leading elements had crossed the river and by 2040G the 1st Bn had relieved the 2d Bn 253d Inf on position in the vic just S.E. of Gunzburg. X8887. This Bn set up defensive positions and prepared to continue the attack the following morning. Company A was located in the vic X8885, Company C in the vic X8886 and Company B in the vic of X9246. The Bn S.P. was established at Reisingen X888650.

The 3d Bn, which was to follow the 1st Bn in the crossing of the Danube River started displacing forward from its old area in the vic of Langenau X7691 at 1032G. By 1800G it had reached the new Assembly Area just north of the Danube River and awaited its turn to make the river crossing. By 2115G it had completed the crossing of the river and entered its Assembly Area in the vic of Gunzburg X8787. It set up local security, established combat and security patrols, and prepared to continue the attack the following morning.

The 2d Bn, which had been the last to move out, reached the new Assembly Area north of the Danube by 1830G and prepared to cross the river. By 2200G it had completed the crossing and arrived in the vic of Gunzburg X8787 where it established security for the night and prepared to continue the attack on order.

The Regimental CP moved to Gunzburg X8787, and made preparations for the continuation of the attack at 0600G the next morning.

Weather: fair; visibility, fair to good.

PWs captured:

	OFFICERS	ENLISTED MEN	
	0	2	by 1st Bn
	0	19	by 2d Bn
	1	2	by 3d Bn
Total	1	23	

28 Apr 45

Status and Casualties

	OFFICERS					ENLISTED MEN				
	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	28	28	-	-	-	788	759	-	-	-
2d Bn	31	28	-	-	-	802	750	1	1	-
3d Bn	29	23	-	-	-	754	693	-	-	-
Hq Co	4	4	-	-	-	100	94	-	-	-
Co	7	6	-	-	-	151	145	-	-	-
Co	13	13	-	-	-	134	129	-	-	-
Co	13	14	-	-	-	128	125	-	-	-
Total	9	8	-	-	-	111	108	-	-	-

27 April 1945

At 0600G the 255th Infantry continued to advance to the S.E. encountering light and scattered small arms fire. By 2100G the units, advancing by "leap-frogging", reached and secured the bridge over the North River at Y190525. This bridge

DAILY SUMMARY

was on an east-west road which led to the Autobahn between Schwabmunchen to the northeast and Bttingen to the south. The bridge was just east of Siebnach. The troops flushed all of the rear areas. The Regiment encountered extremely congested conditions on all roads during the period, the traffic consisting chiefly of friendly armor. The 1st Bn motorized had its initially rapid advance slowed by this traffic. The other two battalions cleared the rear areas.

At the end of the period the 1st Battalion was at Brietenbron Y1271 with the 2d platoon of the 63d Ren Tr in front at Langenmufnach Y1266. The 3d Bn was near Dinkelcherben Y1176 and the 2d Battalion at X8779. The Intelligence and Reconnaissance platoon had advanced in conjunction with the elements of the reconnaissance troop.

At 06303 the Regimental Command Post at Gunsburg X8787 was closed. At 1230B the Command Post was opened at Dinkelcherben Y1176.

Adjacent troops: The 253d with one battalion motorized following the armor continued the attack, crossed the Wertach River and set up defensive positions, having encountered no resistance. The 499th Infantry continued to attack in its zone.

Weather: fair with occasional showers; visibility, fair to good.

PMs Captured:

OFFICERS

1

ENLISTED MEN

134

by 255th Inf Regt

27 Apr 45

Status and Casualties

OFFICERS

ENLISTED MEN

	Asgd	EFF	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	EFF	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	28	24	-	-	-	788	739	-	-	-
2d Bn	31	26	-	-	-	802	750	-	-	-
3d Bn	29	23	-	-	-	754	693	-	-	-
Cn Co	()	()	-	-	-	()	()	-	-	-
AT Co	()	()	-	-	-	()	()	-	-	-
Hq	(34)	(41)	-	-	-	(630)	(609)	-	-	-
AV	()	()	-	-	-	()	()	-	-	-
Inf	()	()	-	-	-	()	()	-	-	-

28 April 1945

The Regimental Commander issued the following instructions: Amendment No. 1 to OI No. 39, Hq 255th Inf, Forsthofen, Germany, 280630B April 1945: 1. 141st Inf - Rel Elms 253d Inf on pos 27-28 Apr 45 and cont atk 280700B Apr 45 to S and SE to seize Corps Obj in Z 2. 255th Inf - Cont atk to S and SE 280700B Apr 45 in Conjunction with 141st Inf. Bns will be "leap-frogged" between rpt lines. Order of attack in rpt lines: a. 1st Bn. b. 3d Bn. c. 2d Bn. 4. Atchnts a/c. 5. Atkng Bns will rpt on reaching rpt lines. Ea Bn in turn will sweep its respective Z and be prepared to entruck for its next rpt lines. 5. I and R: a. Maintain contact w/elms 103d Inf Div.

The 1st Battalion continued to attack from positions near Siebnach Y1952 at 0820B and reached the Lech River in the vicinity of Landsberg Y3344. All bridges across the river had been destroyed but the battalion found an underwater pass for the foot troops near the power plant. Company A minus one platoon was in reserve on the west side of the river, but Companies B and C pushed across the river to the east, Company B taking up positions in the northern section of town, Company C in the southern part. One platoon of Company A was assigned to guard an ammunition factory which had been captured in the vicinity of Landsberg. The battalion established defensive positions preparatory to being relieved by elements of the 142d Infantry. Upon relief late in the period the battalion moved to an assembly area near Landsberg.

The 2d Bn. moved to Regimental reserve in the vicinity of Schwab-Muhlhausen Y2549.

The 3d Battalion followed the advance of the 1st. Battalion and swept the rear areas. It encountered no enemy resistance, but enemy troops continued to give themselves up in large numbers. The battalion moved into an assembly area in Hurlock Y2951.

The Regimental Command Post was established at Forsthofen Y175560 at 0315B. In general the Command Post was a march command post, but at 1400B the Command Post was opened at Schwabmuhlhausen Y2649.

The Regimental Commander issued the following instructions: Operations Instructions No. 40, Hq 255 Inf, Schwabmuhlhausen, Germany, 282400B Apr 45: 1. 255th Inf moves by shuttling to assembly area vic WALKENTSHOFEN (1162). For details of movement see attached march table (Annex No. 1).

Annex No. 1 to Operations Instructions No. 40 specified the following: Serial No. 1: 2d Bn, AT Co, Cn Co;

Serial Commanding Officer, Lt Col Thompson; Hour head crosses IP, 290850B. Serial No. 2: 1st Bn, 3d Bn, Regtl Hq Co, Hq Sec and Det; Serial Commanding Officer, Lt Col Forde; the elements of this serial were to have the following inorganic transportation respectively: 4 - 1 1/2 T Trks, 8 - 2 1/2 T Trks, 4 - 1 1/2 T Trks, 8 - 2 1/2 T Trks; Hour head crosses IP, 291100B. Notes: (1) AT and on Co vehicles will return and pick up trs of 1st and 3d Bns. (2) Service Co vehicles with 2d Bn will return to shuttle trs of 1st and 3d Bns. (3) Two (2) minute time interval between march units. (4) Serial CO's will provide AA defense.

Adjacent units: The 253d Infantry continued to advance in zone and was relieved during the period by the 141st Infantry. The 409th Infantry continued to advance in zone.

Weather: rainy; visibility, poor.

Pws captured:

Officers	Enlisted men
0	24 by 2d Bn
2	67 by 3d Bn
Totals 2	91

	Officers	Status and casualties					Enlisted men				
		Asga	Enl	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asga	Enl	KIA	Wounded	Reinf
1st Bn	28	24	-	-	-	780	739	-	-	-	
2d Bn	31	26	-	-	-	803	746	-	-	-	
3d Bn	29	23	-	-	-	754	692	-	-	-	
on co	4	4	-	-	-	99	93	-	-	-	
AT co	7	6	-	-	-	151	145	-	-	-	
Bq	18	18	-	-	-	134	129	-	-	-	
sv	15	14	-	-	-	128	123	-	-	-	
med	9	8	-	-	-	114	108	-	-	-	
Total	141	123	-	-	-	2969	2775	-	-	-	

29 April 1945

On 29 April the 255th Infantry Regiment moved to an assembly area preparatory to a further move. The 1st Battalion, which was being relieved by elements of the 142d Infantry at the beginning of the period, continued to occupy positions in the vicinity of Landsberg Y3344 until the relief was completed at 0520B. The 142d Infantry had completed the relief of the entire regiment by 0700B. The regiment then moved by shuttling to an assembly area in the vicinity of Walkertshofen Y1162. It closed in the assembly area at 1730B.

The Regimental Commander issued the following instructions:

Operations Instructions No. 41, Hq 255th Infantry, Walkertshofen, Germany: 1. a. 63d Inf Div is reld fr atchmt to the XXI Corps and reverts to 7th Army Res 300001B Apr 45. b. 63d Inf Div (plus) rels 7th A Security Comd, and assumes comd of area as soon as practicable. 2. 255th Inf: a. Moves by mtr to assy area vic HEILBRONN (S0861). b. Regt rels 421st FA Gp in HEILBRONN (S0861) area. 3. I & R Plat will move in adv of 1st serial and post guides at necessary points. 4. Radio silence will be maintained until released by this hq. Incl: Annex No. 1: March table; Route strip Map.

Annex No. 1 to Opns Instns No. 41: March Table: Serial No. 1: Orgn: 2d Bn, Cn Co, Regtl Hq Co, Hq Sec Med Det; Serial CO Lt Col Thomson; Organic Veh: 2d Bn - 49; Cn Co - 17; Regtl Hq Co - 29; Hq Sec Med Det - 21. Inorganic Trk Asgmt: 2d Bn - Twelve - 2 1/2 T Trks; Regtl Hq Co - Four - 2 1/2 T Trks; IP and hour lead passes: 300830B. Serial No. 2: Orgn: 3d Bn, AT Co, Co "C" 363d Md Bn; Serial CO Capt Boyd; Organic Veh: 3d Bn - 49; AT Co - 21; Co "C" 363d Med Bn - 17; Inorganic Trk Asgmt: 3d Bn - Thirteen - 2 1/2 T Trks; IP and hour lead passes: 300910B. Serial No. 3: Orgn: 1st Bn, 263d Engr Bn (-); Serial CO Lt Col Forbes; Organic Veh: 1st Bn - 49; 263d Engr Bn (-) - 25; Inorganic Trk Asgmt: 1st Bn - Twenty - 2 1/2 T Trks; IP and hour lead passes: 300930B. Notes: (1) IP Overlay. Langenneufrach (Y1266). (2) 5 (five) minute time interval between MU's. (3) 10 (ten) minute interval between serials. (4) Serial Comdrs will provide AA defense. (5) Regtl Trans O will meet QM veh and deliver them to Bns. (6) March units limited to 25 (twenty-five) veh. 5(five) IU per serial. (7) Tops may be put up on all except AA veh. (8) 60-yd interval between veh. (9) Rate of march - 20 MPH. (10) Control of mvmt: Location: Gunzburg Bridge, Arrival Time: 0950, Clearance Time: 1320. (11) All veh will be marked, front and rear, with convoy No. C-38, serial

Regimental History, 29 Apr 45 (contd)

and march unit as follows: C-38/1/3 is Convoy No. C-38, 1st Serial, 3d March Unit.

Route: Thannhausen, Scheppach, Gunzburg, Niederstolzlingen, Bisingen, Heidenheim, Aalen, Ellwangen, Sch-Hall, Neuenstein, Neunstadt, Heilbronn.

Weather: fair; visibility, good.

PWs Captured: None reported.

Status and Casualties

No report submitted -
Regiment on move to reserve area.

30 April 1945

On 30 April 1945 the 255th Infantry moved by motor from an assembly area in the vicinity of Walkertshofen Y1162 to assembly areas around Heilbronn S0861. The 1st Battalion was in the vicinity of Bad Wimpfen S0370, the 2d Battalion in the vicinity of Ohringen S2768, and the 3d Battalion in the vicinity of Heilbronn S0861. The regiment was prepared to relieve the 421st Field Artillery Group.

The Regimental Command Post was established at Mosbach S0284 at 0000B.

Weather: Intermittent rain and snow; visibility, poor.

PWs Captured: None reported.

30 April 45

Status and Casualties

Officers						Enlisted Men					
	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	Asgd	Eff	KIA	Wounded	Reinf	
1st Bn	28	24	-	-	-	786	739	-	-	-	
2d Bn	31	26	-	-	-	796	741	-	-	-	
3d Bn	28	22	-	-	-	758	678	-	-	-	
Co	4	4	-	-	-	99	93	-	-	-	
AT Co	7	6	-	-	-	151	145	-	-	-	
Hq Co	18	18	-	-	-	135	130	-	-	-	
Sv Co	15	14	-	-	-	128	123	-	-	-	
Med	9	9	-	-	-	118	111	-	-	-	
Totals	140	123	-	-	-	2971	2760	-	-	-	